564.804

LONDON BOROUGH OF LEWISHAM
LIBRARY SERVICE

Author

Title

BOOK STORE

Books or discs must be returned on or before the last date stamped on label or on card in book pocket. Books or discs can be renewed by telephone, letter or personal call unless required by another reader. After library hours use the Ansafone Service (01-698 7347). For hours of opening and charges see notices at the above branch, but note that all lending departments close at 1 pm on Wednesday and all libraries are closed on Sundays, Good Friday, Christmas Day, Bank Holidays

METROPOLITAN
SPECIAL COLLECTION

SHOREDITCH
PUBLIC
LIBRARIES

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF CHESTERFIELD AND NEWCASTLE 1744–46

942·072
CHE

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF CHESTERFIELD AND NEWCASTLE

1744-46

PART I CHESTERFIELD AT THE HAGUE
PART II CHESTERFIELD AT DUBLIN

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

SIR RICHARD LODGE, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.
PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
HONORARY FELLOW OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD

LONDON
OFFICES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
22 RUSSELL SQUARE, W.C.1
1930

WITHDRAWN FROM STOCK

Ref. 6

8599

942.072

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

SHOR.

PREFACE

SEVERAL of the letters in this volume, and especially some of those from Dublin, have been quoted or referred to by the rather numerous biographers of Chesterfield. But no one of these biographers seems to have had sufficient knowledge of or interest in European history to appreciate their full value. I read them in the Newcastle Papers when I was preparing my Ford Lectures on *Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century*, and again before I wrote my *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy*. On both occasions I was much impressed with their importance. While they throw a great deal of light upon domestic events and party relations, they supply an invaluable commentary upon our foreign policy during the period that they cover. Only one of the letters has been included in Mr. Bradshaw's edition of *Chesterfield's Letters*, which is the fullest that we as yet possess. It is understood that a new and far more complete edition is contemplated, and in such an edition many of these letters may well appear. But Chesterfield's letters alone are comparatively valueless to the historian without those of Newcastle, to which they are in the main critical replies. Also Newcastle himself is a historical personage of no inconsiderable prominence, and his letters are more informative than those of his more sparkling correspondent. In the confident belief that the whole series will prove as useful to future students as it has been to myself, I offered to edit the letters for the Royal Historical Society, and I am grateful to the Society for having accepted the offer.

I have carried my Introduction a little further than the letters—down to the time when Chesterfield took over the Secretaryship of State and became Newcastle's colleague. I have done this, partly because the strange alliance of the two men was the product of their previous correspondence, and partly because their association in office raises questions of great personal interest and of serious constitutional import.

RICHARD LODGE.

February, 1930.

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION :

PART I ix

PART II xxiii

CORRESPONDENCE :

PART I 3

PART II 61

APPENDIX A. LETTER FROM FREDERICK II TO ANDRIÉ . . . 141

APPENDIX B. LETTERS OF NEWCASTLE TO THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND AND STEPHEN POYNTZ 143

APPENDIX C. LETTER OF NEWCASTLE TO LORD HARDWICKE . 146

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES

INTRODUCTION

PART I

DECEMBER 1744 TO MAY 1745

IN 1744 European affairs were in a curious tangle. Great Britain was involved in three overlapping wars. The first was a maritime war with Spain which had begun in 1739 as a result of disputes about sailing and trading rights in western seas. The second was a continental war with Spain which arose when Philip V advanced claims to the Austrian succession and Elizabeth Farnese set herself under cover of these claims to carve out a principality in Lombardy for her second son, Don Philip. This second war had rather thrust the earlier one into the background, but the mercantile quarrel continued, and Spain had strengthened her position in both wars by obtaining in the treaty of Fontainebleau (25 October 1743) the active French alliance which Fleury had refused as long as he lived. The third and most important war was with France, which was not formally declared by either power till the spring of 1744. Before that the two powers had come into collision as auxiliaries of rival claimants to the Austrian succession. Great Britain, as pledged by the Vienna treaty of 1731, had supported Maria Theresa; while France, equally pleading treaty obligations, had taken up the cause of Charles Albert of Bavaria, who also owed to French support his election to the imperial dignity as Charles VII.

By 1744 the force of circumstances had transformed the two auxiliary powers into principal belligerents. This was largely the result of the policy of Carteret. At the outset of the war the startling activity of Frederick II of Prussia, fighting in his own interests, had given to France and the French claimant an apparently overwhelming superiority. Franco-Bavarian successes in

Bohemia, combined with ill-success in the naval war with Spain, had so strengthened the opposition in the British parliament that Robert Walpole had been compelled to resign in February 1742. His colleagues, however, remained in office, and sought reinforcement by bringing Carteret with a few other malcontent Whigs into the cabinet. Although Carteret was not Premier, but only Secretary of State for the northern department, he gained the confidence of George II and became the dominant minister. His policy was a return to the orthodox Whig traditions as bequeathed from the reigns of William III and Anne, traditions which had been largely discarded by Stanhope and Townshend, and very half-heartedly maintained by Walpole since 1730. His supreme aim was to organise a new Grand Alliance against the two branches of the house of Bourbon, and to eliminate every dispute which might distract the efforts of belligerents from this fundamental purpose. To do this he did not hesitate to exact serious sacrifices from Maria Theresa. By the treaty of Breslau she had to resign the greater part of Silesia to the detested King of Prussia, and by the treaty of Worms in the following year she ceded valuable portions of the Milanese to the King of Sardinia. For these extremely distasteful sacrifices she expected compensation, and Carteret encouraged her expectation.

In the first six months of 1744 it seemed as if these expectations were to be fulfilled. The neutrality of Prussia after the treaty of Breslau had left the French fatally isolated in a distant scene of war, and they had been forced to evacuate first Bohemia and later Bavaria. Maria Theresa was crowned in the kingdom which she had so nearly lost, and the Bavarian Emperor, who had ventured to dispute her claim, was driven into exile from his own hereditary dominions. The Austrian army in Germany was now free to co-operate with the troops of the maritime powers in an invasion of Alsace and Lorraine and in the recovery of these *avulsa membra Imperii*. At the same time the Sardinian alliance seemed to secure the Milanese, and the Austrian troops in Italy might safely devote their efforts to the expulsion of Don Carlos from the kingdom of Naples. Out of these actual and prospective conquests, Bavaria, Alsace, Lorraine, and Naples, it would be possible to carve an ample *dédommagement* for the losses incurred by the treaties of Breslau and Worms. And the unfortunate Charles VII, when his Bourbon patrons had been humiliated and rendered

impotent, could hardly retain the imperial dignity, which would perforce return to the Austrian house with which it had been associated for three centuries.

The disappointment of these confident hopes was brought about by one of those sudden reversals of fortune which give to the war of the Austrian succession its dramatic character. Frederick of Prussia came to the decision that he could not safely allow England under the guidance of George II and Carteret, and Austria under the revengeful Maria Theresa, to gain the upper hand in Europe. He knew that Hanover resented the elevation of Prussia, that the Dutch desired the reduction of a too powerful neighbour, and that Maria Theresa would never be satisfied with any supposed equivalent as long as there was a chance of recovering Silesia. Taking as a pretext the ill-treatment of the Emperor and the retention of Bavaria, he renewed his alliance with France, joined the League of Frankfort, and in August 1744 threw his reorganised army by way of Saxony into an undefended Bohemia. This sudden move on Frederick's part, which he had concealed till the last moment, dealt a death-blow to Carteret's schemes and also to Carteret's tenure of office. The Austrian army had to evacuate Alsace and embark on a hasty eastward march for the recovery of Bohemia. In Bavaria only a few garrisons were left, and Charles VII with French auxiliaries returned to Munich. The Austrian advance upon Naples ended in a fiasco. All the prospective gains were gone, and only the losses and the possibility of further losses remained. Maria Theresa found some consolation when Charles of Lorraine and Traun, aided by the loyalty of the natives and by auxiliary forces from Saxony, compelled Frederick to evacuate Bohemia. But there was no consolation for the maritime powers, who were left to face the certainty that France, now that her eastern frontier was once more secure, would be free to resume the invasion of the Netherlands, and the possibility that she would paralyse England by stirring up a rising of the Jacobites and by sending an army to their aid. The powerful peace party in Holland, which had been quiescent as long as success seemed in sight, began to agitate for a settlement which should secure their threatened Barrier. And in England discontent took the characteristic form of demanding a change in the ministry.

The partial coalition of 1742 had never been more than half-hearted. It had not been very stable when it seemed to be success-

ful, and it collapsed when confronted with imminent failure. The two sections were as distinct as before their junction, and one or the other must serve as a scapegoat. On the one hand was Carteret, now Earl Granville, with a minority in the cabinet, with scanty parliamentary support, but with the whole-hearted backing of the King. On the other were the Pelhams and Lord Hardwicke, with a substantial body of supporters in both houses, with the unobtrusive but very real influence of Lord Orford in their favour behind the scenes, and with that control of patronage which enabled them to purchase further support. There was never any real doubt as to the issue. Granville might plead that his policy had been thwarted by his jealous colleagues, but he was not likely to find many to listen to his complaints. The opposition leaders had for the last two years directed their fulminations against Carteret, and could not with any rag of consistency rally to his support. George II could not carry on the war without parliamentary grants, and could only obtain them through the Pelhams. Granville with his small band of followers had to quit office, and in December 1744 a second and more extensive coalition was formed which included not only Whig malcontents like Chesterfield, Devonshire, Bedford, and the Cobham patriots, but also the leader of the Hanover Tories, Lord Gower, and for a time the most active Tory in the House of Commons, Sir John Hynde Cotton. Chesterfield's diplomatic talents were strained to the utmost to bring these acrimonious critics of the war and its conduct into alliance with the men who had been concerned with that conduct from the very outset of the war. The formula which served to unite them was that a strenuous last campaign must be fought in order to force France to consent to a moderate peace.

The only strength of this ill-cemented ministry, known in contemporary jargon as "the Broad-Bottom", lay in its command of a secure parliamentary majority as long as it held together. Its obvious weakness was the probability that the adoption of any definite line of policy would reveal fissures in the Cabinet, and the certainty that the King, who detested both the composition of the ministry and the way in which it had been forced upon him, would welcome any sign of disunion as justifying a recall of Granville. Meanwhile, especially after the death of Lord Orford in March 1745, he snubbed and humiliated his ministers as much as he dared, and kept in constant touch with Lord Granville behind

their backs. In these circumstances the old ministers had to walk very warily. Vital problems of foreign policy, which were the most likely to give rise to discord, were kept as far as possible to an inner circle of four, *viz.* Henry Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, and the two Secretaries of State, the Duke of Newcastle, who had held the southern department since 1723, and Lord Harrington, who took over from Granville the northern department, which he had held before from 1730 to 1742. The only new minister admitted to their complete confidence was Chesterfield, who was trusted to maintain the ministry which he had helped to form, and who was expected to be as ductile in office as he had been uncompromising in opposition.[1] But Chesterfield could not be admitted to the inner Cabinet. He shared with Pitt the bitterest hostility on the part of George II, who could not forgive their denunciations of his Electorate. Pitt had to go without office altogether, and to be content with an assurance of promotion as soon as the royal objection could be overcome. Chesterfield had to take the post of Viceroy in Ireland, which would remove all occasion for intimate contact with the King.

The strenuous campaign by which it was hoped to end the war must obviously be fought in the Netherlands. Austria, as the sovereign power, the Dutch, as occupants of the barrier fortresses, and England, by long-established interest and tradition, were bound to defend these provinces against French aggression. But, unfortunately for the allies, two of them had distractions elsewhere. Maria Theresa was at war with Prussia, and considered her primary task to be the defence of the recovered Bohemia, and if possible the re-conquest of Silesia. France, with an ally in the Elector Palatine, threatened Western Germany as well as the Netherlands, and this compelled the maintenance of an allied army on the Rhine to cover the ecclesiastical electorates and to guard against a possible French invasion of Hanover. George II, more interested in the defence of Hanover than in that of the Netherlands, wished to transfer his Hanoverian troops from Flanders

[1] On the preference given by the Pelhams to Chesterfield see a letter from Stephen Poyntz to Trevor in the *Trevor Papers* (Hist. MSS. Commission), p. 110. "I have the pleasure to assure you that the most open and hearty one amongst them [the newcomers to the ministry], and he in whom Mr. Pelham places the chief confidence, is my old friend Lord Chesterfield."

to the Rhine. Finally, in view of the Jacobite danger and of a possible French invasion, Great Britain could not venture to denude itself of native troops. For all these reasons it appeared that Austria and England would have to diminish rather than to increase their forces in the Netherlands, and thus a disproportionate share in the burden of their defence would have to be shouldered by the Dutch.

This was regarded by the ministers at Whitehall as their most difficult and most pressing problem. The republic of the United Provinces was at once the weakest and the least trustworthy member of the anti-Bourbon coalition. Since the treaty of Utrecht the Dutch had not been engaged in war, and their military, naval, and financial administration had become wofully inefficient. In the present war they had resolutely refused to take any part except as auxiliaries, and they had clung to the profits of a technical neutrality. They had a crazy federal constitution, and the state was distracted by party differences. The extreme republicans disapproved of the war altogether, partly through a traditional leaning towards France, and partly through a justified fear that the war might lead to a rising of the Orange party and the restoration of a Stadholder. Every measure for the increase either of armed forces or of pecuniary subsidies had to be carried through against strenuous opposition, first in the Secret Committee, which had the initiative in foreign affairs, then in the States-General, and finally in the Provincial Estates. England had always to face the imminent danger that, if the Dutch thought themselves deserted or unfairly treated by their allies, they would make their own terms with France, and " the maritime powers " would cease to be a unit in European politics as they had been since the reign of William III. The severance of this tie would be a mortal blow to the Whig " system " of foreign policy.

In these circumstances it was no easy task to induce the Dutch to make exceptional efforts and to give consistency to the conduct of the campaign by accepting a commander-in-chief of the whole allied forces. England had an experienced and trusted representative at The Hague in the person of Robert Trevor, who had gone out with Horatio Walpole in 1734, and had remained as envoy after his patron's departure.[1] But Trevor was not considered

[1] The valuable Trevor Papers have been published by the Hist. MSS. Commission (14th Report, App. Part ix. *Buckinghamshire Papers*).

to possess either the rank or the impressive personality necessary to deal with the present situation. And so it was decided that Chesterfield, before taking up his official duties in Ireland, should proceed on a special embassy to The Hague, not to supersede Trevor but to co-operate with him.[1] The choice was an obvious one. Chesterfield had the rank to which so much importance was attached in the eighteenth century, his diplomatic skill and tact were unquestioned, his previous embassy had given him an intimate knowledge of political and social conditions in Holland, and he had maintained friendly relations with the leading Dutch politicians. George II could offer no stubborn opposition to an employment which kept his enemy at a distance. But the strained relations between the King and his ambassador gave rise to one difficulty. It was customary for an ambassador to supplement his office letters to his particular secretary of state, in this case Harrington, by private letters in which he was allowed greater freedom of comment and suggestion. The King, of course, knew this custom, and frequently asked to see these private letters. Obviously Chesterfield could not write really confidential letters if there was a chance of their submission to royal scrutiny. It was therefore arranged that his private letters should be written, not to Harrington, but to the two Pelhams.[2] As Newcastle was more directly concerned with foreign affairs than his brother, the more important and numerous letters went to him. Newcastle, who aspired after Carteret's fall to get the control of foreign policy into his own hands and to reduce his fellow-secretary from a colleague to a subordinate, desired to keep these letters to himself, or to disclose them only to his brother and Lord Hardwicke. But Chesterfield, who had no desire to be involved in an intrigue against his official superior, insisted upon the communication of all his letters to Harrington, and Newcastle had to postpone his attempt to interfere in his colleague's department until circumstances should be more favourable.[3]

Chesterfield arrived at The Hague on 2 February 1745, and he remained there till 19 May. The letters which passed between

[1] For Chesterfield's instructions, dated 9 January 1745, see B.M. Add. MSS. 35, 434, fo. 2. They are not in the Dutch State Papers.

[2] It should be noted that Trevor had also carried on a private correspondence with the Pelhams when Carteret was his official superior. He continued to do so when Harrington succeeded Carteret.

[3] For Newcastle's schemes and his subsequent realization of them see Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 158–9, 215.

him and Newcastle in this period have been preserved in the Newcastle Papers (British Museum, Add. MSS., 32, 704 and 32, 804). Chesterfield's letters are all written in his own clear and legible script. Newcastle's letters are copies in the beautiful handwriting of his secretary, Andrew Stone.[1] So far as the letters deal with the primary object of Chesterfield's mission, his negotiation with the Dutch, they are a valuable commentary on his office letters to Harrington, most of them written jointly with Trevor, which may be read in the State Papers (Holland) at the Record Office (vols. 408, 409 and 410). Chesterfield was so far successful in his mission that he obtained (without difficulty) the acceptance of a commander-in-chief, and (after a great deal of trouble) an agreement on 30 March as to the forces which the three powers were to put into the field in Flanders and as to the relative contributions of the two maritime powers to future subsidies.

The question of the command was the earliest to be settled. The first request of the maritime powers was for Charles of Lorraine, whose success in ousting the Prussians from Bohemia had given him a military reputation which proved to be undeserved. Maria Theresa, however, refused to part with her brother-in-law, for whom she destined more laurels in her war against Prussia. She offered to send Marshal Königsegg, whom Chesterfield and the Dutch were willing to accept in spite of his age and frailty. But George II revived his contention that British troops could not serve under a foreign general, which he had been willing to waive in favour of Prince Charles. Neither Wade nor Stair, the two alternative British generals, was acceptable to the Dutch, though they preferred Stair to Wade, and in the end it was decided in London to pass over both in favour of the King's second son, the Duke of Cumberland. The Dutch welcomed Cumberland's appointment, as a pledge of English earnestness in the campaign, and Königsegg magnanimously declared himself willing to accept " such an illustrious Principal ".[2] In the end it was agreed that Cumberland should have the command with Königsegg *ad latus*. Under them the Prince of Waldeck was appointed to command the Dutch

[1] Stone continued to act as Newcastle's private secretary, and it was in that capacity that he wrote the letters to Chesterfield in this volume. But he also held since 1734 an official position in the Foreign Office as Under Secretary in the Southern Department. There is a fairly full account of his career in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

[2] Chesterfield and Trevor to Harrington, 12 March 1744 (S.P. For. Holland, 409, fo. 22).

troops, to the disgust of the veteran Dutch generals, and to the disappointment of the Orange partisans, who wished the post to be assigned to Prince William.

Chesterfield was also successful in inducing the Dutch to promise 60,000 men in the field, a larger number than had been considered possible. But for this paper promise, as he himself admitted, he had to pay a very considerable price. He was an acute and clever rather than a strong man, and he was very apt to take his colour from his immediate associates at the time. But, even if he had been more resolute, he could hardly have made better terms. For the campaign in the Netherlands the Dutch were indispensable, and they knew it. Their active participation in the war could only be obtained on their own terms, and if those were refused there was always the insinuation that France would be only too glad to detach them from the English alliance. Chesterfield was well aware that he was at a great disadvantage when it came to bargaining, and found it necessary to send Trevor to London to represent the difficulties of the situation. The Dutch insisted upon the withdrawal of half the naval force which they were bound by treaty to furnish; upon the raising of the British contingent to 40,000 men; upon the retention of the 8,000 Hanoverians in Flanders until an equal number could be supplied from Denmark or elsewhere; upon the sending of another contingent from Hanover in the pay of the elector; upon the hiring of troops from the elector of Cologne; upon the acceptance of the principle that the troops on the Rhine and those in Flanders were parts of one army, so that the former could be called upon in case of need to defend the Netherlands; and upon the cutting down of their contribution to future subsidies from a third to a quarter. All these demands had to be more or less willingly conceded, and in the end Chesterfield, before his departure, saw the inadequacy of his agreement demonstrated when Marshal Saxe defeated the army of Cumberland and Königsegg at Fontenoy (11 May 1745).

The main interest of the letters, however, lies, not in their account of the rather squalid negotiations at The Hague,[1] but in their full and frank references to the domestic affairs of England and to the major problems which were agitating Europe. They throw a flood of light upon the awkward position in which ministers were placed by the obstinate and unconcealed disapproval of the King. Chester-

[1] The best account of Dutch politics at this time is to be found in Dr. P. Geyl's *Willem IV en Engeland tot* 1748.

field, at a safe distance from the court, was always urging that his colleagues should utilise their ascendancy in parliament to force the King's hand and to humiliate Granville and his associates. Newcastle, nearer to the storm centre, was more cautious and less bellicose, and the expedient of simultaneous resignation was not tried till a year later. Another disclosure is as to the difficulties created by the coalition. The old Whig phalanx disliked the calling in of Tories, and the majority of the Tories resented (as Johnson revealed in his *Dictionary*) what they regarded as Gower's desertion to the Whigs. These troubles were reported by Newcastle to Chesterfield in the hope that the latter would use his influence to keep the recent recruits within their new fold.

As to continental affairs, the whole situation had been changed by an event of the first magnitude that occurred after Chesterfield had received his instructions but before his arrival at The Hague. On 20 January 1745 the Emperor Charles VII died at Munich, and his electorate with all his futile claims devolved upon his son, Maximilian Joseph, who had not yet completed his eighteenth year. This event deprived Frederick of his avowed pretext for resuming his war with Austria, it took away most of the reasons for French intervention in Germany, and it virtually dissolved the League of Frankfort. It opened to Maria Theresa the attractive prospect of recovering the Bohemian vote, disallowed in 1742, and of restoring the seat of the Empire to Vienna by securing the election of her husband, the Grand Duke of Tuscany. On this enterprise and on the recovery of Silesia she concentrated all her attention during the following months, with disastrous results in the Netherlands and in Italy. Meanwhile France, unwilling to surrender the one advantage which she had gained by her intervention in the war, determined by a bold stroke to avert the election of the former ruler of Lorraine and to deprive Maria Theresa of her most important ally, Augustus III King of Poland and Elector of Saxony. French envoys were sent to Dresden to offer to raise Augustus to the imperial throne, and little doubt was entertained at Versailles that the golden bait would prove irresistible to the indolent king and to his ambitious minister, Count Brühl. Frederick of Prussia, the most powerful elector, was called upon to support the Saxon candidature, and the French army on the Rhine was held in readiness to apply the necessary coercion or intimidation when the electoral body should meet at Frankfort. Frederick was

in a quandary. He had no desire to aggrandise the elector of Saxony, whom he both despised and detested, but he could not afford to alienate France as long as his war with Austria continued. On the other hand, he had a shrewd idea that, by selling his vote to the Grand Duke, he might put an end to a now purposeless war, obtain a new guarantee of Silesia, and perhaps in addition *un bon morceau* of Bohemia. To gain these ends he must rely, as he had relied in 1742, upon the mediation of England. As soon as he was assured of the Emperor's death he ordered Andrié, his minister in London, to make overtures to the English ministers on these terms.[1] It was assumed at Whitehall that the demand for *un bon morceau* was put forward merely for bargaining purposes, and that Frederick would be content with a mere renewal of the treaty of Breslau.

In any circumstances the vacancy in the Empire would have caused a sensation in London and The Hague, but the almost simultaneous overture from Prussia gave it peculiar importance. The double problem was of puzzling complexity. It was generally admitted that the return of the imperial dignity to the house of Austria was to be desired in the interests of the maritime powers. Equally admitted was the necessity of excluding a candidate who might owe his election to France. These ends could be obtained by the election of the Grand Duke, and George II, with Granville whispering in his ear, had no hesitation as to the need of supporting him. The King, indeed, went so far as to declare that the election was a purely German affair, and that neither English nor Dutch ministers were entitled to meddle with it. This contention, which marks the extreme limit of Hanoverian pretensions, was not accepted in either London or The Hague. But in neither capital was there any clear notion as to the best course to be pursued. There was a general impression, shared by Chesterfield and the Pensionary of Holland, that the Grand Duke was an unpopular and indeed an impossible candidate, that he had no dominion of his own in Germany, and that, if his wife died first, he would be a ludicrous and a pauper Emperor. To back him would be backing a certain loser. It was equally held by the same observers that the Elector of Saxony, however modestly he might conceal it, was really eager for the Empire, and that the only question for

[1] The letters to Andrié of 26 and 27 January 1745 are in Frederick's *Politische Correspondenz*, iv. pp. 21, 23, and 27. See also Lodge, *Relations of Great Britain and Prussia*, p. 55.

him was at whose hands he should receive it. If it was conferred by France, while the allies gave futile support to the Grand Duke, the inevitable result would be that he would become a French puppet, and that the irresistible coalition of 1741 would be re-formed. Their major premise was that the alliance between Austria and Saxony must be maintained at all costs, and they drew from it the conclusion that the allies should offer the Imperial dignity to Augustus III, on condition that the Archduke Joseph, only three years old, should at the same time be elected King of the Romans. This would secure the eventual restoration of the Empire to the Austrian house, without any of the dangers involved in supporting the candidature of the Archduke's father. The Dutch would have liked to commit England to this expedient and Chesterfield was inclined to agree with them. The English ministers, however, afraid of alienating both Maria Theresa and George II, and in constant fear of a return of Granville to office, gave him no such instructions, and he dared not go so far on his own account. But he did not conceal his opinion even in his official dispatches to Harrington, though he was far more outspoken in his letters to Newcastle.

The Prussian overture presented almost equal difficulties. George II had strong Hanoverian prejudices against his nephew, and desired to see his power reduced. So did the Dutch, for reasons of their own. And the English ministers were partially committed by the anti-Prussian measures initiated by Carteret before his downfall. The wanton breach of the treaty of Breslau by the invasion of Bohemia was regarded by Carteret as an insult as well as a mortal injury to England. The guarantee of Silesia that had been given in 1742 was held to be nullified by Frederick's own action. To punish the Prussian King for his unprovoked intervention Carteret set himself to form a quadruple alliance which should include Austria, Saxony, and the two maritime powers. He had reason to believe that it might be possible to expand this into a quintuple alliance by securing the adhesion of Russia, where the Tsaritsa was believed to be willing to make up her old quarrel with Maria Theresa. The negotiations for these purposes had gone too far to be broken off by Carteret's retirement from office. On 8 January 1745 the quadruple alliance was signed at Warsaw. The two English ministers at St. Petersburg, Lords Tyrawly and Hyndford, were instructed to continue their negotiations with the

Russian Chancellor, Alexis Bestuzhev. Although the first pecuniary demands of Russia were rejected as exorbitant, the two maritime powers set themselves to draft a more acceptable treaty at The Hague, which was sent off on 10 March.[1] The Dutch agreed to pay a fourth of the necessary subsidy, and to send an ambassador, de Dieu, supposed to be a *persona grata* at the Russian court, to co-operate with Hyndford, who became the sole English ambassador on the departure of Tyrawly. Although the avowed object of the quadruple alliance and its proposed extension was the defence of Bohemia, it was notorious that the subsidies of the English and Dutch would be employed by Austria and Saxony in the re-conquest of Silesia and possibly in the dismemberment of the electorate of Brandenburg, though the full extent of the prospective dismemberment could not be determined until the two active powers had agreed as to how the bear's skin should be divided after the animal had been killed. The peace overture from Berlin cut right across all such designs. At the same time came the news that Frederick had spiked his enemy's guns at St. Petersburg by a flattering invitation to the Tsaritsa to terminate the war as mediator. If Russian aid was not forthcoming, it might be well to make some use of the Prussian overture. From one point of view it was not unattractive. If Maria Theresa could be induced to accept it, and England, as the paymaster, claimed some right of dictation, she would once more be free, as in 1743, to concentrate her whole forces against the house of Bourbon. On the other hand it could be argued that Frederick was not to be trusted, that he had broken one treaty and would as easily break another, that the overture was a sign of weakness, and that it might be safer in the end that he should be reduced to impotence, a consummation that would equally set free the Austrian forces, while these would at the same time be immensely increased. The elimination of Prussia from its newly-won position among the great powers would be a disaster of the first magnitude to France, and would force that state to make a humble peace. Between the two alternative methods of getting rid of the Prussian bugbear, by conciliation or by humiliation, neither Newcastle nor Chesterfield could see their way to a

[1] The draft treaty, which was never concluded, is in S.P. For. Holland, 408, fo. 256. The covering letter of Chesterfield and Trevor to Tyrawly and Hyndford is in *ibid.* 409, fo. 22. They anticipate failure "from the mediation so hastily offered and so strongly pressed by your Court".

decided course. The tacit decision of the English ministers was to wait upon events. If Austria and Saxony came to an agreement (as they did in May), and if their invasion of Silesia was successful (as Chesterfield seems to have expected), then the league of Warsaw would be justified and Prussia would cease to trouble Europe. If on the other hand they failed to agree, or if the invasion was unsuccessful (as it was), then it would be necessary to fall back upon the renewal of the treaty of Breslau. Meanwhile they put off Frederick with evasive but conciliatory answers.[1]

All these intricate problems are discussed in these letters with outspoken frankness on the part of Chesterfield, but with greater caution by Newcastle. In view of the posthumous estimate of the two men, it is not a little interesting to note that nearly all Chesterfield's confident forecasts proved to be wrong, and that Newcastle displays a far more extensive and accurate insight into the affairs of Europe. Macaulay, following Horace Walpole, has laid so much stress upon Newcastle's unquestionable weaknesses and foibles, that we are apt to forget his unremitting industry and the familiarity with continental politics and politicians which he acquired in his prolonged tenure of office. To what extent the real ability and judgment which he occasionally displays were due to his *fidus Achates*, Andrew Stone, is as insoluble a problem as the relations of Cardinal Richelieu with Father Joseph.

It must be noted that the letters written from England are all dated in the old style, whereas Chesterfield's letters from The Hague use the new style, which had been adopted in most continental states. The new style was not introduced into England until 1752, when the bill for that purpose was moved by Chesterfield in the House of Lords. It is the only legislative measure with which his name is associated. The letters have been arranged in chronological order, which has not always been strictly adhered to in the binding up of the Newcastle Papers. As Chesterfield's letters are autographs, and he himself has a deserved literary reputation, his spelling and other peculiarities, other than punctuation, have been carefully followed. This has not been thought necessary in the case of Newcastle's letters, which are in this part all copies.

[1] Frederick sent full powers to Andrié on 19 February (*Pol. Corr.* iv. p. 56). For the suspicions excited by the English delay see *ibid.* pp. 81, 126, 152, 168, 203, 207–9, 214, 240.

INTRODUCTION

PART II

AUGUST 1745 TO OCTOBER 1746

AFTER his return from The Hague in May 1745 Chesterfield spent the next three months in England. As the King was away in Hanover, there was no difficulty about admitting him to the ministerial circle, and he virtually filled Harrington's place in the inner Cabinet during the summer. It was a gloomy period for England—"the most disagreeable summer that I have ever spent in my life," said Hardwicke.[1] After Fontenoy all resistance to Marshal Saxe's army in the open field was impossible. The fall of Tournay, which was the first result of the battle, was followed by a series of successful sieges, which destroyed the Dutch barrier and gave the French effective occupation of Flanders. The terrified Dutch insisted that the maritime powers should come to some joint accommodation with France, and, if England refused, made no secret of their resolve to seek their own safety in a separate treaty. The news from Italy, though less immediately alarming, was not more cheerful. A treaty with the Genoese, alienated by the designs of Sardinia to gain a port on their Riviera (Finale), enabled a mixed army of French and Spaniards—"the Gallispans," as contemporaries called them—to find a safe passage along the coast into Piedmont, from which they had previously been barred by the difficulty of forcing the Alpine passes. The arrival of this army turned the balance in Italy in favour of the Bourbon powers. Maria Theresa, immersed in her Silesian campaigns, and in guarding the imperial election, would send no more

[1] Hardwicke to Joseph Yorke, 23 August 1745, printed in Yorke, *Life of Hardwicke*, I. p. 439.

troops into Italy, and Charles Emmanuel had always declared that, if Austria failed to defend Lombardy, he would be compelled to come to terms with France rather than submit to the tender mercies of Spain. If Sardinia and the United Provinces both fell away, there would be an end to all hope of a revived Grand Alliance. In such circumstances any treaty with France would be a humiliating one, and a discreditable peace would be ruinous to ministers who had insisted on the dismissal of Granville on the ground that he had shown himself incompetent to carry the war to a successful issue.

Gloomy as the outlook was, there were one or two gleams of brightness. The concentration of French forces in the Netherlands forced them to relax their grip upon western Germany. In the course of the summer it became certain that Augustus III would refuse to become a candidate for the imperial crown, and that Maria Theresa's husband, in defiance of France and Prussia, was assured of a majority of electoral votes. His election would deprive France of her most conspicuous gain, and the consequent humiliation of that power would, in the eyes of Granville and other observers, be more than a set-off against French triumphs in Flanders. And in July England gained one of those colonial successes which had been confidently looked for, but hitherto in vain, since the outbreak of the maritime war with Spain. A body of colonial troops from New England under Colonel Pepperell, aided by a naval squadron under Commodore Warren, captured Louisbourg, the fortified capital of Cape Breton, and made themselves masters of the island which commanded the mouth of the St. Lawrence. This capture, opening the prospect of further conquests in Canada, was greeted with intense jubilation in England.[1] But the English ministers, however gratified by an unexpected success, were uneasily conscious that it increased rather than diminished their difficulties. Some sort of patched up peace

[1] An intercepted dispatch from Zöhrern (left in charge of the Austrian legation when Wasner followed the King to Hanover) of 13 July N.S. 1745 shows the importance of this event. He expresses the hope that the news about Cape Breton is true, "in order to raise the spirits of the people, that have been quite dejected by the late bad news, particularly from Flanders, and by the behaviour of the Dutch there, insomuch that, unless something considerable be performed by Marshal Traun's army, on which all their hopes are now placed and the election of an Emperor depends, a change of measures is to be feared here." P.R.O. S.P. For. Confidential, 62.

with France seemed almost inevitable. France, however, with seemingly secure predominance in the Netherlands and in Italy, would insist in any treaty upon the recovery of Cape Breton. The Dutch, too, would never tolerate any suggestion that England should purchase the retention of Cape Breton by allowing France to retain some of her conquests in Flanders, and a peace which gave away the one solid English gain would be bitterly resented by public opinion.

Quite early in the summer Chesterfield and the Pelhams came to the conclusion that the only possible way out of their difficulties was to accept the overtures of Frederick and to undertake the task of mediating between him and Maria Theresa. Ministers had begun to incline that way before Chesterfield left The Hague. A strong impulse was given when the defeat at Fontenoy put an end to the confident hopes of a successful campaign in Flanders. And all hesitation was removed when Russia finally refused to join the quadruple alliance, and when Frederick's brilliant victory at Hohenfriedberg (4 June) seemed to prove that the recovery of Silesia was a task beyond the unaided resources of Austria and Saxony, even when France ungratefully refused to send direct assistance to Prussia. But there were serious difficulties in the way. The nearest was the undisguised reluctance of George II to come to any terms which would leave his nephew in possession of undiminished territories and power. Any advance towards an understanding with Prussia would widen the gulf between the King and his ministers. Another difficulty, very serious to a politician like Newcastle who instinctively clung to the orthodox traditions of Whig foreign policy, was the risk of a complete alienation of Austria. If England should propose a renewal of the treaty of Breslau, and Maria Theresa should obstinately refuse her assent, England would be compelled to withdraw the Austrian subsidy. The result would be disastrous. The Austrian alliance would be lost, Holland and Sardinia would make terms for themselves, and Great Britain would be left single-handed to face the combined forces of France and Spain, a task which was universally admitted to be beyond her strength.

Henry Pelham and Chesterfield, less attached than Newcastle to the "old system", had no doubt that England was entitled to coerce Austria, and that Austria would be compelled to submit to coercion. Newcastle, who had no alternative remedy, had

perforce to agree. The negotiation with Prussia belonged to the department of Harrington, who had to conduct it at Hanover, whither Andrié, the Prussian minister, had followed him. Harrington had no great love for his job. It was no easy task to negotiate single-handed under the disapproving eye of the King and the Hanoverian ministers. Though he had been a member of the inner Cabinet, he had never been on thoroughly intimate terms with the triumvirate of Pelham, Newcastle and Hardwicke. He had an uneasy sense that his colleagues might throw the whole responsibility upon him and then leave him in the lurch.[1] He required a good deal of pressure and ample assurances from London to drive him to a settlement. Fortunately for him Frederick, genuinely eager for a peace, disgruntled with France, who had rather ostentatiously refused to aid him by attacking Hanover, and rather nervous as to how far Russia would be influenced by her alliance with Saxony, made things easy for him by abandoning all demand for any immediate coercion of Austria by the withholding of pecuniary support. And events occurred in Great Britain which rendered it difficult for the King to veto an agreement with Prussia. On 25 July (O.S.) the Pretender's son, Charles Edward, landed with a small body of followers on the coast of Moidart. It was very naturally assumed that the enterprise had the countenance, and would receive the armed support, of the two Bourbon states. To face the danger of a foreign invasion, it might be necessary to recall the native troops from the Netherlands, to bring over the mercenary troops, and to demand from the Dutch the 6,000 men that they were bound by treaty to supply. In view of the consequent weakening of the allied forces in the Netherlands, it was imperative at all risks to free Maria Theresa, with or against her will, from alien entanglements. So, on 26 August (N.S.), Harrington signed with Andrié a Convention at Hanover, by which England undertook to arrange terms of peace between Austria and Prussia on the basis of the treaty of Breslau. A term of six weeks was allowed for Maria Theresa's answer, and

[1] Harrington graphically describes his difficulties, and hints very clearly his distrust of his colleagues, in a private letter to Newcastle of 15 August (N.S.) 1745 (Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 10). His troubles were increased by Frederick's threatening declaration against Saxony, which George II was pledged by treaty to defend. See his subsequent letter of 22 August (*ibid.* fo. 29). This latter problem was solved by Frederick's promise to postpone any attack on Saxony till Maria Theresa's answer had been received.

until the treaty was concluded, the Convention was to be kept completely secret.

The outbreak of a Jacobite revolt, the dimensions of which could not be foreseen, necessitated the speedy return of the King, and both of these things compelled Chesterfield to quit London and take up his duties in Ireland. He arrived in Dublin on 31 August (O.S.). During his previous absence at The Hague he had been in close touch with foreign affairs, but he was now cut off from the continent as well as from domestic affairs, and was entirely dependent upon such information as might be vouchsafed to him by his colleagues at headquarters. And his relations with Newcastle underwent a complete change. At The Hague he had no official connexion with Newcastle, and such correspondence as passed between them was of necessity strictly private. But Irish affairs came within the southern department, so that as Lord Lieutenant Chesterfield had to write his official dispatches to Newcastle. And it was usual and often necessary for a Lord Lieutenant to supplement these dispatches by "letters apart", or by explanatory letters technically labelled "private", because they did not pass through the office. No arrangement seems to have been made at the outset for the continuance of that genuinely confidential correspondence which had been conducted to and from The Hague. Chesterfield, who needed to know what was going on in London, sought a substitute for it by writing to Andrew Stone. But Newcastle, who had a passion for secret letters, and who continued to need Chesterfield's support and guidance in his relations with the still unabsorbed ministerial recruits, speedily begged him to write freely on the old footing. To this request Chesterfield eagerly responded. At first sight it might appear difficult to distinguish between the semi-official "private" letters, which were carefully written so that they might be shown, if thought desirable, to the King, and those which were intended to be read only by Newcastle and his intimates. The Newcastle Papers are full of both. Internal evidence would be fairly conclusive in most cases, but Chesterfield has been kind enough to his editor to supply an external clue. The semi-official letters always begin "My Lord", whereas the really confidential letters are to "My dear Lord". Newcastle's letters were evidently written under the pressure of the heavy load of work and worry caused by the rebellion and its sensational progress. They are no

longer preserved, like those to The Hague, in fair copies made by Andrew Stone before the signed letters were sent off. The only record now kept is the rough draft, usually in Stone's hand, and full of corrections, additions, and erasures. These drafts, though more troublesome to read, are in many ways more instructive than the copies of the finished letters. They show the immense care and caution bestowed by Newcastle upon the composition of these letters, and the alterations frequently guide the reader as to the precise impression which he desired to produce. There is no evidence that Chesterfield took any equal care on his side. He wrote all his private letters himself, the alterations are few and unimportant, and they read as much more frank and spontaneous productions than the painstaking epistles of the Secretary of State. It should be noted that all the letters in Part II are dated in the old style.

The correspondence largely tells its own tale. Newcastle's letters supply the information, Chesterfield's a keenly interested commentary. The rebellion and the possibility of a French invasion were naturally prominent topics. Newcastle represents the ministerial attitude, which is one of unconcealed apprehension. Chesterfield, on the other hand, is on these matters a convinced optimist. He refused to admit, even after Cope's defeat at Prestonpans, that the Highlanders can hold their own against regular troops. Nor will he believe that the French, in view of our naval superiority, can land enough men to cause serious alarm. This confidence, combined with his undisguised hatred and contempt for Scotland and the Scots, made a very favourable impression upon George II, and helped to wipe out of the royal mind the memory of past transgressions. Newcastle paraded the Lord Lieutenant's rhetorical denunciations of the rebels and his exhortations to merciless severity, in the hope that some crumbs of approbation would fall to Chesterfield's colleagues at home. But he was too genuinely alarmed himself, and too eager for political reasons to impress the King with the seriousness of the situation, to earn the approval of the more stout-hearted sovereign.

With regard to foreign affairs, on the other hand, Chesterfield was an undisguised and unrepentant pessimist. During the later months of 1745 the operations of the allies in Flanders and Italy were paralysed by Maria Theresa's obstinate refusal to accept the terms prescribed by the Hanover Convention. She was confirmed

in her obstinacy by the expectation of Russian intervention in defence of Saxony, and Chesterfield did not conceal his conviction that she had secret encouragement from Hanover. The English ministers were never quite assured that George II would not disavow or repudiate their Convention.[1] Chesterfield had made up his mind at The Hague that the Dutch would never fight another campaign, and letters from Trevor and his Dutch correspondents confirmed him in this conviction. If Austria would not, and England, in view of the rebellion, could not, send adequate reinforcements, a separate Dutch peace with France was, in his opinion, inevitable. And a falling away of Sardinia seemed to him on very good grounds to be equally certain. Hence he came to the conclusion that England was beaten and could not carry on the war without being worse beaten. Therefore the only course was to make peace, which must be a bad peace, because that is always the case with the vanquished.[2]

Newcastle did not contest his correspondent's arguments, nor even his conclusions, though he was careful not to express his assent to either. But he cannot have felt very confident in the later months of the year. He had been taught to regard the Austrian alliance as one of England's sheet-anchors, and Maria Theresa's conduct with all its possible results filled him with dismay. He could not influence Sardinia, but a disadvantageous settlement in Italy was a comparatively minor matter. To the Dutch alliance, however, and to the necessity of preventing a separate peace of the Republic with France, he was determined to cling as long as possible. Meanwhile he tried to conciliate Chesterfield by professing a desire to terminate the war. When the Dutch Pensionary decided to send Colonel Larrey, an emissary of his own, to d'Argenson, the English ministers assented and revised the instructions to be given to the envoy, so that he might appear to speak for both the maritime powers. When intimation reached the Foreign Office that France was ready to open negotiations with England through a secret channel, Newcastle disclosed the secret to Chesterfield, and assured him that an English agent would be sent to Rotterdam to explore the possible paths towards peace.

[1] In September they were on the verge of resigning on this ground. See Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15 September 1745, where he concludes, "whether in or out of power or place, I am ever yours". Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 183.

[2] See especially his letter of 25 November. Below, p. 89.

The relations of ministers to the Crown underwent no improvement after George II's return from Hanover. The Convention of 26 August and the probable rupture with Austria which it involved added to the King's dissatisfaction. But his chief grievance was the old one that they had been forced upon him against his will and that they kept him a prisoner in bonds. He suspected them of an intention to force him into an ignominious peace. The more dependent he seemed to be rendered upon them by the advance of the rebel forces into England, the louder and the more unrestrained became his denunciations of their dictation. The obvious answer was to take him at his word, to resign in a body, and to confront him with the impossible task of finding an alternative ministry. The only objection to such a course was that it might be considered unpatriotic to desert the King in the midst of a national crisis. Chesterfield, from the distance of Dublin, urged that they should have no such scruple, and that they should take full advantage of the King's difficulties, as such a favourable opportunity might never recur. In this advice he was probably wrong. The Duke of Richmond, who held the post of Master of the Horse, in one of his breezy letters to Newcastle, expressed what would have been public opinion if the event had occurred. He declared that he had pinned his faith to the triumvirate of the two brothers and the Lord Chancellor, and that he would resign if they decided to do so. But he added his own personal belief that in time of danger ministers ought to stick to the King in spite of " such foul language that no one gentleman could take from another ".[1] This opinion prevailed, but Newcastle assured Chesterfield that the resignation was only postponed and that " as soon as the rebellion is in effect over, that will be our measure ".[2]

The other main topic discussed in the later part of 1745 was the problem of conciliating the Opposition. In view of the strained relations with the King, Chesterfield continually stressed the need of being as strong as possible in Parliament. The position of the ministry had been inevitably weakened by the military disasters of the year. What disquieted Newcastle most was that Pitt and his patron, Lord Cobham, were showing obvious signs of discontent. So far nothing had been done to fulfil the assurances of finding

[1] Richmond to Newcastle, 16 September 1745 (Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 187).
[2] Below, p. 70.

an office for Pitt, and they could only be fulfilled by putting that extreme pressure upon the King which it had been agreed to postpone. Pitt's patience was coming to an end, and ministers had good reason to dread his devastating criticism in the House of Commons, especially as they were debarred from pleading their one remedial measure, the agreement with Prussia.[1] In deference to Chesterfield's advice, Newcastle arranged conferences with Cobham and Pitt, in the hope of disarming them. The most important meeting was attended by the two malcontents, with Bedford and Gower, the two men who were in the ministry but not in the inner ring, and the four dominant ministers, *i.e.* the triumvirate and Harrington. Newcastle gave a full account of it in his letter of 20 November, which has often been quoted.[2] The chief difficulty arose with regard to foreign policy. As usual during a prolonged war, malcontent Whigs tended to drift towards the Tories and to combine with them against the holders of office. The Tories had always on principle denounced standing armies, and had therefore opposed the embarking on continental wars which required the employment of such an army. They had no such objection to maritime wars, and their "slogan" was that England should trust to her "wooden walls". In the present war they contended, as Swift had contended in a previous war, that we should have been content to be auxiliaries in the main European struggle, and that we should have carried on a naval war against the Bourbon powers. They pointed to our success at Cape Breton as an example of England's legitimate enterprise. Pitt, in his antagonism to ministers, who had hitherto given him nothing but empty promises, had come very near to the adoption of the Tory platform. He and Cobham insisted that all support to Austria, pecuniary or military, must be withdrawn, and that our assistance to the Dutch should be cut down to the 10,000 men we were bound by treaty to provide. They did not, like Chesterfield, advocate an immediate peace, which Newcastle admitted to be the logical conclusion of their arguments, but urged the harrying of France and Spain at sea and in the colonies. To Newcastle, with his

[1] See below, p. 74, note.

[2] Among others, by Lord Rosebery, in his *Chatham, Early Life*, p. 246. Lord Rosebery is not quite accurate in his account of foreign affairs, but he has drawn some characteristically vivid portraits of the chief political actors of this period.

Whig prepossessions, all this was anathema. He could not resist the proposed desertion of Austria, much as he regretted it, because he was practically pledged to it by the Convention with Prussia. But he insisted that we should not limit our aid to the Dutch, which would drive them into submission to France, and that we should promise to send such forces as our circumstances would allow. He still cherished the hope that Austria would repent, and that Austrian repentance would enable the war to be resumed upon more equal terms than in the current year. As Pitt was obdurate, the conference broke up without coming to any agreement. Newcastle ruefully wrote to Chesterfield that it was useless to force Pitt's admission to the ministry, if he would not come in to support their policy, and that all they could do was to hang on with such support as they could muster till the rebellion was suppressed, when the situation could be re-considered.[1]

With the opening of 1746 we enter upon a new period. Two things happened in the previous December which completely changed the aspect of affairs. The rebels retreated from Derby, and the Duke of Cumberland drove them back to Scotland. England was out of danger, and the recovery of the northern Kingdom seemed assured. On the continent Russia was too unprepared to put her threats into action, and Frederick, advancing upon Dresden with two armies, " drubbed " Augustus III into submission. Maria Theresa, deprived of Saxon support, at last gave up the Silesian enterprise as hopeless, and the twin treaties were signed in the Saxon capital on 25 December. The Austrian armies were now free to operate in the extremities of the Empress' dominions, the Netherlands and in Italy. In addition to these major events, the suggested negotiation at Rotterdam had come to nothing, and the mission of Colonel Larrey proved wholly futile. D'Argenson had refused to discuss terms of peace with England, on the ground that it was still doubtful who was its lawful sovereign. Newcastle could plead that he had done his utmost to seek peace, but that such an insulting answer put it out of the question. With the new year his letters to Chesterfield wholly change their tone. Though he still dreads a French invasion, he and his principal colleagues have decided to carry on the war, and have given assurances to a special Dutch envoy, Boetzelaer, who had been sent over to represent the forlorn plight of the Republic. The main

[1] Below, p. 84.

object of his letter of 6th January is to convert Chesterfield to acceptance of this decision. Rather maladroitly he weakened the effect of this appeal by asking the Lord Lieutenant to promise the next vacant Irish Bishopric to the chaplain of a Yorkshire peer, Lord Malton, whom Newcastle thought it important to conciliate.

Chesterfield's reply shows that he was not a little nettled by this attempt on the part of his official chief to influence his ecclesiastical patronage. He declared that he thought "Lord Malton and his drunken parson very impertinent", and excused his refusal on the ground that he had promised the first Bishopric to his own chaplain. At the same time he sent to Newcastle an explanatory letter in his best style to be shown to Lord Malton, in order that the whole responsibility might rest upon himself. As to the assurances given to the Dutch in the answer to Boetzelaer, he thoroughly approved of them, not, as Newcastle desired, because they would spur the Dutch on to renewed exertions, but because he believed that the wording of the answer, which he quoted, would "make the Dutch soon take some engagement of peace, armistice, or neutrality, with France".[1] He reiterated his conviction that there was no possibility of carrying on the war, and that the Dutch would not do it, in spite of all their professions. This letter, which on both personal and political grounds must have been very distasteful to Newcastle, closed the private correspondence for a whole month.

During that month important events occurred in England, of which Newcastle at the time sent no intimation to Dublin, though Chesterfield probably heard of them from other sources. Early in January, before Parliament met on the 14th, Pitt, through Bedford, re-opened negotiations with the ministry. The story of those negotiations, of the subsequent dealings with the King, of the sensational resignation of the chief ministers, and of their return to office after Lord Granville had held the seals for forty-eight hours, is fully told by Newcastle in his letter of 18 February, and need not be recapitulated.

The first news which reached Chesterfield was of the resignations. He wrote at the earliest opportunity to give assurances that he would share the fate of his colleagues, while at the same time he prophesied their speedy and triumphant return to office. Before the letter went off, he received from Stone the intelligence that

[1] Below, p. 101.

his forecast had come true, and he had time to add a triumphant postscript. Then came the long narrative from Newcastle, with its account of the ministerial settlement, including Pitt's acceptance of a minor office, and with its ardent appeal for Chesterfield's approval. The reasoned reply from Dublin, written on 27th February, was by no means enthusiastic. Chesterfield blamed the concessions to the King, such as the leaving the Finch brothers, adherents of Granville, in their household offices, and expressed regret that ministers had not sought to strengthen Gower's hands by bringing in passive unambitious Tories, in place of pushing and efficient Whigs like Pitt, who would never be satisfied with his humble post. At the same time he advised the conciliation of the King's mistress and, if necessary, the purchase of her support by the grant of a pension on the Irish list. Newcastle, who revelled in discussions of this kind, took the criticism in good part, thanked him for the suggestion as to Lady Yarmouth, and briskly defended in detail the extended coalition, which Chesterfield seems to have disliked chiefly because he had had no hand in its arrangement.

But the real divergence between the two correspondents was in foreign rather than in domestic politics. Chesterfield continued to reiterate his conviction that the Dutch would never fight efficiently, that the results of the treaty of Dresden would be disappointing, and that the war must be brought to an end. Newcastle, on the other hand, always more of an optimist in these matters, and in closer touch with the actual situation abroad, was now equally convinced that better terms could be obtained by a prolongation of hostilities, and paid little attention to Chesterfield's jeremiads. This divergence of opinion tended to become serious when the Dutch mission to Paris began to produce something like serious propositions of peace from France. To Count Wassenaer-Twickel (whose title Newcastle disrespectfully shortens to "Twickle"), sent to Paris by the States General after Larrey's return, the Marquis d'Argenson communicated a series of articles which he called *Idées sur la Paix*. The eager Trevor sent them over on 18 March, and Newcastle promptly forwarded a copy to Dublin, with an intimation that he and his colleagues had unanimously agreed to reject them even as a basis of discussion. Chesterfield did not go so far as to contend that the suggested terms were admissible, but he failed to see how anything better was to be obtained.

Even the Dutch allowed that Wassenaer's mission had failed, and the Pensionary induced the States General to strengthen his hands by sending him a colleague in the person of Jacob Gilles, the second Greffier of the Republic and a trusted friend of van der Heim. The new envoy found the French foreign minister much more ductile than he had been at first. His attempt to seduce Sardinia from the coalition had failed, and the turn of the tide in Italy threatened to counterbalance and possibly to overbalance the French successes in the Netherlands. It began to be extremely doubtful whether France would be able to fulfil the obligations to Spain which had been undertaken in the treaty of Fontainebleau. In these circumstances the suggestion of the Dutch envoys that Maria Theresa might endow Don Philip with the grand duchy of Tuscany and provide her husband with another principality elsewhere [1] was gratefully received by d'Argenson. In return he drafted a second project of peace, much more moderate than the *Idées*, and this, after some adjustments with the two Dutch representatives, was transmitted to The Hague and thence to London. But by the time it had been received in England Chesterfield had quitted Dublin, and the need for regular postal communication had come to an end.

Chesterfield returned to London with shattered health to find the foundations of the coalition threatened, and the ministry hopelessly divided on the question of foreign policy. The death of Winnington in April had led to the promotion of Pitt to be paymaster of the forces, and there had been an outburst of discontent on the part of Halifax and other disappointed candidates for place, which Chesterfield for a moment feared might lead to the resignation of his own particular friends, Gower and Bedford. Chesterfield was too ill to play his usual part of mediator, and it

[1] The first suggestion of the cession of Tuscany to Don Philip, which was for a short time prominent in 1746 and impelled d'Argenson to frame his project, was made in article 4 of a scheme for a peace settlement which was drawn up in July 1745 by Trevor and the Pensionary van der Heim. Trevor sent it with an apologetic and explanatory letter to Henry Pelham, and it was seriously considered by the inner Cabinet in London, though no action was taken as the result of the negotiation with Prussia was not yet known. See *Trevor Papers* (Hist. MSS. Commission Report), pp. 122–130. This wholly unofficial and unauthorised scheme found its way into the papers entrusted to Larrey and to Wassenaer, and was disinterred from them by Wassenaer and Gilles.

was left to Newcastle, with the assistance of the youthful Lord Sandwich, to pacify Halifax and his friends. Far more serious was the difficulty as to continental affairs. D'Argenson's project, in spite of some obvious objections, was welcomed by the more moderate of the English ministers as providing a basis upon which serious discussions of peace terms might proceed. The question was submitted, not to a full Cabinet, but to "those persons whom his Majesty usually consults upon matters of importance". To this inner Cabinet Chesterfield was admitted as he had been in the previous summer when George II was in Hanover. All objections on the part of the King had been removed by his conduct as Lord Lieutenant and by his letters from Dublin. In the prolonged discussions on the French terms, Chesterfield joined Pelham and Harrington in advocating that Trevor should be empowered to sign a preliminary treaty between the maritime powers and France on the proposed terms with certain agreed modifications, which were to be transmitted to the two Dutch envoys. This meant, among other things, that they were prepared to cede Cape Breton in return for the restoration of the Netherlands, to recognise the permanent neutrality of those provinces, and to consent to the endowment of Don Philip at the expense of Maria Theresa or of her husband or of both. Once the treaty was concluded it would be necessary to submit it to Austria and Sardinia, just as France would have to submit it to Spain, and it was assumed that the consent of these unconsulted powers, however unwilling, was inevitable, as they could not carry on the war without the aid of their allies. Harrington went so far as to write a dispatch on 16 May to Sir Thomas Robinson which was intended to give some warning to the Court of Vienna of the prospective sacrifices.[1]

To this proposal of precipitate action Newcastle offered the most strenuous opposition. As he became from this time almost a dictator of our foreign policy, it is important to understand his motives. He looked at all schemes of peace from two points of view, (1) as to their probable reception by public opinion at home, and (2) as to their probable effect upon the anti-Bourbon coalition, which he desired to perpetuate. On the first point he was convinced that opinion both at home and in New England would be outraged by the prompt surrender of our one acquisition. On the

[1] This important dispatch of 16 May (O.S.) is in S.P. For. Germany (Empire), 173.

other hand it was equally clear that the Dutch would be exasperated if we refused to make peace solely because we selfishly decided to keep Cape Breton. On this point the two considerations balanced each other. But the Dutch alliance might not be forfeited by a little delay, and therefore this very difficult problem should be postponed. As for the other two allies, it would be an unpardonable breach of British obligations to them to conclude a preliminary treaty behind their backs, and to settle matters in which they were keenly interested without even consulting them. Austria would have a righteous cause of anger if we were parties to an agreement wantonly to deprive the Emperor, a non-belligerent, of the principality for which he had exchanged his hereditary dominion. Newcastle knew that the King of Sardinia was resolutely opposed to the establishment of a second Spanish prince in Italy. He himself had the strongest objections to the proposed neutrality of the Low Countries, because he believed that it would annul the Barrier Treaty, and thus weaken both the alliance of England with Holland and that of the two maritime powers with Austria. Finally he held that it would be discreditable to entrust the defence of our national policy to foreign envoys, and in his own mind he was determined not to entrust full powers to Trevor, the intimate friend of his brother and of Chesterfield, and avowedly desirous of an immediate peace. On these grounds he advocated either the sending of a person of great weight to take the negotiation out of the hands of the Dutchmen, or at least the delay of any final decision until the latter had obtained some answer from France to the English objections. And he urged that the secret should be disclosed to Austria and Sardinia.

On most of the points at issue Newcastle had the weighty support of Lord Hardwicke, though the Chancellor was rather dubious as to the wisdom of alienating the Dutch and altering the whole character of the negotiation by communicating the project to the allies and inviting their cooperation. And so for the moment this suggestion was dropped. On the other points at issue Newcastle and Hardwicke gained a complete victory. Harrington had to rewrite the dispatch which he had drafted to Trevor, and even after it had been rewritten, George II made him revise it to accord with Newcastle's contentions. The King, though he might on some great occasion be overruled, was still normally the dictator of foreign policy, and the Secretaries of State carried out his orders.

That Newcastle was able to carry the day against the majority of his influential colleagues was due, not to the strength of his arguments or to the backing of the Lord Chancellor, but to the fact that he had now secured, what he had been striving for since February, a close alliance with the Crown. To the intense disappointment of the Pensionary and Trevor, the Dutch were informed that the English ministers could come to no final decision until an answer had been given by France to their objections to d'Argenson's project.[1]

After this first triumph, the stars in their courses seemed to fight for Newcastle. The answer from Vienna to Harrington's dispatch of 16 May made it clear that Austria would refuse consent to any sacrifice in Italy, and a complete Austrian victory at Piacenza on 15 June (N.S.) made it preposterous even to suggest the cession of Tuscany. Thus one of the primary conditions put forward by d'Argenson was out of date. Then came the news that Puyzieulx, whom d'Argenson had sent to The Hague to hasten the negotiation, had joined the Pensionary in urging that, in order to avoid the intolerable delay caused by referring everything to London, an English envoy should be sent to some neutral town, such as Breda, to take part in what would then be a triangular negotiation. At the same time he declared that France must consult Spain before settling matters in which that power was interested. Newcastle at once fastened upon this latter declaration as depriving both Hardwicke and the professed pacifists of their strongest argument against calling in the other allies. If France must consult Spain, England must consult Austria and Sardinia. He was now able to carry through his complete programme. It was resolved to send an English representative to Breda, and at the same time to communicate d'Argenson's project and all that had passed with regard to it to the two allied powers. This was embodied in a dispatch which the reluctant Harrington had to send to Trevor on 20 June (O.S.).[2] Finally, in order that Dutch protests might be of no avail, the relative papers were at once communicated to Wasner and Osorio, the Austrian and

[1] Harrington's much debated dispatch to Trevor of 20 May (O.S.) is in S.P. Holland, 418. A full account of the discussions, with the letters which passed between Newcastle and Hardwicke, is given in Coxe, *Pelham Administration*, I. 487–490. Two unpublished letters of Newcastle, giving more summary accounts of the discussions, are printed below in Appendix B.

[2] S.P. For. Holland, 418, fo. 342.

Sardinian ministers at the English Court. The unfortunate van der Heim, who had staked his whole credit upon the conclusion of peace between France and the two maritime powers, learned with dismay of the decision at Whitehall, and implored Trevor to suspend any carrying out of his instructions until his vehement protest had been considered. He never learned that his protest was fatally too late. His health was already broken, and he died on his way to seek a remedy in the waters of Spa.

Chesterfield must have been convinced in June that it was hopeless to struggle against the novel combination of the King and Newcastle. And the conviction was strengthened in July, when Philip V of Spain died (9 July N.S.), and the long-delayed subsidy treaty with Bavaria was at last concluded (10 July N.S.). The death of Philip V might well have been a turning point in the war. It was generally anticipated that Ferdinand VI would deprive his stepmother of all authority, and that the reaction against her policy would bring Spain back to the seventeenth-century tradition of hostility to France. Newcastle was so elated that in imagination he saw Austria and Sardinia permanently conciliated by the withholding of all cessions to Don Philip, while an invasion of Provence would compel France to withdraw forces from the Netherlands, and the recovery of those provinces would remove all reason for surrendering Cape Breton. In order that this dream should come true it was necessary to make sure that the Dutch should not be induced by the recent conduct of England to make their separate peace with France, which the English pacifists had all along declared to be inevitable. If the Dutch could be conciliated or cajoled, this would give him time to send the experienced Benjamin Keene to Lisbon, and from Lisbon it should be easy to open negotiations with Madrid, where a Portuguese princess shared the throne with Ferdinand VI. Once Spain was detached from France and the Family Compact broken off, all would be plain sailing.

From Newcastle's point of view, a great deal depended upon the choice of an English envoy to send to The Hague and thence to Breda. Chesterfield and Henry Pelham wished to employ Trevor, who was on the spot and was intimately acquainted with all that had taken place. But Newcastle could not trust him as too eager for an immediate peace and too closely allied with the republican leaders in Holland. He was now strong enough to insist that

England must send some one of higher rank. From every point of view Chesterfield seemed to be the obvious choice, and Newcastle, after all his recent professions of regard, would have found it difficult to oppose his nomination. Fortunately for the duke, Chesterfield refused to go. He was as convinced as ever that the Dutch would abandon the war, and he was not prepared to go with restricted powers on an embassy that he considered to be doomed to failure.[1] His refusal rendered it possible to find an envoy devoid of prepossessions, not too weighted with scruples, and only empowered to refer matters to London, where Newcastle was confident of retaining the upper hand. The choice fell upon the fourth Earl of Sandwich, reputed able and ambitious, the intimate friend and follower of Bedford, who was understood to be resolute about the retention of Cape Breton. With the King's knowledge and assent, Newcastle arranged to carry on a carefully concealed correspondence with the inexperienced envoy, and thus to take his guidance out of the hands of Harrington, who was his official superior. The secret instructions to the envoy were that he must avert any premature settlement, insist upon the admission of the allies to the Conference, and at the same time prevent the Dutch from making any separate peace. Meanwhile Newcastle pinned his faith to the Lisbon negotiation, which would be conducted under his direct supervision.

Chesterfield was in London when Sandwich was selected, but he can have had little knowledge of what had taken place afterwards behind the scenes. The fever which he had brought with him from Ireland returned in August, and for a time he was seriously ill. When he had partially recovered, he went to Bath to complete the cure and remained there till late in October. His direct correspondence with Newcastle had virtually ceased after he left Dublin, but he still wrote occasionally to Andrew Stone. When he at last returned to London, he was confronted with a wholly new situation. The secret of Newcastle's relations with Sandwich could not be kept, and Harrington, after vehement remonstrances to his colleague, carried his complaint to the King. There he discovered that the private correspondence had been carried on with the knowledge and approval of George II, and he promptly insisted upon resigning the seals. Newcastle, who knew the King's antipathy to Harrington, must have anticipated that resignation

[1] See Chesterfield to Trevor, 14 August (O.S.), in *Trevor Papers*, p. 149.

or dismissal was sooner or later inevitable, and must have known that his own conduct was likely to drive Harrington from office. From the first he seems, for some obscure reason, to have fixed upon Chesterfield as the successor whom he would prefer. As soon as the Earl returned from Ireland, Newcastle sounded him as to his willingness to accept the Secretaryship when it should be vacant. At the time he met with a refusal.[1] After that came the ministerial disputes of May and June, in which Chesterfield openly sided with Newcastle's opponents. But this seems to have brought no change of purpose. When the crisis arrived, Newcastle, while professing a desire to induce Harrington to withdraw his resignation, had another interview with Chesterfield. By his own account, which he gave to his most trusted correspondent, Lord Hardwicke, he pointed out to Chesterfield that the most serious objection to his succession was the difference of opinion as to the continuance of the war. To this Chesterfield is said to have replied that he had genuinely desired to make peace upon something like d'Argenson's project, but that, since the die had been cast against him, he was willing to carry on the war with vigour and to procure the money necessary to hire thirty thousand Russians. On these terms he was prepared to take the vacant office, provided the King approved. It is quite possible, and indeed probable, that there was some discussion and agreement upon other subjects, notably on the policy to be pursued in Holland, though Newcastle very naturally did not feel it necessary to give this information at the time. The decision as to the continuance of the war was the vital matter, and, fortified with this, the busy Duke hurried off to a private conference with the King. There, without any reference to the Premier, it was settled that Harrington was to go and that Chesterfield was to take his place. What exactly took place in the royal Closet can never be ascertained. To his brother, who was naturally surprised and nettled, Newcastle declared that the nomination was entirely the work of the King. In a private letter to Sandwich he boasted that it was all his own doing. Both statements may have some literal truth. It is a not unreasonable conjecture that Newcastle narrated Chesterfield's change of front,

[1] Marchmont Papers, I. 182. Chesterfield is reported as saying "that on his arrival here the Duke of Newcastle spoke to him of being Secretary, if Lord Harrington quitted or was turned out; and that he had refused it, saying he would keep Ireland as long as he was in place."

and that the King then said there could be no objection to making him Secretary. Nor is it difficult to accept the story that Chesterfield expressed surprise at his appointment and hesitation as to accepting it, or that Henry Pelham, believing that they still held the same opinions, insisted upon his acceptance. Chesterfield was not likely to advertise his surrender to Newcastle.[1]

Newcastle was jubilant, and with good reason. He had got rid of an irreconcilable opponent, and he had secured as a submissive colleague (a *commis*, in Chesterfield's own phrase) an eminent pacifist whose conversion was a good argument for a similar change on the part of others. He complacently refused the King's offer of the northern office, which would have brought Sandwich under his direct supervision, on the avowed ground that it did not matter who held the pen as both wrote to the same purpose. It is not at all easy to say why Chesterfield, with his eyes open, accepted office under conditions which necessarily condemned him to be the tool of a fellow-Secretary, whose wisdom and judgment he cannot have estimated very highly. Yet the evidence is overwhelming that he not only accepted Newcastle's policy and guidance, but that he did so with cheerfulness and even with gusto. He knew all about the private correspondence with Sandwich, and complacently encouraged its continuance.[2] In spite of his previous intimacy with the republican leaders in Holland, he was a party to the encouragement of William Bentinck and the other Orange partisans, and thus contributed to the revolution which restored the Stad-

[1] I have relied for this account of Chesterfield's appointment, an event which startled contemporaries and has puzzled biographers and historians ever since, upon a letter which Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke on 28 October (O.S.). It is true that Newcastle's evidence is always to be regarded with suspicion. He tried to pacify his brother by minimising his share in the transaction, while his incurable egotism impelled him to magnify it to others. But he was more likely to tell the truth to Hardwicke than to anybody else. Moreover there is endless circumstantial evidence to support his story. For instance, almost the first act of Chesterfield as Secretary was to order Lord Hyndford to open negotiations for the 30,000 Russians. The letter is to be found in the Hardwicke Papers in the British Museum, vol. 60, fo. 280. It has been printed in Yorke's Life of Hardwicke, I. p. 367, but it is so vital to my story and has attracted so little attention that I have reproduced it in Appendix C. Marchmont's account, hitherto generally accepted, is in *Marchmont Papers*, I. p. 185. For Newcastle's letters to Sandwich see *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, p. 188.

[2] *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, p. 224 and note.

holdership.[1] He was a strenuous advocate of the employment of Russian troops, both in the Netherlands and on the frontiers of Prussia, so much so that Bentinck, after their subsequent split, suspected him of a cynical desire to discredit the war by making its cost intolerable.[2] His presence in the inner circle of the ministry paralysed the Tory pacifists, who had looked to him for guidance in foreign affairs, and helped the Government to gain a complete triumph in the general election of 1747 and to carry through the new Parliament a vote of what was then considered the immense sum of eleven millions for yet another compaign in 1748.

It is true that in the summer of 1747 his cheerfulness disappeared, and that he began to chafe against the bonds in which he had involved himself. After the Austrian repulse from Genoa, Cumberland's defeat at Lafeld, and the obvious failure of the Dutch revolution to reproduce the miracle of 1672, it was clear to meaner intelligences than Chesterfield's that all hope of military success was gone. If the boasted force of Russians ever came, they would arrive too late to be of use. The strenuous efforts of Sandwich, which Chesterfield had encouraged, to detach Spain by a treaty with the veteran Macanaz, ended in failure. Chesterfield knew the Dutch too well to have anything but contempt for the criminally complacent reports by which Sandwich and Bentinck strove to fortify the courage of the credulous Newcastle. When Marshal Saxe's overtures to Ligonier once more opened the possibility of a speedy peace, the two Secretaries parted company, and Chesterfield became again the ally of Henry Pelham and the advocate, as Bentinck contemptuously declared, of peace *quovis modo*. But he was fatally hampered by his record in the previous months. In the council chamber he was moody and silent rather than active in debate. His sullen acquiescence allowed the King and Newcastle to nominate Sandwich to conduct the negotiation which Saxe had originated, and with his nomination the hope of peace receded. When Chesterfield at last made up his mind to escape from an intolerable position, he could not, like Harrington, resign on the plea that his colleague had encroached upon his department, because he had allowed him to do so for fifteen months, and he had to find a trumpery pretext in the failure to get his own way in a matter of patronage.

There can be little doubt that the traditional estimates of

[1] *Ibid.* p. 189, note [2].

[2] *Ibid.* p. 283 and note.

Chesterfield require some revision. No one could have advocated more strongly the coercion of the King and the subjection of the Crown to ministerial control than he did in the letters in this volume. But the prospect of royal favour, so distant at The Hague, and so dim at Dublin, became brighter and more attractive after his return to London. It is clear that Chesterfield attached much value to the royal approval of his appointment and to the access to the Closet which it gave him. In this he set an example which was followed by Pitt, who was not the first minister to exchange defiance for deference in his relations with monarchy. In his letters Chesterfield reiterates constantly his preference for a private to an official life. This must have been largely a pose on his part, at any rate in these years. He had never held high office at the centre of government until he received the Secretaryship, and he would not have accepted so readily if he had not coveted the post. At the outset he obviously enjoyed the sense of being in authority and of pulling strings, even if they were not precisely the strings which he would have chosen to pull. He loved to observe at close quarters the stir of political movements, he was keenly interested in the minutiæ of political management (a taste which he shared with Newcastle), he was eager to form clearly cut opinions on political problems. But his opinions are the result of intellectual effort rather than of profound conviction. When he had put them into forcible words, he was pleased and satisfied. If they were not accepted, if, in his own words, "the die was cast against him," he shrugged his shoulders, and was content in the end with the comfort of saying that the result was what he had anticipated. There was, as he admitted, a vein of indolence in him, but it was an indolence of character rather than a dislike of effort. He was an acute political critic rather than a statesman, and his experience in office probably convinced him of his own shortcomings. He made no effort to return to active political life. Newcastle was obviously his inferior in intellectual power, but he had far more persistence. Timidity at times made him appear to vacillate, but he rarely made any substantial change in his aims. When he had decided on a particular course of action, he sought by all possible methods to follow it, and, as the querulous member of a family so often does, he usually got his own way.

Chesterfield's biographers have wasted a good deal of effort in

denouncing Newcastle's presumption in dictating to so eminent a man. They should rather blame Chesterfield for submitting, at first willingly and later with aversion, to such dictation. Or, better still, they should condemn the system which rendered such dictation necessary if anything was to be achieved. Newcastle may not have been the right man to do it, and he may not have done it in the right manner, but he definitely helped to point the way to a necessary reform. Nothing could be more absurd, and nothing in critical times could be more harmful, than the English system of having two Secretaries of State to deal with foreign affairs, in theory possessed of equal authority with each other, and with their functions divided by a preposterous partition of the map of Europe.[1] The inherent difficulties could only be overcome in one of two ways. Either one Secretary must be the predominant partner, or a capable Prime Minister must control both. Stanhope was predominant for a period under George II, and then Townshend took his place, getting rid of Carteret as a possible rival. From 1729 to 1741 Walpole dominated both Harrington and Newcastle. When he fell, Carteret took the lead. On his fall Harrington aspired to play the same part, and did so for a year. But he was not strong enough to hold the position, and Newcastle wrested it from him in 1746. Newcastle made Chesterfield his subordinate, got rid of Bedford when the latter became too independent, and at last secured a genuinely docile assistant in Holderness. After the ministerial interregnum, Pitt secured the upper hand, and kept it till Bute took Holderness's place with the backing of the King. Then Pitt had to go. After the Peace of Paris, foreign politics fell into the background, and the double secretaryship worked fairly well because there was so little to do. But when the continental powers began to take part in the American revolt, and we found ourselves isolated in Europe, the old arrangement was found to be intolerable, and in 1782 the long delayed reform was made which gave us a single Foreign Secretary. This was what Newcastle had desired, but he had to strive for it by underhand means.

[1] There is a good account of the absurdities of the two Secretaries of State in F. S. Oliver, *The Endless Adventure*, p. 256.

PART I

DECEMBER 1744 TO MAY 1745

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES

CHESTERFIELD AT THE HAGUE

To Newcastle.

Saturday. Dec. 1st O.S. [1744].

My Lord,

When I had the honour of seeing your Grace last, you seem'd desirous to know the numbers and names of our necessary people; in consequence of which Lord Cobham, Lord Gower, and myself have prepar'd such a list, which we are ready to give your Grace whenever you please to command us. For my own part, I am in all events

your Grace's most faithfull and most obedient servant,

Chesterfield.[1]

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,703, fo. 447.

To Chesterfield.

Whitehall, Monday noon [December 3, 1744].

My Lord,

I had the honour of your Lordship's letter yesterday at Claremont; and as it is necessary we should have a meeting, I should be glad it could be this evening. My Lord Chancellor, who has been in the country three or four days, returns to town this day; and, as possibly it may be inconvenient for him to stir out this evening, if your Lordship, my Lord Cobham, and my Lord Gower will be so good as to come to my Lord Chancellor's house at eight o'clock, my Lord Harrington, my Brother and I will not fail to meet you there.

I beg your Lordship would give notice to my Lord Cobham and

[1] This letter and its successor illustrate the part played by Chesterfield in forming the coalition. It also shows that the active negotiator on the official side was Newcastle, who was apt in all such matters to take the lead from his less pushing brother, Henry Pelham. Lord Marchmont's Diary confirms the prominence of Chesterfield as Opposition leader, but assigns the opening of the negotiation to the Premier.

my Lord Gower; and if it should not be convenient for you to meet this evening, that you would let me know it by a line to my house in the afternoon.

Your Lordship will be pleased to bring the paper with you that you mention in your letter. I beg your Lordship would believe that I am with the greatest truth and respect, etc., etc.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

In the handwriting of Andrew Stone. Add. MSS. 32,703, fo. 454. *Ibid.* fo. 456, Chesterfield writes a short note on the same day: "We will not fail having the honour of attending your Grace at the time appointed at Lord Chancellor's."

TO CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, 22 January 1744 [5].

My Lord,

I did not intend to trouble your Lordship so soon with a letter; much less to beg a favour of you.

Your Lordship will be informed, by this post, of the death of the Bishop of Derry. The Lords Justices have or intend to recommend my friend D^r. Stone, Bishop of Kildare,[1] in the first place to be translated to Derry: and the Primate [2] and Lord Chancellor of Ireland [3] have both wrote to the Bishop of Kildare to assure him, in the strongest manner, of their good wishes; and my Lord Chancellor tells him that he will have no competitor, on that side of the water, except the Bishop of Down.

Had the Duke of Devonshire continued in Ireland, he would have been disposed to translate his chaplain, the Bishop of Dromore,[4] to Derry. But at present the Duke of Devonshire will be very well pleased that the Bishop of Kildare should go to Derry, and the Bishop of Dromore to Kildare, if your Lordship will be so good as to agree to it. By this you will very much oblige both the Duke of Devonshire and myself, and have the Bishoprick of Dromore (which is a very good one) to dispose of as you think proper. My friend, the Bishop of Kildare, has the honour to be known to you, and, I may venture to say, will not discredit any station you may do him the honour to place him in.

[1] George Stone was a younger brother of Andrew. There is a full account of his activities in Ireland in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

[2] John Hoadley, archbishop of Armagh.

[3] Robert Jocelyn, Lord Newport. [4] Dr. Thomas Fletcher.

I am sorry I cannot send your Lordship an account that our affairs mend on this side of the water. Good news from you may do a great deal, but at present we don't at all advance. An unexpected opposition in the House of Commons last week from the Tories and some Whigs to the estimates for the Ordnance, which they would have had amended and the part for foreign service left out entirely for the present, was great matter of triumph to some people, tho' we carried it by a majority of above two to one. Mr. Lyttelton acted and spoke with great steadiness and judgment, and some others followed him. Mr. Pitt, who has not yet been abroad, comes out on Friday, the day that the estimate for the English troops in Flanders comes on, and will act with that resolution, firmness, and spirit which is so natural to him and, I am sure, will be approved by your Lordship. I cannot say too much in commendation of both his and Mr. Lyttelton's behaviour, who, as they are sincerely connected to you, act in every thing as your Lordship would do. Our good friend, Lord Gower, does the same. A word or two from your Lordship, to fortify him with resolution to resist or detach himself from those of his old friends who do not agree with him, would, I am persuaded, have a good effect, tho' at present I do not see any want of it.

I hope this will find your Lordship safely and happily arrived at The Hague, where, I am sure, your presence will be of the utmost service to this country and all Europe. If a calm can be struck out from the present distraction, I am sure you will do it. If not, nobody will be so well able as yourself to unite and reconcile the different parties in the Republic, and the several powers that do, or ought to, compose our Alliance, to the necessary measures for carrying on the war with vigour in order to obtain a peace.

If you have any commands here, I shall be proud to be honoured with them, and am, etc.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Andrew Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,704, fos. 24, 25.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, Feb. ye 5th N.S. 1745.

My Lord,

The post from hence is going out just as I receive the honour of your Grace's letter, so that this must be short, but I would not delay a moment signifying my chearful obedience to your

commands with regard to my Irish department; I am therefore very desirous that the Bishop of Kildare, whom I know a little and by reputation esteem very much, should be translated to the Bishoprick of Derry, and am very willing that the Bishop of Dromore should succeed him at Kildare. As for the Bishoprick of Dromore, and the other preferments whatever they are that may become vacant by these translations, I should be desirous to have 'em kept open a little while till I am fully inform'd of all particulars. As it is not possible for me to write to-night to the Dukes of Devonshire and Dorset, from both of whom I have receiv'd letters, as well as from the Bishop of Kildare himself, may I beg of your Grace to say to all three (only much better) what, if I could have writt to 'em myself to-night, I should have said. I shall also obey your other orders with regard to certain domestick affairs. As for matters here I refer your Grace to a very long letter which I send to your Brother by this post. And I am, with the greatest truth and respect,

your Grace's most faithfull and obedient servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph.34. Add. MSS. 32,704, fo.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, Feb. 8th 1744/5.

My Lord,

I could not but take the first opportunity to return your Lordship my most sincere acknowledgments for the honour of your letter of the 9th inst. N.S., which I received yesterday morning. I am truly sensible of the marks of confidence you have given my Brother and me, of which, you may be sure, we shall make no use but such as you desire. As my Brother found, by your Lordship's last letter to him, that you intended this private correspondence should be communicated to my Lord Harrington, we have shew'd him all the letters of this kind that have passed, with which he is perfectly satisfied; and everything is extremely right in that respect.[1]

[1] There is a letter from Newcastle to Henry Pelham of 19 January (O.S.) 1745, which shows that his original desire was to keep all secrets to the triumvirate in the first instance, and to exclude Harrington. "I am sure you will not think unreasonable what I now propose, that every thing, as far as possible, should be first talked over by you and I, before it is either flung out in the closet, or communicated to *any* of our brethren; I always except the Chancellor, who, I know, is a third brother." B.M. Add. MSS. 32,704, fo. 17.

I should have been under great uneasiness at the situation of affairs in Holland from your letter to me of the 9th; had not my Brother at the same time received one from you of a later date which opens a more agreeable prospect to us, and by which I find that the expectations we had that affairs in Holland would take a better turn, from your weight and influence upon the minds of people there, than they have of late done, will not be disappointed. The principle upon which your Lordship has effected this alteration seems the only one upon which you could have promised yourself success, viz. the necessity of making the utmost efforts this campaign in order to obtain a peace at the end of it. In this view you may depend upon our cooperating with you thoroughly on this side of the water; and that we will take care fully to enable you to answer any expectation you shall think proper to give.

For this purpose, we had last night a meeting with the Duke of Bedford, Lord Cobham, and Lord Gower, where every thing went very well; and the necessity of augmenting forthwith our army in Flanders to 40,000 men was cordially and unanimously agreed, on condition that the Dutch will engage to have the same number at least to bring into the field early this campaign. At this meeting not the least mention was made of your Lordship's private correspondence; but we talked upon generals and from your publick letters. It is hoped and expected that some assurance in writing may be given by the Dutch of the number of troops to be furnished by them, and of the time they will be ready to take the field; or otherwise we may be under a difficulty in augmenting so considerably our contingent. We hope this may be the more easily obtained as it seems to be the method you have yourself pointed out, by the paper you left with the Deputies.

My Lord Harrington will fully state to your Lordship the several ways that are suggested for augmenting our army to the proposed number of 40,000 men. There is only one contretems, that comes very unluckily across us. Every thing was settled here for my Lord Stair to go to Flanders and he would have set out very soon; and indeed I was the more desirous of it, not only as I was persuaded he was the best that could be sent, but that my Lord Cobham was perfectly satisfied with it, and that Lord Stair's going to Flanders would remove the difficulty between the two generals here at home. But the promising or giving the supreme command to Marshal Königsegg will, I am afraid, make it impracticable for

Lord Stair to go: at least he seems at present determined not to go upon that foot.

Your Lordship will have seen the overtures made by the King of Prussia [1] and the answer that has been given to them. You will have heard of the good disposition the Elector of Saxony is in, particularly with regard to the election of an Emperor (he having already, as Vicaire, written to the Elector of Mayence to give activity to the vote of Bohemia, which he would hardly have done if he had himself intended to be a candidate). And means may possibly be found out to secure the young Elector of Bavaria. You are also acquainted with the inclination of Prince William of Hesse to return to his old friends,[2] which, I think, should be encouraged; and there seems to be a disposition in the Circles of Suabia, Franconia, &c. for clearing the Empire of French troops. These indications promise, not only a good choice of an Emperor; but also a good turn to be taken by the Empire in opposition to France, and, I should hope, would greatly facilitate your Lordship's negotiations. But there is one difficulty which at present I am not able to solve, and therefore fling it out only, without myself seeing the remedy. The good disposition of the Elector of Saxony will probably ultimately depend upon the encouragement to be given him of advantages to be gained by acquisitions from the King of Prussia. This will be a favourite point with the Queen of Hungary and other Princes of the Empire, but might be the occasion of a long and disagreeable war. On the other hand, it is probable that the King of Prussia will come in upon no terms but those of

[1] Chesterfield had ample information of his own on this subject, as Frederick instructed the younger Podewils, his agent at the Hague, to do all in his power to gain his support. Frederick professed a great admiration for Chesterfield, and had been led by his attitude in opposition to expect his cordial support for a reconciliation with Prussia. He was disappointed to find his ministerial attitude much cooler. See *Pol. Corr.* IV. pp. 44–48, 67–69.

[2] Prince William was Administrator of Hesse-Cassel for his brother, the Landgrave, who was King of Sweden. His son was married to Mary, one of the daughters of George II, and Hessian troops were hired by England at the outset of the war. But the house of Hesse also adhered to Charles VII, from whom they hoped to obtain electoral rank. William set himself to effect a reconciliation between England and the Emperor. He quarrelled with Carteret after the failure of the Hanau negotiation, withdrew his troops from the English service, and in 1744 joined the League of Frankfort. See two articles in the *English Historical Review*, July and October, 1923 (vol. XXXVIII. Nos. 151–2.

securing to himself both the Upper and Lower Silesia, or at least of retaining what he got by the Treaty of Breslau. That will go down very hardly ;[1] and, to be sure, great objections may be made to it ; and the difficulty of having any dependance on a Prince that has acted as he has done, will add great weight to these objections. In short, there appear great inconveniences as well as advantages from either side of this question.

I am much obliged to your Lordship for having wrote to my Lord Gower. I think I already see the good effects of it. You may be assured we will give all possible attention to your advice. Mr Pitt's behaviour requires all the returns that gratitude and a concern for our own situation and that of the publick can demand. One can only want to know him as well as your Lordship does to admire him as much. We cannot forget the obligation we have to your Lordship on his account as well as your own.[2] I have frequent opportunities of seeing Mr Lyttelton. I must do him the justice to say that I never met with any one with whom I was better satisfied, or whose head and heart I more approve.

I think things here rather mend. Your Lordship's success in Holland will be the surest means of bringing about a real alteration. I am not surprised that they knew at The Hague exactly our situation, the ill consequences of which in Holland could have been stem'd by nothing but your Lordship's presence. And if the Pensionary thinks upon your Lordship's subject and ours here as (without vanity) if he thinks rightly for his own country he must do, a proper hint, now and then, to Monsr Hop[3] would have a good effect.

My Brother, who has seen this letter, desires you would, for that reason, excuse his not writing this post.

Count Nassau desired me to acquaint your Lordship last week (which indeed I forgot to do) that he had intended to set out for Holland this week, but that he thought then he had better stay till Lord Stair was appointed in form (which was intended to be done every day) that they might have an opportunity of discoursing

[1] *i.e.* with George II who, on Hanoverian grounds, had many quarrels with Prussia, and who was jealous of his nephew's sudden increase of power and prestige.

[2] Chesterfield had evidently been active in pacifying Pitt. But he was less eager to gratify him at the beginning of 1746, when the demand of office for Pitt supplied occasion for a ministerial crisis. See below, p. 114.

[3] Hendrik Hop had been Dutch envoy in England since 1723.

together upon the business of the campaign. Since that Count Nassau has been extremely ill of a cold, tho' that is now better; and Lord Stair's nomination is become very doubtful.

Forgive me this *St. Saphorin*;[1] and my next shall be much shorter.

I am with the truest regard, my dear Lord

&c.

Holles Newcastle.

Draft, with corrections, in the handwriting of Andrew Stone. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 210–215.

To Newcastle.

Hague, Feb. ye 23d N.S. 1745.

My Lord,

Having writ very fully to Lord Harrington, I should not have troubled your Grace by this post, but to inform you of a gentleman who will be in London at the same time with this letter. It is one Baron Hohberg, who arriv'd here from Dresden last Friday night, and who delivered me a letter from Mr Villiers under flying seal to Lord Harrington, which I forwarded by the last packet. That letter was of little consequence, but the gentleman was in a violent hurry to go to England, and would have gone the same night to Helvoet, if the wind had not been directly contrary. I am assur'd that he carries a packet for Sir Luke Schaub,[2] whose emissary I know he has long been. He has been much in England before, where he was domestick at Lord Granville's and Sir Luke's; and he now hopes to succeed Count Fleming.[3] Many things to and from foreign courts are, I am persuaded, convey'd through such channels, unknown to you and your friends.

I believe your Grace will think that the idea of securing the Elector of Saxony at any rate is a right one. And that the maritime powers, who have surely some right to advise the Queen of Hungary, should talk to her in a pretty firm tone upon that subject. To me it is the plainest point in the world that, if the Great Duke be set

[1] St. Saphorin was British envoy at Vienna from 1718 to 1728. His verbosity was resented at the Foreign Office, and it became an office joke to call all letters of excessive length "St. Saphorins."

[2] Schaub was English minister in Paris from 1720 to 1724, when he was superseded by Horatio Walpole. He had been in the confidence of Stanhope, and was later in that of Carteret.

[3] Count Flemming was the Saxon minister to the English court.

up for Emperor, every thing will be in greater confusion than ever.[1] He is despis'd by the whole world, and hated in the Empire, where I dare say he would but have three votes, including Bohemia should that vote be admitted.[2] All this I foretold in my first letter to your Brother after my arrival here. And I am more confirm'd in it now. Whereas by setting up the Elector of Saxony immediately *et de bonne grace*, you snatch him from France, that is now holding out her arms to him, and I think you have a secure majority in the Electoral College. But where shall we be if the obstinacy of the Court of Vienna should connect him with France? I make no proposals. I distrust my own opinion too much; but I should think that the Court of Vienna should be plainly told by the maritime powers that the present situation of affairs makes it absolutely necessary to offer the Imperial dignity forthwith to the Elector of Saxony, and that, at the same time, all possible means should be us'd to get the Archduke elected King of the Romans. If the Elector of Saxony should decline the Imperial dignity upon account of the difficultys with regard to the Crown of Poland[3]: in that case I am persuaded that the election of the Archduke for Emperor at present, either under the guardianship of the *agnati*, or under the Vicars of the Empire, would go much easier than that of his Father. Upon the whole, what I mean is that the Court of Vienna should be made sensible that the maritime powers cannot and will not concur in any measures that will shock the Elector of Saxony and force him into the alliance of France. But that they insist upon the closest union between the Courts

[1] From the office letters to Harrington it is clear that Chesterfield drew his opinions on the imperial election very largely from the Grand Pensionary, van der Heim. The latter, who had held his office since 1737, was a leader of the moderate republicans, who clung to the English alliance but were opposed to an Orange restoration. His death in 1746 was a blow to his party, and contributed to the elevation of William IV in the following year.

[2] The Bohemian vote had been excluded at the election of 1742, as at that time the Kingdom was largely in French and Bavarian occupation. On that ground Maria Theresa disputed the legality of the election.

[3] Many German jurists held that it would be illegal to combine the crown of Poland with that of the Empire. As Augustus III, the second successive Saxon King, aspired to make the Polish crown hereditary in his family, this was one of the reasons which impelled him to refuse to become a candidate for the Imperial crown. Another very strong reason was that the Tsaritsa Elizabeth frowned upon his candidature. He owed his elevation to the Polish throne to Russian support

of Vienna and Dresden, leaving the particular arrangements of that union to their mutual discretion.

Before your Grace receives this letter you will, I hope, have seen Mr Trevor, who will leave me nothing to say to you upon my particular affairs here, in which nothing has happen'd since his departure. I am with the greatest sincerity and attachment

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 220, 221.

To NEWCASTLE.

Hague, March ye 5th N.S. 1745.

My Lord,

After having read and writt for fourteen hours this day without intermission, I have very little time, and as little power, left to trouble your Grace. I have acknowledg'd your letter by a post-script to your Brother; but, having seen the Pensionary since, I can't help telling you that by this post he will do what you mention'd and will repeat the dose occasionally.[1] By your thinking it will be of use, I hope things mend. I never mean't to exclude Lord Harrington from our private correspondence, and I mention'd at first *the four* to your Brother, meaning him and the Chancellor. He might have been examin'd about separate letters to him; the others I knew would not.[2] I am your Grace's quite exhausted humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 224.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, 22nd Febry 1944/5.

My Lord,

As this letter will turn chiefly on Foreign Affairs, in answer to what your Lordship has done my Brother and me the honour to

[1] This means that the Pensionary will write to Hop.

[2] This rather enigmatic sentence explains the reason for the private correspondence. It was to be kept secret from the King. This could not be done if the letters were addressed to Harrington. The King might at any moment ask him if he had any private letters in addition to his official dispatches. But he would not be likely to put such a question to ministers who had no official communication with our ambassador at The Hague.

write to us, and as I am sensible no hints I can give will be of any use or advantage to your Lordship, it is but reasonable I should make the reading of it as easy to you as possible ; and therefore, for your sake more than my own, I take the liberty to make use of Mr Stone's hand,[1] in whom you may have the same confidence as in myself.

I shall begin with returning your Lordship my thanks for sending Mr Trevor over to us, tho' I have scarce had an opportunity of having any private conversation with him. But your Lordship's letters, and particularly your private one to my Brother, and one conference we had with Mr Trevor, the day after his arrival, sufficiently shew the use and the necessity of this measure. For the greater certainty both of you and us, I desired Mr Trevor to reduce into writing, in as concise a measure as he could, the principal points of his commission, against which we might set down the most satisfactory answers we should be able to obtain ; and that Mr Trevor should return with them to The Hague as soon as possible.[2] This has been done, and I hope, considering the situation of things, Your Lordship in the main will be pretty well satisfied with them.

The two points on which the most difficulty was to be apprehended and did actually arise, were the agreeing formally that the two armies on the Lower Rhine and in Flanders should co-operate with and mutually assist each other, and that His Majesty should promise to act in his Electoral capacity, and furnish a contingent, *eo nomine*, towards the support of the common cause. These we all press'd with as much strength as possible. We soon made some way, and at last from the necessity of the thing have prevailed in the manner you will see from Mr Trevor's paper, where, tho' neither the electoral contingent, nor the troops to be furnish'd to the Queen of Hungary, in consequence of the £200,000 given by England,[3] are what we could wish them, yet, as they are under the denominations desired, and do together compose a strong force of 20,000 men, if what is now promised be punctually performed, I hope our friends in Holland will be satisfied with it, and that

[1] It was fortunate that Newcastle had a Secretary who wrote a really good hand. His own caligraphy is almost incredibly difficult to decipher.

[2] Trevor arrived at The Hague from London on 8 March (N.S.).

[3] These were the Hanoverian troops which Maria Theresa was to pay with money received from England.

the rather as the whole number demanded of Hanoverians (viz. 23,000 and some hundred men) are at present employed, and it may be some time and will depend upon incidents when the 3000 men shall be sent back to Hanover.

Your Lordship's letter relating to the Duke of Cumberland (tho' never mentioned to the King) has greatly facilitated our success in that respect, and His Royal Highness is extremely sensible of his obligation to you.[1] Upon the strength of your letter I encouraged M^r^ Trevor to fling out something of that nature to the King, which has been of great use. M^r^ Trevor is of opinion that the giving the nominal command to the Duke with Count Königsegg expressly *ad latus*, will be far from being disagreeable in Holland and, as C. Königseg will in effect have the command, the reasonableness of having the King's son nominally at the head of an army to which England contributes so much, and the example of C. Königseg's having formerly served in the same capacity with Prince Charles of Lorraine, will, we hope, prevent any objections he might have to this manner of turning it. For, tho' His Royal Highness would have liked extremely well to have commanded the English troops only under Count Königseg, yet, when the King was to send his son to command so considerable a part of the army, it was natural for His Majesty to like that he should have the nominal command of the whole. But His Royal Highness's disposition is such, and his instructions will be so form'd, that this will be in every respect the same thing.

Before I enter upon the subject of your Lordship's last letter to me of the 23^d^ inst. N.S., I enclose to you, in the utmost confidence, copies of two letters of great consequence from Paris. They are both very sensibly wrote, and, I am persuaded, contain the present scheme of the Court of France, viz. to keep the King of Prussia and to gain the King of Poland at any rate. This is so conformable to your Lordship's own way of thinking and to the accounts you had received, that I thought you would not dislike to see these letters. But I must beg that you would destroy them both as soon as you shall have made yourself perfectly master of the contents, and that in any letter you may write to me or my Brother you would take no notice of my having sent you

[1] From this it appears that the suggestion of giving the command to Cumberland came from The Hague. George II had refused to give his son a command in 1744.

these letters, whatever you may say of the subject matter of them.

Upon your Lordship's letter to me and that to Lord Harrington, I have urged to the King the necessity of speaking plainly to the Court of Vienna that they must not on any account (not even for the Imperial dignity) lose the King of Poland and fling him into the opposite scale, and of shewing them the impossibility of stirring a step against France or Prussia, if that should be the case. And I have gone so far as to suppose that, pursuant to the rule His Majesty has already laid down, if neither the Grand-Duke nor the Archduke could be chosen Emperor, His Majesty in that case would be for the King of Poland. And here I must own freely that whatever we may say relating to the election of an Emperor makes but little impression. We are always told that His Majesty understands that best himself, that he must go his own way, and that that, being the business of the Electors, must be left to them ; and neither the interposition of England or Holland is at all tasted.

However, if the Elector of Saxony should insist upon being Emperor (which his Minister here persuades the King he will not), I think we shall be able, on condition of making the Archduke King of the Romans, to get the consent here to it. At present we flatter ourselves with the hopes of satisfying the King of Poland *another way*,[1] and, as we imagine ourselves sure of the votes of the Electors of Mayence and Treves, we are doing all we can with the Court of Vienna to fix those of Cologne and Bavaria ; which the Elector of Cologne has represented here may be easily done for a small sacrifice (I think that of the Burgau only) from the Queen of Hungary, with the full restitution of Bavaria. Or at least, if the Elector of Bavaria should refuse those terms, he, the Elector of Cologne, would then remain firm to his present allies.

And now, my Lord, you must forgive me if I say that, tho' I am as much of opinion that the Elector of Saxony should not be lost for the Imperial dignity as you are, yet I cannot but think it may prove an unhappy expedient, if we should be obliged to have recourse to it, for the following reasons. I am as sensible as any body can be of the personal, as well as publick, objections there

[1] *i.e.* by procuring for him a substantial share in the anticipated Prussian spoils. The instructions to Villiers, our envoy at Dresden, on this subject are in the Record Office (S.P. For. Poland, 63 and 65).

may be to the Grand Duke. But the Imperial dignity cannot be certainly or solidly restored to the House of Austria but in the person of His Royal Highness, and after him in that of the Archduke. That it is for the general interest of Europe that the Imperial crown should be fix'd in the House of Austria, late experience has, I think, sufficiently shew'd. A weak Emperor will be (and sooner or later must be) a French Emperor; and the Elector of Saxony, if chosen Emperor, with the Archduke at the same time King of the Romans, will never be cordially united to the Court of Vienna, but will live in expectation of fixing the Imperial dignity in his own family, in case of an accident to the Archduke. And besides he, tho' a more powerful Prince than the Elector of Bavaria, will want acquisitions to support the Imperial dignity; and those acquisitions must be gain'd by the Queen of Hungary for him, or from the Queen of Hungary by others. I have also another apprehension which, I believe, has not occur'd to your Lordship. If the Elector of Saxony be chosen Emperor, he and *one* of his neighbours [*sc.* Hanover] will be constantly raising disputes with a certain Power [*sc.* Prussia], which is at present too strong, which will make it very difficult to put an end to the war. And, if a peace were made, we should be in continual dread of a new war on their account.

In these circumstances, and surrounded as we are with objections on all sides, I wonder our friends in Holland (and particularly the Pensionary) have not given a little more attention to the overtures made here and to your Lordship by the King of Prussia. I do admit that it would be difficult to have any dependance there. But, at the same time, if it could be brought about, it would do the business at once; and possibly, by renewing the Treaty of Breslau only, not only the peace might be made, but the Imperial crown be solidly settled in the House of Austria. But I find this is not at all tasted, and indeed I do not like it myself. The notion that prevails here that even Holland would be glad to see that Prince reduced [1] (tho' they will not themselves take a part in doing it) is a great encouragement to push it.

[1] This attitude on the part of the Dutch contributed to delay the Anglo-Prussian agreement until late in August. The Prussian possessions in Cleve and Gelderland bordered on the United Provinces, and Frederick had in 1744 strengthened his possessions in the west and gained a convenient harbour at Emden by his seizure of East Friesland. On both political and mercantile grounds this was resented by the Dutch.

I am much obliged to your Lordship for the hint you give me with relation to the gentleman who is lately come hither with a view of residing here as a foreign Minister. You are certainly in the right that many things to and from foreign Courts are convey'd through such channels unknown to us. And most of the material Foreign Ministers are as much attach'd to a certain person [*sc.* Granville], and act as much in concert with him as formerly. And, what is worse, I am afraid this is not only known but approved, and done in concert with some body else [*sc.* the King]. The time will come, and that soon, when all that must be explain'd. The King's servants must be his Ministers, exclusive of all others, or they cannot remain his servants.

Our Parliamentary affairs go swimmingly, tho' odd phenomena appear there every day. Lord Gower told me he would write fully to your Lordship by M^r^ Trevor. I am sorry to say our old friends begin to grow uneasy. Great industry is used to make them so, and therefore we must not be put upon any thing that can in any way contribute to it.

I have troubled you with a very long letter, more to fling out hints for your consideration than from any determined opinion of my own. I beg you would forgive the liberty I have taken, which could proceed from nothing but the real regard and respect with which I am

&c.

Holles Newcastle.

Copy in Andrew Stone's hand. The letter was carried to The Hague by Trevor. Add MSS. 32,804, fos. 226–232.

To Newcastle.

Hague, March 9th N.S. 1745.

My Lord,

I snatch what little time I have, and God knows that is little enough, to answer more fully than I could by the last post the honour of your Grace's letter of the 8th Feb. O.S. As to the number of men which the Dutch will bring into the field, I will answer for forty, I may say five and forty, thousand men, in case it may be prudent so to do, and that, I suppose, is all you would desire. I explain myself. They destine upwards of sixty thousand men for the service of the war in Flanders, out of which whatever number is proper shall take the field. If the army is strong enough

to advance before and consequently protect the frontier towns, they will leave very small garrisons in those towns, and have so many more men in the field, but if, on the contrary, we cannot advance and that those towns must defend themselves, the garrisons must necessarily be greater, and consequently the number of men in the field less. And therefore I do not very well see that they can, or that we should desire 'em, specifically to stipulate the number in the field, which from the reason I have mention'd must be eventuall, but I should think it would be more proper and practicable for 'em to give in writing the number of men to be employed in the *actuall service of the war in Flanders.* This I can further assure your Grace of, that they are as much determin'd to act with vigour as you could wish 'em to be, and, as they are determin'd that it shall be their last effort, they are determin'd too that it shall be a strong one. As for the time of taking the field, it will be settl'd, I hope, with many other things soon after Count Königseck's arrival here, whom I expect to-morrow, if not to-night. I am very sorry my Lord Stair is angry about Count Königseck, and I know he is particularly angry at me, having been told by Lord Carteret that he might thank his friend Chesterfield for his disappointment, which shows you the use that has been made of the letter I was oblig'd to write to L^{d} Harrington upon that subject, and with what little safety I can write what *somebody* [*sc.* the King] must see.[1] But I will take care to show L^{d} Stair himself the copy of that letter, with which, when he sees the whole, he can have no reason to be offended. However, I confess I am glad it is to be Count Königseck, whom I look upon to be without exception the ablest General now in Europe.

The difficulty your Grace mentions has been long in my opinion insurmountable. You cannot gain the King of Prussia without enraging the Queen of Hungary and probably losing the Elector of Saxony, and in consequence Russia, who have all their eyes upon Silesia and it may be some other morsels of Prussia's dominions; and, even if you could gain him at their expence, you could not rely upon him an hour. On the other hand, if you do not gain him, you rivett him in the arms of France, and continue

[1] This refers to Chesterfield's official letter to Harrington of 2 February (S.P. For. Holland, 408, fo. 141) in which he had enumerated the Dutch objections to Lord Stair, and also suggests that the King had communicated this letter to Granville.

the war in Germany for years. I see the disease, but I see no cure. The immediate danger that I dread is the disagreement between the Courts of Vienna and Dresden; if that be not prevented, the King of Poland throws himself into the arms of France, and the business is then all over. You will see by my letter to L^d^. Harrington the opinion of this Republick upon that point. The insisting, as I find the Court of Vienna will do, upon the Great Duke's being Emperor will, I am convinc'd, be attended with very ill consequences, and the attempt prove unsuccessfull at last; whereas that dignity yielded to the King of Poland, upon condition of the Archduke's being King of the Romans, would have been very practicable and have prevented a thousand difficultys, and, I will add too, would have restor'd the Imperial dignity to the House of Austria in the properest, the most advantageous, and, I believe, the only practicable manner. I must here observe to your Grace that though, by L^d^ Harrington's letters, *somebody* seems very reasonable about the choice of an Emperor and willing to conform to circumstances, yet orders, which may be you do not know of, came by last post to M^r^ Schwiegelt [1] to declare explicitly for the Great Duke, and M^r^ Busch, now Minister at Dresden,[2] has orders to go from thence forthwith to Vienna to concert and support that nomination. I beg this may be an inviolable secret because, if known, it would be the ruin of poor Schwiegelt, who is really a good sort of man, tells me everything, and does every thing I desire. This comes from L^d^ Granville's quiver, who I know said that the Great Duke must be Emperor, and that you were all a parcel of fools if you did not make him so. I rather fear that you will lose the Elector of Cologne than gain the Elector of Bavaria. Chavigny,[3] who was upon the spot, has taken possession of him, and the Court of Vienna does not seem to take the way to recover him. They think they do a great deal if they let him have his own again, which in truth is not leaving him bread for these ten years to come. Further than that they will not go, and I am sure France will; judge then which will prevail. His

[1] The Hanoverian envoy at the Hague.

[2] *i.e.* Hanoverian minister.

[3] Chavigny, the French minister at Munich, claimed the credit of founding the League of Frankfort. He was now engaged in endeavouring to prevent a reconciliation between the young elector and the court of Vienna. He failed in this, and the preliminaries of Füssen were concluded on 22 April 1745.

Royal Highness's [1] transactions with Monsieur Champigny,[2] and the unbounded confidences he makes him, are known and do mischief. Champigny is un chevalier d'industrie, a universal spy and particularly of the Court of France.

Pray take care to have the letters receiv'd by Monsieur Alt from M[r] Mann [3] here open'd and read in a proper place; because I have taken care to have *certain doses* administered that way. Mann belongs absolutely to me, and I risk nothing by making this use of him.

Upon the whole, I find things have gone well in the House of Commons. If you encourage those who have behav'd well or pretty well this year, without distinction of party, you will have no difficulty next year. The sour Whiggs and Torys will both stay in kennel and content themselves with drinking to your confusion, which will not contribute in the least to it. Please Gower and his detachment, I beseech you; which will at least break the Tory party, so as to make the other part of it absolutely inconsiderable. Monsieur Steenberg [4] has written to his son, who is at Leyden, to be ready to go with him to Hannover in two months, and by letters I have seen from thence company is expected there as soon as the Parliament shall be up.

Does not this facility of raising seven or eight millions please somebody [*sc.* George II]? And are not some people [*sc.* Ministers] better somewhere [*i.e.* in the royal Closet] than they were? If they are not now, they never will. It is high time that the state of affairs should change for the better, either at home or abroad. I think it very bad abroad, your Grace knows best how it is at home. I am not apt to have or to indulge very gloomy ideas, but as to affairs abroad I protest I can form no others. Let us pray for accidents. I believe I have given your Grace a strange

[1] Frederick, Prince of Wales.

[2] Champigny was the agent of the Elector of Cologne.

[3] Alt was the Hessian minister in London, and Mann held the same post at the Hague.

[4] Steinberg was one of George II's electoral ministers. At this time he was in London, where the King always kept a German minister to attend to electoral business. His message to his son was significant, as it indicated George II's intention to go to Hanover. These continental journeys during the war were regarded with serious misgivings by the English ministers, but their remonstrances were of no avail, and would have been worse than useless in 1745.

jumble of ill digested matter, but my head, at best fit for but little business, is really quite confounded both with the quantity and quality of what I have now to go through. The clearest notion I have left is that I am with the greatest truth and attachment

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

The letter to Mr Alt which I have hinted at will go by Friday's post.

I have received by Mr Trevor the honour of your Grace's letter of the 22nd Feb. O.S., which I have not time to enter upon any part of now, and only return my thanks for it.

But I see by it that you must soon kill or be killed.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 239–244.

To NEWCASTLE.

Hague, March 10th 1745.

My Lord,

If Mr Trevor has brought me any satisfaction from England, it is but very little and in very few points; for, by his verbal accounts, and still more by your Grace's letter, the most material affairs at home, I mean *above stairs*, seem to go as ill as possible, which must necessarily affect affairs abroad; and, for my own part, I soon expect to be asked here (as Lockhart was at Paris after the Restoration) whose Minister I am, to which I confess I shall be puzzl'd what to answer. That I am not the King's is pretty well known here already, and if you are his servants and not his Ministers, I am not the Minister of his Ministry neither, which will soon be known here too. Your Grace says, and very truly, that the King's servants must be his Ministers exclusive of all others, or they cannot remain his servants. But give me leave to say that, if you do not bring that matter to a decision before the Parliament meets, you will certainly be neither after it is up. Your strength is in Parliament, and you must use it while you have it. The unanimity you have procur'd there, far from recommending you in the Closet, is us'd as an argument against you there, and somebody is told *since they can do what they will there, make 'em do what you will.* It is, therefore, surely time to show the person who suggests that argument [*sc.* Granville]

that, as you can do what you will there, you will do what he won't like. You have rais'd seven millions for unpopular services with a unanimity yet unhear'd of; you have tried conciliating methods in the Closet and push'd complaisance as far as it can go. All this has fail'd; what resource have you then but in Parliament? The measure will be as popular to the nation as necessary to yourselves. If you ask me how this is to be done, I answer, no matter how, provided it is but done. The Parliament is willing to do it how you please. It is no up-hill work, no nice attack upon a Minister that has either a great many personal friends or a whole party to support him, where forms must be observ'd, proofs clear, and where ill success would be fatal. On the contrary, it is only giving way to a national and a Parliamentary impatience to mark a man who has no party and scarce a friend to support him. The success is not doubtfull; and the precedent is even favourable to Ministers as a regular establish'd Company, and only formidable to the interloper and unfair trader. I confess I suspect the uneasyness your Grace mentions of some of your old friends, which may very possibly be pretended to cover other things. Your enemys, I believe, have agents, and *able ones*, to foment that uneasyness among your old friends; make an example of one or two of those agents, and the uneasyness will cease. And send those who are now so scrupulously affraid of Torys back to their original Jacobitism and Jacobite friends. The acquiring of the bulk of the nation and a hundred head of Torys in Parliament is surely more than an equivalent for their loss.

I troubled your Grace so much upon foreign affairs by last post that I mean to be short upon 'em now, though, when I have once begun, like Horace,[1] I may possibly be, and your Grace probably think me, too long.

The forty thousand men promis'd for Flanders have had a pretty good effect here, though some doubt a little whether they can come in time; but, however, they look upon it as a mark of our being in earnest, which puts 'em in a good humour. The case is not the same with regard to the Electoral troops, which from twenty thousand that Monsieur Schwiegelt promis'd 'em they have found out amount exactly to four. The 8000 now in

[1] *i.e.* Horatio Walpole, whose lengthy disquisitions upon foreign affairs, with which he had once been closely associated, were the terror of the Secretaries of State to whom they were addressed.

Flanders, and still paid as they suppose by England,[1] when replac'd are to decamp ; and of the twenty thousand upon the Lower Rhine, two thousand of the sixteen taken by the Queen of Hungary and paid by England are nimm'd in order to swell the remaining four up to six thousand men. Moreover they do not perceive that the promis'd cooperation of that corps upon the Rhine with the army in Flanders means that detachments may occasionally be made from the former to the latter ; on the contrary, they are persuaded that will not be allowed for reasons too obvious for me to mention. All this poor Schwiegelt will hear with both ears to-morrow, when he presents his memorial, by which he is order'd to demand admission to all conferences, and the same securitys and guarantees which the other allies are mutually to give and receive.

The Court of Vienna has absolutely lost that of Bavaria, which cannot be wonder'd at considering the shamefull offers made by 'em at a time when France was offering every thing. I heartily wish the same thing may not happen with the Court of Saxony, but I much fear it will. It is plain that the King of Poland is setting himself up at auction. From the House of Austria he will either have the Imperial dignity or an equivalent ; perhaps he would like the equivalent best. But, if the Queen of Hungary will give neither, he will certainly listen to France, who will give him both. Moreover the Queen of Hungary herself has rais'd his price by making him so much more necessary to her upon losing the Elector of Bavaria. I heartily wish the Duke of Lorraine were to be Emperor, and that that dignity were to be hereditary in the House of Austria, but, as I am persuaded the first will meet with insuperable difficultys of various kinds, the insisting upon it will in my opinion hinder even the recovery of the Imperial dignity to the Archduke. If the King of Poland is too weak for an Emperor, what would the Great Duke be if the Queen of Hungary should dye ? in which case he would not have a foot of land in the world except Tuscany. This and many other objections will be urg'd against him by most of the Princes of the Empire, among

[1] They were previously paid by England, but in 1745 they were transferred to Maria Theresa, who received an additional £200,000 to enable her to pay them. This transparent evasion was devised to meet English prejudices, and it served to enable Pitt, who had denounced the Hanoverian forces before, to defend them now.

whom I really believe the Elector of Hannover is the single one who wishes to see him Emperor. It is most certain he never can be it without the support and concurrence of the Elector of Saxony, which if they are not obtain'd and yet the point insisted upon, we shall all feel the fatal consequences of that error. But all this it seems is Electoral business, you none of you know any thing about the matter, and England and the Republick have nothing to do with it. The Republick does not reason exactly in that manner, but as they think themselves here highly concern'd in the consequences of this affair, they will be apt to interpose in the beginning of it. Your Grace's last objection to the King of Poland would be a very weighty one if it held only in that case ; but let things turn which way they will, that objection will be equally strong. Should the Great Duke be Emperor, would not that person have the same inclinations, and think even that he had a stronger right to have 'em gratified from that quarter than from any other ? And would the offended Elector of Saxony interpose in our favour ? In short you must never expect in any situation to see those two houses agree until one or t'other is ruin'd. With prudent conduct I really think the King of Prussia would at present stand a fair chance of being undone. How far England, singly as England, ought to wish that is another question ; but, considering all circumstances, I don't know whether the dismembering of him is not the shortest way of getting out of our difficultys. For to make up with him at present I consider as absolutely impossible, if you will have any thing more to do with the Queen of Hungary, the Elector of Saxony, and possibly Russia.

Count Königseck and Prince Waldeck arriv'd here yesterday, and I shall now press this Government to come to some precision upon the several points of my instructions, but with what success as to many of them I cannot say. This only I can and will say ; that you must take these people as you can get 'em this year, and have nothing to do with 'em the next. They cannot, they will not go on another year. Your peace, tho' necessary, will, I fear, be but a bad one, and even worse for the Emperor's death than if he had liv'd ; for he grew tir'd of France, and France grew weary of paying him, and being tolerably satisfied with having snatch'd the Imperial crown from the House of Austria, would have been more *traittable* than they will be now when they see the design of recovering it again for that House.

Forgive this incoherent rhapsody, most inaccurately writt by snatches, as I could find moments from the constant hurry I am now in. I think aloud with your Grace, and write, as I think, unconnectedly at least, it may be erroneously. My notions, however mistaken, will not mislead you who can so well correct 'em, and the communication of 'em is a proof at least of the unreserv'd confidence in which I will ever live with your Grace while I live a publick life; but I own every thing makes me pant after the quiet and comforts of a private one, which, I think, I am in a fair way of being restor'd to. This persuasion makes me send you, sooner than otherwise I should have done, a letter in form for some Irish ecclesiastical promotions. I mean the Bishop of Chlonfort for the see of Dromore, and Doctor Chenevix for that of Chlonfort. He has been my Chaplain these sixteen years, was recommended to me by Scarbrough,[1] was Chaplain to the Princess Royal, and is now most strongly recommended to me by her for this preferment. The Bishoprick is but a poor one, and the man is so poor too that I should really be unhappy if, by neglecting this opportunity, it should afterwards, as probably it may, be out of my power to help him. I am with the sincerest respect and attachment

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

I am very happy to have contributed in any degree to what I am sure gives the Duke [2] so much joy. I am sure I wish him not only joy but victory and triumph.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 243–247.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, March 5th 1744/5.

My Lord,

I am too sensible how usefully your time is employ'd for the service of your country and your friends to give you any unnecessary trouble. I could not, however, avoid returning you my thanks for the honour of your letters of the 5th and 9th inst. N.S.

Nothing can be more comfortable than the account you give

[1] Lord Scarborough, Chesterfield's most intimate and valued friend, committed suicide in 1740. See Chesterfield's sketch of his character in *Letters* (ed. Bradshaw) III. p. 1420.

[2] "The Duke" in that generation was the Duke of Cumberland, just as in a later generation it meant the Duke of Wellington.

of the efforts the Dutch intend to make this year, especially in Flanders: and, without a compliment, I cannot but think it is much owing to the right way in which you have managed them. I hope we shall do our part to second them. Nothing will tend so much towards it as the appointment of the Duke to command in Flanders, who will, I believe, be made Captain-General of all His Majesty's forces.

I shall long to hear how our friends in Holland and Count Königseck take it. I will pawn my credit the Duke shall do his part, and you may answer for him to C^t^ Königseck. Lord Drumore, who is a very prudent man and esteem'd to be a very good officer, will be next in command under His Royal Highness.

As to Lord Stair, whether he will continue in the command I know not. He often talks of giving it up, but as yet has not done it. He was at first, I believe, displeas'd with you; but since seems to have turn'd his resentment elsewhere.

I wish, my dear Lord, you had been able to suggest a remedy for the evil we all see and feel. Strong orders goe by this messenger to prevent the disagreement between the Courts of Vienna and Dresden. Count Flemming seems really to think that there is no danger of his master's flinging himself into the arms of France, that he will not insist upon the Imperial dignity, and that the Court of Vienna may easily secure him by gratifying his demand of part of Silesia in case it be conquered from the King of Prussia.

In the confidence I write to your Lordship, I will trust you with an anecdote which is only between ourselves. M^r^ Steinberg and M^r^ Wasner[1] have, unknown to all the King's English *servants*, sign'd reciprocal declarations, engaging the King's Electoral vote on the one hand for the Duke of Lorraine, and the Queen of Hungary's and the Duke of Lorraine's consent to certain facilities and advantages to the King as Elector on the other. The first of which engagements has since been explain'd to us to be conditional only in case the Elector of Saxony be satisfied. This explains the orders you mention to have been sent to M^r^ Schwiegelt, and the mission of M^r^ Busch to Vienna.

M^r^ Schwiegelt's secret and every thing you write to me shall

[1] Ignaz von Wasner was the able Austrian minister at the English Court, and played a part of no small importance in guiding the relations between London and Vienna during the war. By some odd perversity Chesterfield frequently writes his name as "Wassenaer". See below, pp. 67, 89.

be kept and confined only to those you yourself desire; and I cannot give you a greater proof of my resolution in this respect than the unlimited confidence with which I write to you.

The King of Prussia is certainly thoroughly frighten'd, and is come now to talk very closely and very moderately. Andrié received a courier last Saturday from his Master, whereby (as I understand, for I have not seen him) he is authorised and press'd to sign immediately upon the following conditions.[1]

1. The bare renewal of the Treaty of Breslaw;

2. The offer only (tho' it should not be accepted) of the Elector of Bavaria's countries without any *dédommagement* of any kind;

3. On these conditions to make his peace, and to give his vote for the Duke of Lorraine to be Emperor.

These, you will own, are tempting proposals: at once to abandon France and to restore the Imperial Dignity, immediately, to the House of Austria. You will certainly be acquainted with them by the next post. I am not sure you will hear any thing of them in form till then. But, till you do, I beg you would take no notice of them.[2] I know the just diffidence and abhorrence that all the world must have of the King of Prussia's behaviour. But, if we never have to do with Princes who have once broken their words, we must never make peace with France. I took the liberty to tell the King to-day that, if these proposals were rejected, they would be immediately made publick: and, if it should be once known that we might have made peace with Prussia upon these conditions, it would be impossible afterwards to carry on the war against him. I shall be surprised if the Pensionary does not eagerly embrace this overture. If he does not, I own, I think, we shall have a right to demand of him to concur in the necessary measures for carrying on the war against the King of Prussia, which he will not do. I am far from meaning by this that we should too hastily give in to these proposals, or that we should make up with Prussia, at any rate without the concurrence or consent of our allies. This

[1] The terms proposed by Andrié, which appear to have been authorised from Berlin on 8 March (N.S.) are in S.P. Foreign Ministers, 48. They are endorsed "Sent to E. Chesterfield, M[r] Trevor and Sir Thos. Robinson." The relevant dispatch is not to be found in Frederick's *Politische Correspondenz*.

[2] It is characteristic of Newcastle's underhand methods to take this communication out of the hands of the Northern Secretary, to whose department it belonged.

way, if the King of Prussia is in earnest, I do see a way out and no other: and this way, if we take right measures and push our operations this campaign, we may possibly make an advantageous peace with France at the end of it.

I have troubled you so much upon our foreign affairs that I shall say nothing upon those at home. Things remain just as they were. Every thing in Parliament goes well; and every thing out of it ill. The Parliament will probably rise before Easter, and immediately after the King thinks of going abroad; before which time there must be a thorough explanation.

I am ashamed of giving you so much trouble. But it proceeds from that unalterable respect with which I am

&c.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

In Stone's handwriting. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 253–256.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, March 20th 1745.

My Lord,

Having kept back the post till this day I have just time to acknowledge, though not to answer, your Grace's letter of the 5th O.S. which I received by a courier this morning.

The affair of Prussia draws near a point: that surely deserves great attention: how you will be able to bring the Court of Vienna into it is the question. If that can be done, the King of Poland becomes less important, and the majority in the Electoral College secure. But there will be some (I doubt insuperable) objections to this *elsewhere*.

Mr Van der Poll's [1] son of Amsterdam goes to England by the next packett boat. Hop will present him at court and to your Grace. I beg you will let Chloe stuff him once or twice, and let him know that I procur'd him the stuffing. I wish he could have a word said to him when presented; his father is the ruling man of Amsterdam; he had a French tendency, but I have been pulling at him ever since, and with some success. He is very able and very proud. Pray tell the son the great regard I have for his

[1] Jan van der Poll was frequently burgomaster of Amsterdam between 1718 and 1744. He was a prominent figure in the republican party, which it was Chesterfield's cue to conciliate.

Father, and that I have assur'd your Grace of his ability and his zeal for the common cause. I am with the truest attachment,

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 249.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, March 23d, N.S.

My Lord,

Your Grace's friendly and confidential letter to me of the 5th O.S. had only by the last post my hasty acknowledgment, but without the thanks it deserv'd or the answer it requir'd. My thanks may be very short because they are very sincere ; I wish for your sake my answer could be so too. The Duke's affair is as well here as we could wish it ; there were odd difficulties at first, they are not only remov'd, but even he shall have the command given him voluntarily without it's having been once ask'd. Marechal Königseck took the thing most *galamment* the moment I mention'd it to him ; therefore, for God's sake, let the Duke be advis'd to act in the same manner towards him ; and I will venture to say that his Highness cannot acquire more glory by any one thing this campaign than by implicitely conforming himself to the Mareschal's instructions. He is, I think, the most amiable man I ever knew, and in every thing he says or does here shows a most superior understanding. I hope no cabal of English officers will suggest to the Duke the least contradiction, or, if they do, that it will not have any effect.

By what I can learn I cannot think that the Elector of Saxony will so easily give up the Imperial dignity as Count Flemming supposes ; nor can I conceive that Count Bruhl, the vainest and most profuse man living, will barter that glittering and profitable employment of First Minister to the Emperor, for an assignment of lands *in partibus infidelium* to be conquer'd some time or other for the King his master. But I can much more easily believe that Count Flemming is prevail'd with by Carteret and Schaub, whose creature he is, to hold that language.

The *reciprocal declaration*, I dare say, is not the first, and will not be by many the last, that will be sign'd without the privity of the King's *servants*, unless they take care to make themselves his ministers too. They have but little time to do it in, and there-

fore I should lose none. Upon this occasion let me tell your Grace in the utmost confidence that I receiv'd by the last post a round-about indeed, but a very plain, intimation from a person in the confidence of Lord Granville, *that there would be soon great changes at Court, but that it was hoped Lord Chesterfield would not quitt, for that those who would have the power were more his friends than those who would lose it*; with many other things upon my own subject not fit for me to repeat. That *soon* I take to be the rising of the Parliament. Remember what Cardinal de Retz says of the blustering people of Paris: *qu'il craint toujours quand il voit qu'on ne le craint pas.*

The acquisition of the King of Prussia, which I am convinc'd might be brought about for the present upon the terms your Grace mentions, would certainly be a great object; and the more so as it would probably secure Bavaria and Cassel into the bargain, besides that I begin much to doubt of Russia's acting.[1] But the difficulty will be how to combine it with the views of the Court of Dresden; for, as for the Queen of Hungary, I think she might be brought into it, both to secure, as it would do, the Imperial dignity to the Duke of Lorraine, and enable her to send a sufficient number of troops into Italy, whence (if the Elector of Saxony were not worth managing) she might recover Naples and Sicily by way of equivalent for Silesia.[2] This Republick would like it well enough if it procur'd a peace; but they would like a peace procur'd by any other means much better, for they are uneasy at the great power of the King of Prussia and would be glad to see it reduc'd, though they will not contribute towards it themselves. Next week I hope to finish the Convention with the States for the respective proportions of troops, artillery, contingent expences, and future subsidys, and then I shall have done all I can do here. For, as for the Grand Alliance and the universal plan of operations mentioned in my instructions, I am convinc'd they will be impracticable, and it may be not adviseable for the reasons I mention'd in my last to your Brother. I would therefore submitt

[1] During 1745 important efforts on the part of the allies were made to procure Russian intervention or Russian aid in the war. I have traced the story in detail in an article on "Lord Hyndford's Embassy to Russia," which will appear shortly in the *English Historical Review*.

[2] But the treaty of Worms had promised Sicily, if conquered, to the King of Sardinia.

it in time to your Grace's consideration how much longer you would have me stay here, I mean within a month or six weeks more or less, in which I would intirely conform to whatever you and your friends may think most convenient for yourselves. But in all events it is impossible for me to stay here after the King shall have left England ; the reasons are too obvious to be mention'd.[1] Another thing which I think it necessary to give your Grace notice of beforehand is that, when I do return to England, though I neither expect nor desire favour, I will not be mark'd out for indignitys. So that, if I am treated in a certain way, you must not be surpris'd or displeas'd if I quitt. You shall prescribe the manner of my doing it, which is the only sacrifice I can make you where my honour is so nearly concern'd. I do not mean by this to be us'd better than the rest of you, but only that I will not be us'd worse. And I assure you at the same time that, should I be restor'd to my private life, I should not be less zealous, nor it may be less able, to serve you and your friends, for no man living can be with more truth and respect than I am

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

P.S. I have just now finished the agreement with the States as to the several proportions, after so much wrangling and such twopenny cavils on their part that I did not expect to have concluded yet of some days, and was a little surpriz'd at their agreement to-day. In one respect I have made a better bargain than I expected, for I have brought 'em up to a third part of the whole expence of the artillery as well as of every thing relative to sieges, whereas I fear'd they would not have exceeded a fourth. As to the casuall expences and contingents of the war, which is but a small object when the whole expence of sieges is deducted, I have contented myself with one fourth, which was the utmost I could get, as well as of future subsidys. The whole is to be put in the form of a Resolution of the States, as your Grace will see it by next post. Which I like better than a Convention, it being equally decisive and obligatory, whereas a Convention must have been sent to the Provinces, which would have taken a great deal

[1] This means that Chesterfield, as ambassador at the Hague, would have to meet the King at Helvoetsluys, and that rudeness on the King's part would make his retention of office impossible.

of time in itself, not to mention the various alterations and silly objections it would have been expos'd to from these ingenious Knights of the Shires. The putting of the whole of the artillery into the hands of the Dutch, in which England is to have nothing to do but pay two-thirds in money, may possibly not be very agreeable to our board of Ordinance, but I know it will save us a great deal of money, and that the artillery will be much better serv'd. If they have any thing well here, it is their Ordinance, which, I don't know why, has been better attended to than any other part of their government. Though I have made the best bargain I could, I am very sensible I have made but a bad one. And to obviate as far as I could the ill consequences it might otherwise have had hereafter, I have inserted a clause in the resolution that none of the stipulated proportions shall ever be urg'd as a precedent after the present war. I look upon my business here as finish'd, except some little details to be adjusted in consequence of these general stipulations. For I again submitt it to your consideration, whether you would have the great scheme of a Grand Alliance broach'd, since this Republick will certainly not come into it, and whether you would desire to take new engagements for a war which you want to get out of, and moreover must get out of after this campaign. As matters now stand, you cannot get out of it without breaking some engagements; would you then contract new ones? M^r^ Trevor and I shall by next post call for some instructions from Lord Harrington upon this point, and if upon deliberation you should think proper not to have it push'd, I should think you might put it in a meritorious light in the Closet, instead of having the real reason suspected.

C.

I have this moment reason to believe that the Regency of Hannover have writt to England to advise the immediate march of the 8000 Hannoverians now in Flanders to the Duke of Aremberg's army.[1] Frightn'd as they are out of their wits at Monsieur Maillebois and at the loss of their 400 men in the Castle of Cronenburg, should this be but attempted here after the repeated assurances I have given by the King's orders that those 8000 men should positively remain in Flanders till replac'd by others to the amount of 40,000, and immediately after the stipulations I have

[1] Arenberg commanded the allied army on the Rhine.

this day concluded, every thing here would be broke up at once, and I could not show my face here any more. I am sure it is advis'd by this post. And I am as sure that the advice will be relish'd, but I hope not pursued.

Autograph (last paragraph very hastily written). Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 273–278.

To Chesterfield.

Newcastle House, March 12, 1744/5.

My dear Lord,

My Brother writing by the last messenger, I did not so much as trouble your Lordship to thank you for your letter of the 12th inst. N.S.

You will have seen what use we propose to make of the incident of the Prussian overture, which, you will own, is a frank offer, plain and simple; and, if accepted and sincerely executed, may put a shorter and better end to our present troubles than any other expedient that now offers. These are our thoughts, and I hope on consideration will be yours and the Pensionary's. This way, we may make a tolerable, and even an advantageous, end with France and Spain; any other, I doubt, will be plunging us into new difficulties.

Our affairs at home, I am afraid, are not to be remedied by the measure you hint at. There is neither time, disposition, nor, for ought I know, materials proper for it. *Tout va de mal en pis*; and so will continue, till some resolution is taken. When that will be, or what it will be, I cannot possibly determine; but some resolution must be taken, and that soon.

I laid the affair of the Irish Bishops before the King, and supported the recommendation for supplying the vacancy, not only in the best manner I could, but with the authority of the old Lords Lieutenants now here. Nothing goes glib, and so that is not yet done. I hope to send a better account in a post or two.

We are told we shall have a battle tomorrow in the House of Commons upon an innocent Justice of the Peace Bill; and that it will meet with great opposition, or opposition from great persons, in the House of Lords. We shall endeavour to stand it, and I doubt not our success.

However uneasy your own situation is, be assured, my dear Lord, that of your humble servants here is not less so. You have

this advantage, you are able to do more good, and whatever you get done is with a good will.

I am with the greatest truth and respect
&c

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 257.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, March the 30th N.S., 1745.

My Lord,

I receiv'd in due time the honour of your Grace's letter of the 12th O.S.

You will see by this post that the King of Poland, or rather Count Bruhl, has declared himself explicitely a candidate for the Imperial crown, as it was all along evident to me that he would. The court of Vienna must therefore now make its option whether it will yield that dignity to the King of Poland, or [let him] receive it from the King of Prussia. But in order to bring it to make that option, it must be talk'd to in a very different language from what it has been us'd to hear from us, but which may very properly be held by those who both pay and fight for it. If the Queen of Hungary will neither make up with the King of Prussia nor satisfy the King of Poland, the immediate effect of that obstinacy and greedyness will be the junction of those two Kings (however unwilling) with France. Which junction will necessarily be follow'd by that of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. She will then be in a fine situation, and so shall we, for we shall be left tête à tête with her ; since I am very sure that this Republick will not stand that united force one day longer than while they can send to Paris to beg a peace and receive an answer. If the Queen of Hungary would, on the other hand, yield the Imperial dignity to the King of Poland, upon condition of the Archduke's being elected at the same time King of the Romans, she need give the King of Poland nothing else, and would secure that dignity for her family. Or, if she would renew the Treaty of Breslau and gain the King of Prussia, she might then be more tenacious with the King of Poland, and yet secure the Empire for her husband, who will never have it by any other means. One or t'other she must do, or she is undone ; and yet I believe she will do neither, because

I do not believe you will be allow'd to speak to her in the proper manner, or, if you are, a whisper of a much gentler nature will be convey'd to her at the same time to defeat you. These situations give Lord Granville fine opportunitys to distress you, disturb affairs abroad, and make himself be thought *somewhere* more necessary than ever ; and I dare say he will neither let the opportunity slip, nor even *delay it.*

Prince William of Hesse, by some undoubted accounts that I have had this day, is not only willing but impatient to reunite the allies of Frankfort with the maritime powers, and has writt to his Brother [1] to be provisionally authoriz'd for that purpose. He is convinc'd that the King of Prussia (in case the Treaty of Breslau be renew'd) might be depended upon, and would even give any proofs that could be thought of of his sincerity ; moreover I find that Prince William would be willing to be employ'd in that transaction. I beg this may be an inviolable secret, and that Monsieur Alt may know nothing of it. But, if you should think it worth improving, and be inclin'd to employ Prince William of Hesse in it, which I should think might be safely and usefully done, you may mention it to Monsieur Alt as a thought of your own, without so much as intimating that it was suggested to you, or known by any body else, especially by me. For, having finish'd my own business here as far as it can be finish'd, I am resolv'd *rebus sic stantibus* to be involv'd in no other. I therefore say nothing of this in our joynt letters, in which I have no longer any other share than the reading and the signing of 'em : for, as I write to you, as to my friends, I do not desire to write at the same time to your enemys, and to have the same use made of more of my letters that I know has been already made of one.[2]

Your Grace tells me that things go *de mal en pis* at home, that they must be brought to a decision, but that you don't know when. In the name of God, can there be a doubt as to the *when* ? Will you stay till your strength, I mean the Parliament, is out of your hands, and let that decision be then against you which you can now secure ? Your situation is as well known out of England as in it, and has even worse effects abroad than at home. Some rejoyce at it, some lament it, but, to tell you the plain truth, most laugh at it. Moreover, independently of the evident advantage

[1] The King of Sweden, who was Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.
[2] This refers to his office letter about Lord Stair. See above, p. 18 note.

of an immediate decision, I would ask by what means such a decision is to be brought on next month that will not bring it on full as well next week? I beg your Grace's pardon, but I cannot help being a little warm upon this subject, as it is of the utmost consequence to your selves, to the nation, and to all Europe. Every hour's delay has an ill effect somewhere or other. The game is now in your hands, and if you lose it—*your enemys will tell you the rest with pleasure.*

I am sorry that your Grace and my two predecessors have had so much trouble about my ecclesiastical recommendations, which, were it not for the sakes of the persons concern'd, I am very indifferent about them, because the refusal would save me a great deal of trouble and restore me to that kind of life which I unwillingly left and shall most willingly return to. If my recommendation to the dirtiest Bishoprick in Ireland (independently of it's name) is not to prevail, it can only be because it is mine. An indignity by which I am distinguish'd from all my predecessors, and to which I will upon no account submitt; and I think it but fair to give your Grace and our friends notice that, upon this foot, I will not be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland one hour after my arrival in London.

I see Sir John Eyles is dead, and Sir Everard Falconer [1] is in another destination. Pray think of Harry Furnese;[2] I am sure he can, and I am as sure that he will, be of infinite use to you, not only in that office, but in many other ways.

I have this moment a certain account that just before the King of Prussia left Berlin he refus'd to concert any plan with Monsieur Mortaigne and Monsieur Courten,[3] who press'd him to do it, and would allow neither of 'em or any foreign minister to attend him to the army. A precaution he always takes when he meditates a sudden turn.

I hope to hear soon from your Grace or your Brother when you would have me write an office letter to Lord Harrington for leave

[1] This should be Fawkener, but proper names were very capriciously spelt in the eighteenth century. Sir Everard had been ambassador at Constantinople, and was at this time private secretary to the Duke of Cumberland.

[2] Henry Furnese was M.P. for New Romney, one of the Cinque Ports. He had been a member of the Committee appointed to inquire into the conduct of Sir Robert Walpole.

[3] The military representatives of France at Berlin.

to come home. Since my stay here now is as useless to you as it is disagreeable to your Grace's

most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 279–282.

TO CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, March 26, 1745.

My Lord,

I must begin by asking pardon of your Lordship for not having sooner returned you my sincere thanks for the honor of your letters of the 20th and 23rd inst. N.S. The true reason was that I had not time to write so fully as I could wish, and was not able to procure from amongst ourselves such explicite answers as I thought you had reason to desire. However, I would no longer defer sending you the best account I could of things here, and at the same time thanking you for your letter of the 30th N.S., which I received on Saturday night.

You will allow me, in the first place, to congratulate your Lordship upon the success that you have had in many material parts of your negotiation, and the happy turn you have given to the grand work of all, I mean the accommodation with Prussia. As to the first, the settling, in so satisfactory a manner, the command of the combined army in Flanders in the person of His Royal Highness the Duke, with the assistance of Marshal Königseck; the formal engagement of the States, by their last Resolution, to furnish (for such I take it to be by putting the parts together) upwards of sixty thousand men in the whole for the service of this campaign; the Republic's taking upon themselves the care and conduct of all sieges, furnishing the necessary artillery, ammunition &c., on condition we pay two-thirds of the expence (out of which two-thirds is to be deducted the value of our artillery in Flanders); and the establishing a certain proportion (tho' not so great a one as we could wish) for future subsidies; the joint measures concerted by your Lordship and the Pensionary for bringing about the views of the Maritime Powers, in the several Courts of the Empire, upon the great incident of the Emperor's death; as these are in my opinion greatly, if not singly, owing to your Lordship's weight, prudence and ability, they are also demonstrations of the disposition of the Republic to act thoroughly and without

reserve in the support of the common interest, and great indications of their resolution to contribute as much towards it as their present abilities and exhausted state will admit.

As to what remains to be perfected, viz. the plan of a general alliance, and general or particular operations in consequence of it, mentioned in your instructions, I am of opinion, with your Lordship, that at present it will be impracticable to come to any such agreement, from the different views and objects of the respective parties, and above all from the present seeming determined resolution in Holland to put an end to the war at the conclusion of this campaign. But, were the war to be carried on, such a plan would be both reasonable and necessary, and, if properly espoused by England and Holland, would be the only way to prevent the particular and foreign objects of any of the parties from having any undue influence upon the whole. In this view we inculcated the necessity of this measure in the answer we drew for M^r^ Boetslaer in May last.[1] And, for this reason, we alleged the want of such a concert and plan as a misconduct in the person who was supposed to have the chief management of the King's affairs in the paper we delivered to His Majesty in November last.[2] Whether, therefore, it should be absolutely drop'd, without knowing the Pensionary's thoughts upon the advisableness of it and the possibility of succeeding in it, I will not determine. But, as your Lordship wrote to my Lord Harrington in your publick dispatch upon this subject, you will receive the King's orders upon it, which, I am persuaded, will be such as you will not disapprove and will not necessarily detain you any longer at The Hague. Looking therefore upon the chief object of your commission to be over (and I think, considering every thing, very happily and honorably over) my Brother and I are of opinion that you cannot too soon write an office letter to my Lord Harrington for leave to come home.

I come now to the second point, viz. the happy turn given to the accommodation with Prussia. Your Lordship knows my thoughts so fully upon the advisableness and necessity of that

[1] Boetzelaer had been sent over to ascertain British war aims. The answer referred to was drafted by Pelham, Newcastle and Harrington, and finally adjusted with Carteret. The draft, with Carteret's amendments, is in Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 223. It is dated 17 May (O.S.) 1744.

[2] This was the paper, drawn up by Hardwicke, which led to Carteret's resignation. See Yorke, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, I. pp. 332–5.

measure that you will easily imagine the strong manner in which you have recommended it to Sir Thomas Robinson, supported by the opinion of the Pensionary, and the manner in which you acquainted us here with his, the Greffier's, and your own thorough approbation of it, was not only extremely agreeable to your friends here, but it is thought will have (if any thing will have) a good effect at Vienna, where there will not be wanting endeavours from different quarters to defeat it. The Queen of Hungary has certainly (as your Lordship says) but one of these things to do, either to consent to the King of Poland's being Emperor, or to purchase that dignity for the Duke of Lorraine by her accommodation with the King of Prussia. That, of the two, the last is most advisable for her, for us, and for all Europe, I am clearly of opinion.

But there is a third method, which perhaps may be the most likely to take place, viz. the purchasing the Elector of Saxony's consent to the Duke of Lorraine's being Emperor by promising him extensive acquisitions to be gain'd by the spoils of the King of Prussia; and that I think is the worst of all.[1] If the Elector of Saxony refuses these eventual allurements, the Queen of Hungary must consent to one of the other two expedients, and she and all Europe is undone.

Your Lordship may be assured that what you mention relating to Prince William of Hesse shall be kept an entire secret; tho' M^r^ Alt has had the same accounts and has communicated them to us. I doubt not Prince William's inclination to return to his old allies: and I really think, from all that I have seen, that the King of Prussia seems to be sincere.

The inaction of Duke d'Aremberg occasions great uneasiness (and I think with reason) here. General Smissaert [2] is thought too partial to him, and, if great care is not taken, our army, which is now but just superior to the enemy, will be made much inferior by dividing and separating; and therefore I think our friends in Holland should take care that no personal views of Duke d'Aremberg should get the better of the great and primary view in sending that army to the Rhine, viz. the protecting the respective frontiers and the Princes in those parts by opposing with the utmost expedi-

[1] This was the method adopted by Maria Theresa, and previously approved by England (see above, p. 15 note). For the terms of her agreement with Augustus III see Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, III. pp. 39–41.

[2] Smissaert commanded the Dutch contingent in the army on the Rhine.

tion the motions and operations of the French army under M. Maillebois.

Having thus finished all I have to say upon foreign affairs, I must trouble your Lordship a little upon domestic ones; and, as what relates to yourself makes one principal object, you will allow me to mention that in the first place. As a faithful friend and humble servant, I neither am surprised at nor disapprove the resolution you have taken, tho' I hope there will be no occasion to put it in execution. You are certainly in the right, as you do not desire to be used better than your collegues, to determine not to be used worse. This way of reasoning and this resolution (tho' I think they must appear just to every body) are so much my own, and from the same cause, that I am far from blaming them in your Lordship. When we have the honor to see you here, which I hope will be soon, we shall then freely open our thoughts to each other, and, I am persuaded, agree upon what is right both with regard to our particular situations and the whole.

The Irish Bishoprick will, I think, be got over. It stands thus. When I first laid before the King the recommendation of D^r^ Chenevix, I could make little way, notwithstanding the strong things that both Lord Harrington and I said upon it. I have since renew'd the application, and urged the regard always shew'd to Lords Lieutenants in their first recommendations; to which I was answered (but with much less acrimony than before), "Lord Chesterfield should then recommend properer persons" (for unfortunately this poor man lies under former prejudices of long standing); to which I answered that the Doctor had a very good character, that the prejudice the King had to him was from what His Majesty could not blame him for, and, upon the whole, it ended that there was no haste to dispose of the Bishoprick. So that I really think (tho' I may be mistaken) that this will be disagreeably done before or at your Lordship's return to England. I shall renew my charge in two or three days.

The scene of our home affairs is a good deal alter'd since my last. The Duke of Beaufort has set himself up, and the Tories have taken him, for the head of their party. In consequence of which they have excluded Lord Gower from a negotiation depending about Justices of the Peace, put it into the hands of the Duke of Beaufort, and, upon an unsatisfactory answer given to what was really no proposal, Sir Watkin Williams, Sir John Hynde Cotton,

and one hundred and nine more voted in our last question about the £500,000 to be given for extraordinary services in the war against 247, amongst which were all the Whigs your friends, all Lord Gower's family, and upon the whole near forty Tories. This affords the best opportunity to Lord Gower, so ill used by them, to separate and detach a number, which, with your Whigs and our old corps, would form a body not to be resisted. Lord Gower, M^r^ Pitt (who has quitted His Royal Highness's service [1]), M^r^ Littleton &c. are extremely well disposed: you may imagine we wish to receive them with open arms. The only point is to think of some means of doing what may satisfy, as Lord Gower desires, his honor and not offend, or do any real prejudice to that old corps which must be the principal support of us all. And this is what we have now under consideration, and, if that can be hit upon, it will give us a strength that (if any thing will) must have weight in the Closet. Forgive me, my dear Lord, if I do not so easily see how we have the game in our hands. All Parliamentary proceedings require great union, concert, and resolution, grounded upon a tenable fact, which at this time, late in the year, may be hard to find and harder to carry through. I see but one way, and that a plain clear short one, respectful and dutiful, at the same time that it is firm and decisive; viz. to lay, in a proper manner, the state of things before the Person most concern'd, to shew the success that has attended the measures in the present hands, the reason there is to promise the same success for the future if the King's servants are his ministers, and then leave it to His Majesty to determine who shall be his ministers, either those who are now his servants, or to make those his servants who are now his favourite ministers. In some shape or other this must come to be decided before the King goes abroad, which he is every day pressing to do. He has proposed to Lord Harrington to go with him, which he has not yet determined to do, for this determination will depend, in a great measure, upon the general measure. If you write to Lord Gower, for God's sake preach up firmness towards those who have left him, and moderation and inclination towards those who desire to join with him. This affair of the Justices of the Peace is, at present, the only point in debate amongst us.

I am not surprised at Lord Granville's overtures to your Lordship.

[1] *i.e.* the service of the Prince of Wales.

Could he succeed there, he would indeed distress us and gain his point. But I am persuaded he did not flatter himself with the hopes of success. Some appearances there are that they flatter themselves with some stroke at Court in their favour. For my part, I wish anything might bring matters to a point one way or other.

I forgot, when I was upon the head of foreign affairs, to mention the 8000 Hanoverians now in Flanders. I see signs of great inclination to send them away, but I think it will not, it cannot be done. I am glad you are pleased with Marshal Königseck. I dare answer for the Duke, he will do right. He has as good a heart and as much prudence as one of his age and experience can have.

Since I wrote the beginning of this letter, I have seen Lord Harrington's letters that go by this post. I think they are agreeable to what is above.

To-morrow M^r Van de Pol &c. honour M^r Clouet. I have already obey'd your commands in doing justice to you and the father; and shall endeavour by all the means I can to entertain and please the son, being desirous every body, both here and abroad, should know that no recommendations can have so much weight as your Lordship's with

Your most faithful humble servant,
HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

P.S. I forgot to mention the Post Office. The King says he has long intended it for Sir Everard Fawkener, and will give it to him.[1] His attendance on the Duke will be an objection. But, upon the whole, I should think Sir Everard would have it in some shape or other.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 283–288.

To NEWCASTLE.

Hague, April the 13th N.S. 1745.

My Lord,

Last post brought me the honour of your Grace's letter of the 26th March, O.S., and likewise one of the same date from your Brother, to both of which, for this post, let this letter be an answer. I write to night an ostensible letter to Lord Harrington for leave

[1] Sir Everard Fawkener became joint Postmaster-General with Thomas Coke, afterwards Earl of Leicester, in 1745.

to return, which I believe will readily be granted me, and the only favour that would, as indeed it is the only one I will ask. Though the plan of general alliance and operation was both a prudent and practicable measure when first thought of by you, in the supposition that you would have been, what you ought to have been, the masters of that negotiation, it is now I am very sure absolutely impossible, and would in my opinion even be imprudent in the present situation of affairs, for the reasons I have formerly given you, not to mention this additionall one, that few foreign powers would at this time have any confidence in us; this Republick I know would not, and will not, till things are in a very different situation in England from the present. The Prussian negotiation, I am persuaded, will not take place, for even should the Court of Vienna be wise enough (which I much question) to lend itself to it, I am persuaded it will receive strong hints from a certain quarter to the contrary. Our dependance therefore will be upon Saxony only, to whom the Imperial dignity must be yielded, for though that shuffling fluctuating court talks differently upon that subject at different times and to different people, I am convinc'd it is determined to have the Imperial crown, and must have it unless the accommodation with Prussia should (which I think impossible) take place. But I'll trouble your Grace no longer now upon foreign affairs, since I hope to have the pleasure of talking 'em over with you more fully soon. As for my self, I am very glad your Grace approves of a resolution which I can never depart from, I mean that of not suffering an indignity. And I look upon it as the highest, the most distinguish'd indignity to have my recommendation to the dirtiest Bishoprick in Ireland refus'd. D^{r} Chenevix is without blemish as to his life and character, and if his attachment to me is, as it must be, the only objection to him, that objection doubles the indignity. I am therefore determined that, if D^{r} Chenevix is not Bishop of Chlonfort, I will not be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. I know the plan with regard to my self very well; I am to be very ill us'd with one hand, and very well offerr'd with the other, in order to make me accept the latter. But those who know me little enough to imagine that that is the way of dealing with me will find themselves mistaken. I will resent the indignitys, and will despise the offers. As to what I mention'd to M^{r} Pelham about M^{r} Percival's place, and his friendly answer to me, for which I am oblig'd to him, I

think I had better take no step in it at present, because, should I be out soon, as I suppose I shall, it might seem what they call keen, which I don't love the least appearance of.

But what is of much more consequence than any thing that relates to me is the present distracted state of our party in the House of Commons. I don't much mind the Duke of Beaufort's opposition, which, singly as his and a few of the red hot absurd Torys, might rather do good than hurt ; but then such reasonable satisfaction should be given to the others as to enable Gower to carry off the best and leave only a mark'd avow'd Jacobite faction behind him. Little things, and in my mind prudent things in themselves, would I am convinc'd strip this new opposition of Watkin Williams and Lord Oxford, the only two people to be regarded in it. Therefore, for God's sake, my dear Lord, do all that is possible naturally to satisfy the reasonable part of that party, and then you may with safety and even with advantage despise the rest. The difficultys you find in the Closet, instead of discouraging, ought to animate you upon this point, and you may soon come to want that strength which you will have lost for a trifle, for such I call the Justice of Peace Bill, and those other little objects that Tory boobyes have set their hearts upon, and which for that only reason some of your Whigg boobys oppose, who by the way would not nor could not leave you upon it. Where or to who could they go ? I will write to Gower, whose good intentions I know, but I know his distress too, and it is impossible for me to advise him to do that which, if I were in his place, I would not do my self. I would by no means have him intimidated by an unreasonable party clamour, and if he can make a decent schism of the Tory party, I would have him stand it ; but, if he cannot do that, I cannot advise him to stand single, a suppos'd apostate from a party of which he was once the head, and which will remain too numerous, and possess'd of too many nationall pretences at least, to be called Jacobite or Factious. In this last case he has in my opinion nothing to do but to be a private man for the rest of his life and set serenely with a good character and a good conscience. As to yourselves, I cannot yet help thinking but that you have the game in your hands. I think it is plain that you have the Parliament, for 109, upon so strong a point as the last must seem to all who do not know the inside of things, I look upon as no opposition at all. But, however, if you don't

chuse to have your own and the publick enemy mark'd out by Parliament, the measure you mention, if speedily and vigorously pursued, must at least get the better of him. Pardon me if in business I only consider the expediency the prudence and the necessity of measures, not *their respectfullness*. And I cannot conceive but that, if you will give the law, you may and must do it ; I speak plain. And if you, all of you who begun the attack and gain'd the victory, will pursue that victory and categorically declare that by a given day you all resign your places unless you have not only assurances but proofs that you are the ministers and Lord Granville and Lord Winchelsea not so, how can you fail of success ? Where will or can another administration be found ? Will Lord Granville take, or will somebody give him, one ministerial employment, when all the others remain necessarily vacant ? It is impossible ; your strength is irresistible if you exert it and must be submitted to.[1] But then you must exert it effectually, and not let little notions of frivolous decency or compliment enervate either the reality of your strength or weaken the appearance of it in the Publick. You must mark out Lord Granville by exterminating without quarter all who belong to him. The decision must be clear, publick, and undoubted. And it may be so. If you take this resolution, as I hope you will, I empower you to make what use you please of my name as quitting with you ; and I say as Will. Seymour did, *and me too sweet Jesus*.

I have had strong hints again from Lord Granville's quarter, and the going to Hannover with the King has been hinted to me as a delicious bait. I answer'd 'em in the proper manner, in jest. For my own part, I am convinc'd that the King not only won't go abroad this year but that he does not in the least intend it. Those who ought to know best I find think he will go, but I, who think I know him best, am persuaded that he will not. So that Lord Harrington will not be put to the difficulty he apprehends.

Monsieur Schwiegelt's declaration about the 8000 Hanoverians in Flanders is now become pretty publick, and excites the various passions of fear, indignation and contempt, from reasons too obvious to mention.

Thank God I shall soon be out of the foreign gally, and probably soon after out of the domestick one ; but if (as I don't expect)

[1] This scheme of simultaneous resignation was carried out in February 1746, when Granville returned to office for forty-eight hours. See below, p. 110.

I should continue to serve the latter, I assure your Grace it shall only be with the crew I came into and the best of the crew I came in with. So, *vogue la galère* as it will, I am, in or out of it, your Grace's

most faithfull humble servant,
CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 290–293.

To NEWCASTLE.

Hague, April the 23d 1745.

My Lord,

Don't be frightn'd this time, for I'll be short. Your Grace will see by Sir Thomas Robinson's letters, which Kuoni the messenger carrys, that, as I foretold, the Court of Vienna will not listen to the Prussian proposals, but rejects 'em with the poorest reasonings I ever saw. The Imperial Crown, it seems, *is not worth having without Silesia*. If Silesia is torn from the King of Prussia, other things probably will too. Ergo, no peace with Prussia. Mr Wasner's instructions upon this subject I dare say were very ample.

Your Grace will not find that the accommodation between the Queen of Hungary and the Elector of Bavaria is in so fair a way as by Sir Thomas Robinson's letters it would seem to be. But in truth they have not let Sir Thomas into the secret ; for I know from Bonn that the Queen of Hungary has only offerr'd to restore to the Elector his *plat pais* at present, but has insisted upon keeping the strong places till France shall have restored Fribourg and whatever else it has in that country that belong'd to the House of Austria, a condition which it is not in that Elector's power to execute. When I charg'd Baron Reischach [1] with this, he confess'd it to me. So that if the Elector of Bavaria, who went to Augsbourg in order to be at liberty to chuse his party, instead of to Frankfort where Chavigny would have carried him, should throw himself intirely into the hands of France, the Court of Vienna may thank itself for it.

In my mind the negotiation with Saxony, though seemingly in a fair way, will not end better ; for I am persuaded that that Court is dealing underhand with France. The state of that Court is this. The King himself, a gentle passive animal, is pretty

[1] The Austrian minister at the Hague.

indifferent about the Imperial dignity, and would rather have some solid permanent advantages for his family and his electorate. But Monsieur Bruhl, the vainest and most profuse coxcomb living, will have the Imperial dignity, though, to flatter his master, he pretends to be willing to give it up upon certain conditions, which conditions he will take care shall be such as he knows the Court of Vienna will not comply with. When this negotiation breaks off too, where are we ?

The Court of Vienna, I have some reason to think, will demur about Duke d'Aremberg, and possibly, instead of removing him, counter-represent against General Somerfeldt.[1]

Monsieur Schwiegelt sends to Mr Steenberg by this post a strong resolution he receiv'd yesterday from the Deputys with relation to Hannover. I got it put in much civiller forms than otherwise it would have been in. But they grow quite out of patience with the Electorate, as will appear soon after I have gone.

His Royall Highness [2] is I know negotiating a reconciliation between you and Lord Granville, or intends to do it. I say nothing upon that subject, only that your Grace certainly remembers that it was Sino who introduc'd into Troy the horse (have forgot whether it was a white one or no) that destroy'd it. I am with the greatest truth your Grace's

most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Champigny has been playing the devil at the Court of Bonn, and in conjunction with Count Cobenzel, who has quarrelled about a whore with the Grand Maitre Hohenzollern, had endeavour'd to demolish the latter with the Elector ; which Hohenzollern and his party are in truth the only friends we have at that Court. But Champigny has been detected in a cheat, and is himself ruin'd with the Elector.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 298, 299.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, April 16th 1745.

My dear Lord,

In the uncertainty whether this letter may find your Lordship at the Hague, I can as little think of troubling you with a long

[1] Somerfeldt commanded the Hanoverian contingent on the Rhine.

[2] Frederick, Prince of Wales.

one, as I could excuse myself to let two posts go without endeavouring to return your Lordship my sincerest thanks for your two last most confidential letters, the last of which I received this morning.

You already know my sentiments as to foreign affairs agree so perfectly with your own,[1] and we both think so much alike as to the remedies to be had to the unfortunate situation they are in at present, and from whence alone the obstacles come which do, and I am afraid will continue to, prevent those remedies from taking place, that it is unnecessary to say anything more upon that subject; except that I believe we shall venture *here*, and that *soon*, to make one strong bold tryal whether they will be permitted to be tryed or not; and upon the success of that attempt probably great events may depend. Precision and decision I love so well, and admire so much your manner of negotiating in that way (tho' in some instances the decision may have come out against us), that I shall be very anxious to have something of that kind tried here at home.

Whatever schemes Sinon may be hatching (of which we have yet heard little or nothing), I will answer there will be Laocoons enough to disappoint the effect of them, who will endeavour to save Troy and themselves from being ensnared by the horse. I am not surprised at the Pensionary's reflections on that head mention'd in your letter to my Brother.

I hope Lord Gower has acquainted you with his present satisfaction with us. We have gone as far as we can to please him, consistently with not displeasing others; and it would not be his interest, and I hope is not his inclination, to desire we should do that. I have before troubled your Lordship with my most sincere thoughts upon the great success that has attended your embassy in Holland. I have nothing further to add but my most hearty wishes for your speedy and happy return to your friends and servants in England, amongst the numerous crowds of whom you will find none more respectfully, more sincerely, or more gratefully so than,

my dear Lord,

your most obedient humble servant

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

P.S. I say nothing about the dirty delay about the dirty Irish

[1] This is blarney on Newcastle's part. On the vital subject of the imperial election their opinions were diametrically opposed.

Bishoprick, but that it shall be over, one way or other, before your arrival here. I can't and won't think but it will be as I wish.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 303–4.

To Chesterfield.

Newcastle House, April 23d 1745.

My dear Lord,

I have the pleasure (which is almost the only one of the kind either with regard to things or persons) to acquaint your Lordship that this day His Majesty was pleased to consent to the Irish Bishopricks; and I shall carry Dr Chenevix's warrant to-morrow, with the others, according to your Lordship's recommendation.

We meet this evening with the Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower to settle, as far as depends upon us, every thing before the King goes. But, by what appears at present, His Majesty is determined to let things, in every respect, remain as they are. I hope we shall have the honor of seeing you here before the King goes. It is much to be wish'd that we may have Your Lordship's assistance to concert with Lord Harrington what conduct he should hold in Holland, that our future measures may be settled between the Pensionary and Lord Harrington in his passage through the Hague. To-morrow we are to have a chapter of the Garter for the Duke of Weissenfeldt's alone:[1] we have used our utmost endeavours to have Lord Harrington join'd with him: but the King has absolutely refused it. The accommodation between the Queen of Hungary and the Elector of Bavaria has greatly changed the state of our foreign affairs, and perhaps may make some alteration in our system.[2] I should have been glad to have known your Lordship's and the Pensionary's thoughts upon it. I most heartily wish you

[1] Johann Adolf, duke of Saxe-Weissenfels, commanded the Saxon army at this time. He enjoyed an ill-deserved reputation as a general, and was proposed as commander-in-chief in Flanders after Charles of Lorraine. But Augustus III refused to release him. Thomas Villiers went to Weissenfels to invest the duke with the Garter on his way from Dresden to Berlin in February 1746 (S.P. For., Poland, 68).

[2] The treaty of Füssen between Austria and Bavaria, signed on 22 April 1745, negatived all Chesterfield's pessimistic forecasts. The young elector recovered his father's dominions, withdrew all claims to the Austrian succession, and promised to give his vote in favour of the Grand Duke.

a good voyage and happy return to your friends and servants here ; and am, with the greatest respect

My dear Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 309.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, May the 4th 1745.

My dear Lord,[1]

I receiv'd last Sunday your Grace's and your Brother's letters of the 16th April O.S., and, though I shall so soon have the pleasure of seeing you both, I could not refuse myself that of sending you this forerunner with my thanks for all the marks of confidence and friendship you have both shown me during my stay here. The yatcht is not yet arriv'd, and a Convention with the Counsil [*sic*] of State concerning the artillery, contingencys of the war &c., in which I am nam'd, is not yet quite concluded, so that I don't believe I shall be able to embark before next week.

I heartily wish that the negotiation with Prussia had been brought to some consistency some months ago, for so many difficultys now stand in the way of it that I confess I almost doubt of the possibility of success now. And therefore it is worth your consideration whether you would make that your point *somewhere*. The Queen of Hungary, elated with her success in Bavaria, depends, and I really believe with reason, upon the same success against the King of Prussia, and consequently will not agree to this proposal of accommodation, unless she be positively told that upon her refusal all the assistance of Great Britain shall be withdrawn. The new dispositions of the Court of Russia, and the hopes Lord Hyndford entertains of concluding the treaty, make her success the more probable and her obstinacy the greater. The majority which she thinks she now has in the Electoral College renders the vote of the King of Prussia unnecessary if not useless to her, which would have been her greatest if not her only inducement some time ago to have listen'd to those proposals. By this time too it is

[1] Hitherto all Chesterfield's letters have formally begun with "My Lord". The insertion of the word "dear" meant in the eighteenth century a considerable advance in intimacy. Henceforth all his confidential letters to Newcastle are to "My dear Lord".

probable that a blow has been struck in Silesia and, if it has, I do not doubt but to the disadvantage of the King of Prussia, considering the nature of the two armies.[1] The Pensionary and I, whose sentiments upon that subject your Grace knows are the same with yours, have severally sounded some principal people here upon this point, without however letting 'em into the secret, and I must tell you that we find 'em extremely desirous to see the King of Prussia reduc'd, and very sanguine in their opinions that he soon will be so. They say likewise that there will be no quiet for Europe, nor no security for his neighbours, if he should be left in a condition of keeping up that very great force after a peace, when all his neighbours shall have reduc'd theirs, for that there is no trusting to any the most sollemn engagements with him. I am sensible that it is the great probability there is at present of his being reduc'd that makes 'em both talk and think in that way, and should that probability be increas'd by some success on the Queen of Hungary's part in Silesia, they would be still more confirm'd in those sentiments.[2]

I thought it necessary to inform you of this, that you should not depend upon being strongly seconded here. They don't consider the King of Prussia now as an object that will lengthen the war, and they expect to see him soon reduc'd to their mind, without their being concern'd or expos'd. All these considerations vary the state of the question from what it was some months ago, and may possibly make it problematicall whether you should now stake your whole upon that point, or wait an event in Silesia which, if favourable to the King of Prussia, may better authorize you to do it, and, if unfavourable, will make him be glad of a composition, and content himself with the three Dutchys he first claim'd.[3] I don't mention our Electoral difficultys or the motives of 'em, which are obvious and ought in my mind never to be regarded. But, whether you make this your decisive point or not, there is surely one important point which ought not to be neglected, and which in my poor opinion you should insist upon decision in. I mean the speedy and proper disposal of the vacant ribbands, to the exclusion of Lords Granville, Winchelsea,[4] and Bath, what-

[1] This was a peculiarly unfortunate prophecy. [2] See above, p. 16.

[3] The duchies of Liegnitz, Wohlau, and Brieg

[4] Daniel Finch, Earl of Winchelsea and Nottingham, was First Lord of the Admiralty when Carteret was Secretary of State, and was removed when the latter fell.

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

ever promises or engagements may be pleaded in their favour. This negative mark should at least be put upon 'em. And your Brother should by all means have one. For, if there are neither positive nor negative marks given of their disgrace, God knows how soon they may triumph.

I have an account from Hannover that the relays for the King are actually order'd, and that Monsieur Freychappelle will be here to-morrow or next day. Notwithstanding which I still do not believe that he will go abroad this year. If my Irish affair be not finish'd before my return, it implys a resolution taken of making it impossible for me to continue in my employment, in which they will not be disappointed. But this letter runs into conversation, as if, instead of seeing your Grace next week as I hope to do, I were not to see you these six months. I am, with the greatest truth,

Your Grace's most faithfull and obedient servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 311–313.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, April 26th [O.S.] 1745.
May 7th

My dear Lord,

I find I shall continue to persecute your Lordship with my letters as long as you remain in Holland; for I cannot avoid returning my thanks for the repeated marks of your goodness to me. Nothing could give me more satisfaction than your letter of Tuesday last, which I received this morning. Your present notions of the alter'd state of our affairs in Germany are so exactly my own that it puts me in mind of what my old friend, the Duke of Kingston,[1] said after a long and most able speech of Lord Somers, that he thought every word that Lord Somers had said, but had not been able to bring it out. Let us make your plan, laid down in your letter, our rule of proceeding this summer, and I think, in or out, we may defy our enemies. I am sorry we shall not have you so soon as we expected. I should hope the plan for carrying on the war, or putting an end to it when there should be a favourable opportunity of doing it, would be, either here or

[1] Evelyn Pierrepont, first duke of Kingston, the father of Lady Mary Montague and of Lady Gower.

in Holland, settled with your Lordship and Lord Harrington, or with Lord Harrington and the Pensionary ; so that neither inactivity on the one hand, nor improper pursuits on the other, would be to be apprehended.

I had this day the honour to get all the Irish warrants for Bishopricks signed. There is one necessary alteration which M^r^ Liddell has desired should be made, by the translation of the Bishop of Killaloe to Dromore, and D^r^ Chenevix's appointment to Killaloe, the Bishop of Clonfert having absolutely refused to go to Dromore.[1]

The affair of the Garters is over. I am much obliged to your Lordship for your kind thoughts of my Brother. It was not thought proper to make a point of them ; and it has been agreed that we should rub on this summer with declaring that, if things did not alter, we must be permitted to go out at the end of it. It was thought it would be idly giving the game into our enemies' hands to be resigning after we had raised all the supplies ; and the appearances abroad were so much altered for the better by the accommodation with the Elector of Bavaria and the good appearances in Russia, and, I may add, the vigorous behaviour of the Dutch, owing entirely to your able management of them.

Give me leave to repeat my thanks for your obliging and useful correspondence, and the assurance of my being, with the greatest respect and gratitude, my dear Lord,

Your most obedient and faithful humble servant,

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 326–7.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, May ye 7^th^ N.S. 1745.

My dear Lord,

I did not propose troubling your Grace any more from here, but think it necessary to do it now, in order to inform you of an affair which will not be mention'd in our Office letter of to-night to Lord Harrington, in which I am unwilling ever to insert any thing that I can avoid till absolutely necessary.

On Wednesday morning last Monsieur de la Ville [2] went to the

[1] Chesterfield's letter of 12 May to "Bishop Chenevix", announcing the final settlement, is in *Chesterfield's Letters* (ed. Bradshaw), II. p. 784.

[2] The Abbé de la Ville was at this time the French envoy at The Hague. Later in the year he left Holland to become *premier commis* at the French foreign office.

Pensionary's house, without giving previous notice as usuall, and at an hour when he was sure not to find him at home. About three hours afterwards, Monsieur Hallewyn, Pensionary of Dort, and the Pensionary and Burgomaster of Amsterdam, came to him (the Pensionary Van der Heim) and told him that Monsieur de la Ville had been with them severally, and had acquainted 'em that the King his Master, to prove to 'em his sincere desire of peace, had order'd him to acquaint 'em that he would not oppose the Grand Duke's being elected Emperor, since by the late turn of affairs in Germany it was probable that his Highness would have a majority in the Electoral College. That this concession of his Master's requir'd in return some proposals from hence for a general peace, which it was inconsistent with his Majesty's dignity to make first, and that, if such proposals could be made before Tournay was taken, so much the better. What answer Monsieur Hallewyn made to this no body knows, nor no body cares, it had doubtless been concerted with him before. But the people of Amsterdam ask'd Monsieur de la Ville whether he had inform'd the Pensionary Vanderheim of this, to which he answer'd that he had that morning been at his house in order to have communicated [it] to him, but had not found him at home. Upon which they told him that they could give him no answer till they had consider'd further and talk'd with the Pensionary Vanderheim upon that subject. In his conversation with 'em he dropp'd that, as to the King of Prussia, the King of France, they might depend upon 't, had no thought of sending an army into Silesia to his assistance.

That evening (Wednesday) the Pensionary sent for me to acquaint me with all this, and to concert with me what he should say to the Amsterdam people about it. They had agreed (I must do 'em the justice) that it should be communicated to me. The Pensionary and I determin'd that, in order to be masters of this affair, we should not reject it absolutely ; and that he should tell the Amsterdammers, and even M[r] de la Ville, if he saw him, that the proposals of the Republick were already known to the Court of France, having been given in last year by Monsieur Twickell [1] ; and that the favourable events which had since happen'd, did not incline 'em to recede from one tittle of what was then ask'd. Yesterday morning again Monsieur de la Ville went in the same manner

[1] Count Wassenaer-Twickel. On the terms which he carried to Arras in 1744, see Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, p. 130.

as before to the Pensionary Vanderheim, that is at an hour when he was sure not to find him. I saw him (the Pensionary) again last night, and we have taken the proper measures to prevent any ill consequences that might flow from this insidious attempt, and from the strong disposition of minds here to listen to whatever is call'd a proposal for peace. And I think I can answer that this attempt, if intended to disunite people here, and to check the progress of our operations (as I believe it is), will not have the intended effect. By next post it will be more clear, and then it shall be related in the office letter. My yatcht is not yet arriv'd and if it had I would have given a few days to this affair. Should it arrive to-morrow or next day, I will not embark till I have settled this matter in a way that I can be sure it can do no mischief. So that it is possible I shall not leave this place till the latter end of next week.

A M^r Hardenberg, a Hannoverian, brother to him in England, is at the army upon the Rhine, and has assur'd people there that the King will come and command that army himself. But I am apt to think he is mistaken.

Did M^r Steenberg, when Hannover was lately threaten'd, make no proposals to Marshal Belleisle[1] upon that subject? I believe he did. Notwithstanding the length of this letter, I am with as much haste as truth

Your Grace's most faithful humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fos. 320–322.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, April 30^th 1745.

My dear Lord,

I must still trouble your Lordship with my thanks for the continuance of your favours. I received last night the favour of your letter of May 7^th N.S. I am very glad to find the Court of France begins to talk; tho' I think, with you, their present design is to do mischief in Holland, which appears plainly by the persons

[1] Belleisle was at this time a prisoner in England, having been captured on Hanoverian soil in December 1744. His detention made a great sensation in Europe. As he had been engaged at the time on a diplomatic mission to Prussia, it was doubtful whether he could be regarded as a prisoner of war. Ultimately he was so regarded, and was released by way of exchange in August 1745.

to whom they apply. But as they came out with their secret before you had left The Hague, all ill consequences, I am persuaded, will be prevented. The acquiescing in the election of the Grand Duke and the declaration of sending no troops to the assistance of the King of Prussia are good beginnings, and shew a great dejection in the present French Councils. I think you did extremely right to advise the Pensionary not to reject absolutely these overtures, tho' made in this awkward manner. I could have wished he had not referred to the proposals made the last year by M. Twickel. The circumstances are greatly changed in many particulars ; the Emperor dead, concerning whom most of the articles were formed ; the events very favourable since to the allies ; and the present situation of Prussia, both with regard to us and France, not such as should make us offer France to leave him Silesia. But I hope the Pensionary does not mean literally to abide by these articles.

To-morrow the Council will be held for the Regency. His Majesty is pleased to name the Earl of Stair to be one. Gower and I have made Lord Cobham quiet ; and I can, with the greatest truth, assure you that our late resolutions have been taken in conjunction with and the full approbation of the Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower. The Parliament will rise on Thursday. I send you a copy of what I presume will be the speech. The King posts away on Friday. Lord Harrington stays till your arrival, and goes over in your yacht, after, as I hope, we shall have settled every thing with him upon your Lordship's report and advice. I long for your arrival amongst us, and am, my dear Lord, &c.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 328.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, May the 14th N.S. 1745.

My dear Lord,

I little thought to have troubl'd you again from hence, and my yatcht being arriv'd I intended to have embark'd to-morrow, but upon the disagreeable news we receiv'd from Flanders early yesterday morning [1] the Pensionary intreated me not to leave him in the general consternation it had put people in here. I thought

[1] The battle of Fontenoy, 11 May (N.S.).

it necessary to comply with his request, and I have since found it was so. I shall therefore stay till Lord Harrington comes here, to talk with him and the Pensionary together, and then embark the moment he sets out for Hannover. For I will upon no account be here one post after his Majesty's arrival at Hannover. I shall with decency avoid going to Helvoetsluys to meet the King, which both he and I shall be equally glad of. The necessity of my watching people here being not only a good pretence but in truth a good reason for my not going. I am in so great a hurry and shall see your Grace so soon that I will say nothing now about publick affairs, in which however I fear this accident in Flanders will make a disagreeable change. The finishing my Irish affair, I am persuaded, I owe to your Grace and M^r^ Pelham ; accept my thanks for it. I wait with impatience for the arrival and departure of Lord Harrington, being impatient to be out of this galley, and to assure you in person, even so far out of town as Claremount if you please, that I am your Grace's

most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,803, fo. 330.

TO CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, May 7^th^ 1745.

My dear Lord,

The resolution you took, at the Pensionary's request, to stay in Holland for Lord Harrington's arrival was undoubtedly very proper and shews great attention to the publick service. I find it has distressed Lord Harrington a little, who has no other yacht to go over in. I own I think it very unlucky that the King will now be so long without any English minister to attend him. You may imagine we were extremely concerned at the unfortunate event in Flanders. The loss of so many brave men and some particular friends could not but be most sensible, upon publick as well as private accounts. Our only consolation is the great justice the officers of all nations do to the courage, conduct, and temper of His Royal Highness upon this great occasion. You will see by my publick letter the steps we are taking here to recruit and reinforce our army in Flanders. That, I think, is our capital point at present ; and I hope we shall have the assistance of the Republic, not only by their *corps de réserve* but by drawing out of

their garrisons which are not exposed as many of their troops as can possibly be spared. You will see the advice we have given for a detachment from the Rhine. As it is not refused, our friends in Holland may help us in it, especially if the situation there shall enable them to recall Smissaert's Corps and send it to Flanders. The affair of the Irish Bishoprick does not deserve the thanks you give for it. Indeed Lord Harrington and all of us did our part.

I am &c.,

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 334.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Hague, May the 18th 1745.

My dear Lord,

If this letter gets to you before I do, it is to acquaint you that I set out the day after to-morrow for England, where, by your account, I shall find Lord Harrington. I could not leave this place sooner, and fear some inconveniencys may attend my leaving it now; but so far I think I have settl'd things here that, instead of showing their real dejection upon our late misfortune, they will act courage, and send more troops from hence to the army. I can say no more in the hurry I am in than that I am your Grace's faithfull and obedient servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,804, fo. 336.

PART II

AUGUST 1745 TO OCTOBER 1746

CHESTERFIELD AT DUBLIN

AUGUST 1745 TO MAY 1746

CHESTERFIELD TO ANDREW STONE.

Dublin, August 31st 1745.

Sir,

I arriv'd here this day at noon after the best sea passage possible, and am now endeavouring to acknowledge the favour of your letter of the 25th, which I receiv'd at Holyhead the moment before I embark'd; but whether (stunn'd as I am with the noise of cannon, drums and trumpets) I am able to write common sense, you will be the best judge.

I am heartily glad that at last something is reduc'd to writing and sign'd between us and Prussia. The conditions are even better than I expected, and, if they had been worse, ought not, in my opinion, to have obstructed the great and main object. The Court of Vienna must and will comply, if not *secretly and indirectly* encourag'd to stand out. But should that Court (no matter from what motive) refuse to compleat this work, it will be more difficult if not impossible to give any more subsidys or assistance; for in that case the King of Prussia will not fail to publish the whole transaction,[1] and from that moment it is easy to guess what will both be said and thought of the continuance of the war in Germany.

As it is reported here that two or three thousand people have declar'd themselves and appear'd in favour of the young Pretender in Scotland, and as it may be necessary to have more frequent

[1] Both here and in a later letter Chesterfield loses sight of the fact that Frederick had his own motive for secrecy in the desire to conceal his projected desertion from France. Austria, from a desire to make mischief between Prussia and France, was much more likely to publish the transaction, and did so.

and speedy accounts from thence here, than we can have by way of England, I shall next Monday send a person well recommended to me into that part of Scotland, who (unknown himself there) will, by means we have concerted, send me authentick accounts of whatever passes there.

By a letter I have just now receiv'd from Mr Trevor, I find to my great surprize that the Pensionary is the only one of our friends in Holland who hesitates about the Prussian affair, but, as I find all his friends are zealous for it, he will come into it soon.

Pray make my compliments to the Duke of Newcastle and Mr Pelham. I trouble neither of 'em by this post, having yet nothing to say to either, but what both know already, that I am their faithfull servant. I am with great truth and esteem

Yours,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS., 32,705, fos. 129, 130.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, Sept. 2nd 1745.

My dear Lord,

By way of business in my own department I have nothing yet to trouble your Grace with, but to desire that you will send me a warrant for the Postmaster here to open letters when it may be thought necessary. Sir Marmaduke is squeamish and won't stir a step without a proper authorization. He says he had such a warrant in the Duke of Devonshire's time and lately in the Lords Justices'. I believe it may be very necessary now.

I was heartily glad to hear from Mr Stone that something was sign'd. Whatever may be intended, that's a good step, and not so easily receded from as possibly may be thought. But I am really in hopes that some people are at last convinc'd how chimerical their views were, and how great and real their danger. If so, the affair will be soon finish'd.

By letters from Scotland here the young Pretender's affair seems every day to grow more serious, but, as I can't very well depend upon those accounts, I have sent a trusty smuggler to the north of Scotland for more authentick informations. He is gone to the Macdonalds, with whom he has had frequent dealings, and I am assur'd that I may depend upon his accounts.

The little time I have been here has been employ'd in ceremony

and noise, and I am sure *I have my drums and trumpets* with a vengeance. But by what little inquirys I have yet been able to make this country appears to be in a most defenceless condition. The forts are extremely out of repair, the militia in the several countys absolutely neglected, and the regular troops, as you very well know, very few.

I suppose the King is arriv'd by this time; and I long to hear the consequences of his arrival. Whatever they may be, you will find me equally in every and any situation,

Your Grace's most attach'd and faithfull servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 133, 134.

To CHESTERFIELD.

[Undated, but endorsed 5 Sept. 1745.]

My dear Lord,

According to the liberty you gave me, I make use of Mr Stone's hand, both for your convenience and mine, to send you the best account I can of our present situation.

I conclude you will have received at Chester Mr Stone's letter of [25 August], with the good news that my Lord Harrington had signed on the $\frac{1}{2}\frac{6}{7}$ August [1] a convention with Mr Andrié, whereby the King of Prussia obliged himself to come to an accommodation with the Queen of Hungary and also her allies upon the foot of the Treaty of Breslau. The definitive treaty with the Queen of Hungary was to be concluded in six weeks. In the mean time no cessation of hostilities was absolutely stipulated; but the King of Prussia promised to suspend his designed attempt upon Saxony till the Queen of Hungary's answer should be known. My Lord Harrington wrote immediately in the strongest manner to Sir Thomas Robinson, but we have yet no answer. I have had a long conversation with Mr Wasner, who seemed not to know that the Convention was signed, but, in very strong and very passionate terms, told me that the Queen, his mistress, would not on any terms consent to it.

The King seemed at first to have come over in good humour; but not so much affected with the miscarriage of this campaign,

[1] The Convention of Hanover was signed on 26 August (N.S.). Newcastle may have been misled by the fact that Harrington announced its signature in a letter dated the 27th (Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 61).

or so sensible of the difficulties of continuing the war (at least upon the present foot) as one would have imagined.

The mission of Sir John Ligonier from the army to the King at Helvoetsluys and the strong remonstrances of the Pensionary to my Lord Harrington against sending away any of our troops from the army, alledging that, in that case, the States would infallibly recall all their troops also, and consequently that the remaining part of the Low Countries and the whole continent would be given up, prevailed with the King and my Lord Harrington to accept the 6000 Dutch and to suspend the sending away any of our troops from the army.

His Majesty was encouraged to think that not only our army could maintain themselves in their present position but preserve Brussels and Antwerp and in all events the communication with England. And in this opinion the King came over, not dejected with the present situation, with some hopes of even getting some advantages in Flanders this campaign, when the Hessians, the garrison of Ostend, and our prisoners, which were to be released in consequence of M. Belleisle's declaration, had joined the army. But the greatest expectations are conceived from the election of the Great Duke, which in all probability was made on Monday last.[1]

The King has scarce yet mentioned the Convention with Prussia. He said once slightly that the Queen of Hungary would not consent to it, and perhaps may have some expectation that it will drop of itself. But Lord Harrington is not only of opinion that it must be stuck to in all events, but thinks that we shall prevail with the King to agree to it.

Thus stand at present our foreign affairs. As to things at home, they grow every day worse. The good humour is gone or going off, and we are returning to our old complaints and uneasinesses to a degree that my Brother had yesterday a very unkind reception, and I had this day something of the same sort, tending to shew great dissatisfaction, which at present can mean nothing particular except it be the ordering the ten regiments to England, which, at the time it was agreed to and for the reasons alleged, did not seem

[1] The Grand Duke of Tuscany and ex-Duke of Lorraine was elected Emperor as Francis I on 13 September (N.S.). He received seven votes, the representatives of Prussia and the Palatinate having left Frankfort after protesting against the procedure adopted by the electoral dict.

to be so much disapproved. Upon the whole there seems little variation from what there was three months ago, and the miscarriages this summer have been far from operating that change which might have been expected.

Lord Granville talks in a pretty extraordinary manner: that the King makes the greatest figure imaginable; that the ministry have the game in their hands, if they knew how to play it; and he has told my Lord Harrington that France has made but a pitiful campaign this summer, that they had indeed gained some few towns in Flanders, which they would be obliged to give up again, but that they had abandoned the great system of the Empire.[1]

You will lay the circumstances together and judge what a comfortable time your friends in the administration have. However, in this time of common danger, we must do what we can for the preservation of the whole. My Brother sends you the most sincere compliments. If you are not more taken up with giving orders in Ireland than you were in executing them so ably as you did in Holland, I should flatter myself that I might now and then have a private letter from you with your thoughts upon occurrences as they shall arise.

Draft, with erasures and corrections, in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 137–142.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Sept. 10th 1745.

My dear Lord,

Your Grace will make what use you please of the inclos'd letter, and show it to the King or not as you shall think proper.[2] I proceeded in this way with Lord Harrington while the King was

[1] The Marquis d'Argenson was inclined to agree with Granville. If he could have had his way, the French, instead of concentrating upon the Netherlands, would have employed their main force in Germany, partly to relieve Prussia, and partly to dominate the election. In his opinion the conquests in Flanders, which only inflamed European opinion against France and would have to be resigned at the end of the war, were no equivalent for the return of the imperial dignity to the house of Austria.

[2] This was one of the supplementary letters which were labelled "private", but might be shown to the King at Newcastle's discretion. They were almost always written by Chesterfield himself, and composed with great artfulness. But they are quite different in character and tone from the really confidential letters.

at Hannover, and possibly the frankness of it may sometimes help my recommendations, but of this you are the best judge.

I never expected mails from any place with half the impatience with which I now expect every mail from England. Every event both at home and abroad is now important. I trouble you with no speculations of mine beforehand, but end with this certain fact, that nobody is more faithfully your Grace's &c.

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 162.

To NEWCASTLE.

[Undated. Endorsed "received 17th Sept."]

My dear Lord,

In the hurry I am in, I can only thank you for your private letter, and lament with you the situation of the Closet. But I am sure there must be some fear there, which resolution and steadyness elsewhere may direct to good purposes. The Prussian affair I see is intended to be broke, but I think you cannot recede from it. And a more popular point you can neither stand nor fall upon. Adieu, my dear Lord,

Yours most truly

CHESTERFIELD.[1]

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 166.

To NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, Sept. 12th, 1745.

My dear Lord,

Though I have little more time to-day than I had yesterday, yet I can't help acknowledging more particularly than I could do yesterday the honour of your private letter of the 5th.

I think I can account for the good humour of *some people* upon their first arrival, from their thinking the place they were come to much safer upon the whole than that they had left.[2] And

[1] This is really the first of the genuinely "private" letters from Dublin. It is clear that the invitation to continue the confidential correspondence came from Newcastle, and that Chesterfield waited for such an invitation before writing anything more intimate than the friendly letter of 2nd September.

[2] One of the arguments used to induce the King to consent to the Prussian convention was that Frederick might attack Hanover.

you know the present immediate object has always for the time a great but not a lasting effect upon 'em. But afterwards, when security made way for reflexions, the chimerical and darling views presented themselves again, seem'd more practicable and less dangerous, and the disappointment of 'em consequently more mortifying, and the authors of that disappointment more odious. I am convinc'd that Lord Harrington was only allow'd to sign the treaty with Andrié from the immediate danger which it was thought would attend the not doing it at that time; but that the court of Vienna was instantly appris'd of it, advis'd to stand out, and promis'd to be supported in so doing. And what confirms me in this opinion of the collusion is M[r] Wassenaer's [1] pretending not to know that the Convention was sign'd, which is both incredible and impossible. However it's being sign'd is a very good circumstance and strengthens you in insisting upon obliging the Queen of Hungary to agree to it by declaring explicitely to her that otherwise the subsidys will be withdrawn. And I really don't see how you can help doing it. For, when it shall be known (as the King of Prussia will take care that it shall [2]) that such a convention was sign'd and then defeated by the court of Vienna, the collusion and the motives of the refusal will be too obvious to be withstood in Parliament.

The danger at home strengthens you too, and must produce compliance on one side but not on yours. I think you have the domestick game in your hands, though by no means the foreign one, as Lord Granville has the impudence to say. What are those great advantages which the election of the Great Duke (now over I suppose) is to procure us? Only some fine resolutions and declarations of the Empire against France, and the troops of the Circles upon paper and nowhere else. I am heartily glad that ten regiments are sent for back from Flanders, which I think will have two good effects; the one to secure us at home. The other I won't tell you, because your Grace won't like it as well as I do.[3]

[1] There was much contemporary confusion, as there has also been among historians, between Wasner, the Austrian envoy in England, and Count Wassenaer, the Dutch noble, who was prominent in European diplomacy at the time, but that Chesterfield should confuse them is almost unthinkable. It seems like a mere slip of the pen. But see below, p. 89.

[2] See above, p. 61 note.

[3] This means that it will necessitate the early closing of the war.

In the present situation let me most earnestly recommend to your Grace to try by all means to keep together the strength you had in Parliament last session. It is more necessary now than ever. I am sensible there will be great difficultys in doing it, but necessity has no law and this is the time to distinguish between what is only difficult and what is impossible. You know my impartiality in this matter, and that I have never spoke in it from private affections much less from private interest. But, if you cannot show a very great majority in Parliament and hinder the forming of a party of various denominations which will then be called a Nationall Party, I need not mention the necessary and obvious consequences of such a situation. Some publick brand should surely be put upon Lord Granville and his followers before the meeting of the Parliament, that people may know where the power at least if not the favour is lodg'd. Finches turn'd out,[1] Garters properly dispos'd of, would be the true signs where the best power is to be found. And the same methods that turn'd out the master will turn out the men. I own I pity you all, but pray pity me a little too, who am as much plagued with little business as you can be with great. For though there there are no partys of Whiggs and Torys, no form'd opposition, yet every connexion, nay almost every family, expects to govern, or means to distress, if they can't govern, the Lord Lieutenant. Any thing propos'd by one is for that very reason oppos'd by twenty. The Chancellor is a most sensible good sort of man, honest and able, but, if I were to show the preference I justly give him, it would be the worse for us both. Add to all these agreeable circumstances that I shall be above five thousand pounds out of pocket by this campaign, not from any ridiculous profusion, but from the excessive price of every

[1] On the Finches, William and Edward (" the black funereal Finches ", as Hanbury Williams called them), see below, pp. 111, 113, 115. They held the household offices of Vice-Chamberlain and Groom of the Bedchamber, and Chesterfield suspected them of serving as a channel of communication between Granville and the King. Edward Finch, the Groom of the Bedchamber, had been a diplomatist, and concluded the first (futile) treaty between England and Russia. He was at St. Petersburg during the revolution of 6 December 1741, which seated Elizabeth on the throne. See an article on " The First Anglo-Russian Treaty " in the *English Historical Review*, vol. XLIII, no. 171 (July, 1928). The two Finches were younger brothers of the Earl of Winchilsea. Edward was M.P. for the University of Cambridge, while William sat for Cockermouth.

thing here, which is much higher now than in London. But this last consideration never had yet, nor has not now, any great weight with me. If I am but able to carry on the business without disgrace, I shall be very well satisfied. This is run to the length of a Hague letter, which it is more than time to put an end to by assuring your Grace that I am

Your most faithfull and humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

I beg my compliments to M^r^ Pelham. I don't write to him because I have writt to your Grace; and you know I insist upon't that whoever writes or speaks to one, writes or speaks to both.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 173–176.

To CHESTERFIELD.

[Undated. Endorsed "Sept. 21, 1745 by express".]

My dear Lord,

I am now in a hand better than my own to return your Lordship my thanks for your most kind private letter of Sept. 12, wrote with the greatest affection to your friends and servants here, and with a clearness and strength peculiar to yourself.

Your Lordship will see by my other letters that His Majesty has most really [? readily] approved all that you have proposed and given directions accordingly.

You will also see that we have for the present lost one kingdom; and I am afraid you will find by my letter that the proper methods will not be taken to save the other. I mean by a disposition to follow such advice and countenance such persons as are most capable of doing it. The ill humour and jealousies of part of the administration increase every day: and a new method is now taken up, to cajole and flatter almost every member of the administration at the expence of the two Brothers, your most faithful servants. The doctrine of being kept prisoner, in tutelage, in slavery, which I suppose is instilled by others, is vented every day; and the greatest dissatisfaction showed at the very measures that are awkwardly yielded to.

The Brothers have spoke out very plainly, and that plainness

has embarrassed but not convinced. We have at last directly and plainly declared that, in case the Queen of Hungary does not consent to the present treaty with the King of Prussia, either through her own obstinacy or any other motive, we cannot undertake to support her any longer, or to open the Parliament upon that foot. This declaration has been strongly backed by my Lord Chancellor and Lord Harrington, and will be so by all our friends, and especially the Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower, with whom we act in perfect concert and friendship in every thing.

The objections that are alleged (besides those above-mentioned, of being kept prisoner &c.) are: Will you abandon your allies? If you will not support the Queen of Hungary, will you abandon the Dutch and Flanders? To all which we have given that obvious answer, that it is impracticable and impossible to go on upon this foot with the war; that the Dutch will make their separate peace, and the King of Sardinia [1] too; and the Queen of Hungary and the Empire be overrun by France and Prussia. This makes some but very little impression. Sanguine councils and sanguine councillors behind the curtain have got entire possession of our hearts and minds: and in one word nothing but a rebellion in the heart of the kingdom would or should hinder us from retiring from the most disagreeable and perhaps the most dangerous situation that ever ministers were in. And, as soon as that rebellion is in effect over, that will be our measure.

I have given you a plain and true account of the state of our case. Our foreign advice for the accommodation with Prussia, and the danger we represent there is from the rebellion, are both said and thought to proceed from a resolution to put an end to the war by a scandalous peace. Our only comfort is that the nation in general, and all our friends in particular, pity us and approve us. Your friendship and approbation is, without a compliment, as great a satisfaction to me as I can have, and I shall conclude with more sincerity than the author, *In power a servant, out of power a friend.*

P.S. I thank you for your kind postscript. I understand it,

[1] Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia came very near a separate peace in December 1745. See Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, chapter iii. He would have made it if Maria Theresa had not concluded the treaty of Dresden on Christmas Day 1745.

and can assure you every thing in that respect is as well as you can wish.

Draft in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 201–203.

CHESTERFIELD TO ANDREW STONE.

Dublin Castle, Sept. 30th 1745.

Sir,

A certain little piece of paper containing the refusal of a Person to undertake the administration of affairs exclusively of the two Brothers, confirms me still more in the opinion I have long entertain'd that those two Brothers have the game in their hands. How can somebody help himself if he can't get others, as I am persuaded he can't, to undertake the administration? The present publick situation of affairs and private distress in the Closet should in my opinion be made the proper use of and immediately. Complaints of imprisonment &c. are surely not to be minded. Every body complains when they can't do what they have a mind to, but others always avail themselves of their distress. The two Brothers, as they are call'd, can never expect favour, but they have strength, and should exert it without loss of time; they have friends who will stand or fall with 'em; and if they will now give the law I am convinc'd they may. Why should their continuance in their parts be put singly upon the foot of the Queen of Hungary's acquiescence? And why should not domestick regulations be made at the same time another condition *sine qua non*? The first is the most tender and sensible point somewhere, and the same degree of force necessary to carry that will carry the other. And the opinion of the nation will be as strong for the Brothers in one as in the other. If a publick brand be not put upon Lord Granville and his adherents before the meeting of the Parliament, they will have the strength before the end of it. *Delenda est Carthago*, and this is the moment in which it may be done. The cajoling of individuals may in time have effect, and I doubt will; at present they are firm and may be made use of. There is a moment in all affairs. This is it in my opinion for the Brothers to secure themselves, their friends, and the publick. They can't fall now, if they will stand; but some time hence they may fall, and then possibly unsupported or unpitied. These are my sincere thoughts for their service only; for, as to myself, I

most sincerely wish at my return from hence to be at liberty and quiet. I really have not had time to write to the D. of N. myself by this post, but this to you is the same thing.[1]

I am most faithfully yours,

C.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 233, 234.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Oct. 5th 1745.

My dear Lord,

In a hasty letter by last post to Mr Stone I acknowledg'd the receipt of your Grace's private letter of the 25th Sept., and shot my bolt as to the present state of affairs at St. James's, to which I have little to add. And I trouble you with this more from the satisfaction I have in writing to you than from the hopes of suggesting any thing that can be of any use to you and those I most heartily wish well to. It is a maxim in physick that health is preserved by the same means by which it is acquir'd, and I believe this maxim is as true in politicks. You remember how you got Lord Granville out of place. *Somebody* was then a prisoner, was ill us'd, had the law imposed on 'em; the two Brothers were the goalers [*sic*], the usurpers, the devil, and what not; but you persisted and you prevail'd. The same means will and alone can give you the power and take it from Lord Granville, who will always have the favour.

I am astonish'd at the blind obstinacy and sanguine expectations of the court of Vienna and it's *abettors*. Do they not see that while they have the King of Prussia upon their hands, the Dutch can expect no assistance in Flanders nor the King of Sardinia in Italy, and that consequently both will think of securing themselves by the only means left 'em, a separate peace? Do they imagine that the King of Poland, almost the most timerous prince living, will exhaust and expose his country in pursuit of what a little common sense will show him he cannot get, at least this bout? And what will become of 'em when these allies drop off, as they certainly will? These truths are so obvious that I think they must prevail; the only danger is of their not prevailing soon enough. I am convinc'd that the atoms must and will (though I don't know how) jumble

[1] This and the previous letter to Andrew Stone are inserted because they are essentially part of the private correspondence with Newcastle.

into a peace this winter; the point is to put 'em into a tolerable shape, which the previous treaty with Prussia can only do.

I look upon the rebellion in Scotland as crush'd, as soon as our army gets there; the Highlanders will then return to their dens, and trust to their damn'd country for their security. But I hope they will not find it there. And were I to direct, I would have a short Act of Parliament for the transporting to the West Indies every man concern'd in the rebellion, and give a reward for every one that should be apprehended and brought to transportation. This I think would be a much better way than hanging some of the rascals and letting the others go home for another rebellion.

All my good subjects here are unanimously zealous; but unanimously frightn'd too, which I confess I am not. They think themselves of so much importance as to be the principal objects of the designs of our enemies; whereas I rather think that our enemies are well enough inform'd to know that this country must necessarily follow the fate of England, and that their whole force will consequently be directed there, and not divided to do here what would either do of itself, or not do at all. However I take all the proper precautions *à bon compte*, but without encouraging the millions of projects that are every day offerr'd me. I believe I shall find no difficultys in Parliament here. I fear you can't say so much of yours. I am with the truest regard and attachment

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

I beg my compliments to your Brother and Lord Chancellor.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 241, 242.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, Oct. 9, 1745.

My dear Lord,

I did not think I should so soon have had an occasion to congratulate you upon your great success in the Closet. For I can now truly say that, in this instance, the stones have not been deaf to your musick; and indeed it was almost impossible to be so. The spirit, the solidity, and the *bravery* of your letter had a wonderful effect.[1] *Chesterfield is in the right; it is the wisest letter*

[1] This must refer to Chesterfield's semi-official "private" letter of 29 September (Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 225–229), in which he advocated the recall of Cumberland to command the army, the giving of no quarter to the rebels

that ever was wrote, and in short every thing was liked, and you will see by my office letter, which had our Master's approbation, that we have proceeded ever since entirely upon that principle. And indeed I must own my obligations to your Lordship; for I think I never saw so masterly an instruction for our interiour situation as is contained in that letter.

We begin to hope that we shall now soon have troops enough at home to quash our intestine rebellion, and to discourage our foreign neighbours from making any attempt upon us. But, however, we must not be too sanguine. For, tho' the northern counties have appeared very zealous, and M. Wade will have an army of 15 or 16,000 men there, and tho' the midland counties shew a good spirit and we shall have a great force for the defence of London etc., yet we must consider that the western part of the kingdom is without any troops, and, I am afraid, far from being well affected, and exposed to attempts both from Brest and Ferrol.

Our nobility are raising regiments; I doubt a little too fast. They will be a great expence to the publick, and create some confusion among the military men.

Our speech is made, and an admirable one. It is entirely confined to the rebellion and home affairs.[1] And there are some parts of it, which you will like, to flatter the present unanimity, and to assure all those who shall vigorously oppose the attempts of the Pretender of countenance and favour.

Our foreign affairs go ill indeed. The Queen of Hungary thro' her own obstinacy a second time beat; and she deserves it. The principles of the Closet are in appearance changed. We are no longer advocates for the Queen of Hungary: her conduct is not to be defended: she should not refuse to make peace, except she knew better how to make war: the accommodation with Prussia is talked of as a necessary thing. But yet the Queen of Hungary is obstinate, and Wasner yesterday threatened my Lord Harrington with what might be the consequences in case we abandoned her. The King of Prussia is still ready to make up with the Queen of

in the field, and the most unsparing prosecution of all who have aided or encouraged them.

[1] For the King's Speech, delivered on 17 October (O.S.) 1745, see *Parl. Hist.* XIII, p. 1309. The exclusion of foreign affairs was partially due to Lord Hardwicke's ruling that the obligation of secrecy, even though it had been broken elsewhere, precluded any reference to the Convention of Hanover. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 October, in Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 256.

Hungary, notwithstanding his last victory.[1] I really think, if the Queen of Hungary does not comply, there will be no more question here about her.

The Dutch are a good deal uneasy at our sending for our troops home. They long much for peace; but, I think, are neither determined, nor know how to get one. We have showed all the facility that can well be expected of us. We have consented to a Congress, which is all France did desire. We have showed no disinclination to a reasonable establishment for Don Philip in Italy. But we must not be too forward in that, out of regard to the King of Sardinia, who deserves as well of us as some of our allies deserve ill.[2]

But the great point of all will be the restitution of Cape Breton in return for the restitution of all, or the greater part of, the towns in Flanders. There the Pensionary and the Dutch will strongly attack us; and there the Duke of Bedford and his friends will be immovable.[3]

For my part, I do not know what to say upon this affair, and I should be glad to have, as soon as possible, your thoughts upon it. A peace with France we must have if possible: a peace with France is impossible without giving up Cape Breton.

The Pensionary presses extremely the treaty with the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne: and I must own, for the sake of keeping well with Holland when we are obliged to withdraw almost our whole army out of the Low Countries, I am for it. If you are of the same mind (but not otherwise), I wish you would write a word or two to my Lord Gower.[4]

With the Duke of Bedford and my Lord Gower we are as well as is possible. They are both now military men, and in that I

[1] The Battle of Soor, 30 September (N.S.). Frederick's remarkable moderation as to terms, in spite of his sensational victories in this year, is not only a proof of great practical wisdom, but it also shows how completely he was alienated by the callous neglect of his interests by France, and how convinced he was that this second war had been a blunder on his own part. Frederick himself admitted "qu' à certains égards cette guerre causa une effusion de sang inutile" (*Mémoires*, I. p. 371).

[2] On the subject of English partiality for Sardinia, see my *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 34–36, 57, 105, 121, 399, 402 note.

[3] Bedford was eager to use the capture of Cape Breton as a stepping-stone towards the reduction of Canada. See his *Correspondence*, I. p. 65.

[4] It was characteristic of Newcastle to suggest that there should be no letter to Gower unless Chesterfield's views agreed with his own.

cannot follow them. As to all other domestick affairs, we do with them, as the King does with the foreign ones in the speech; postpone them till the rebellion is over.

One thing I can never postpone, whenever I am upon the subject, returning you my sincerest thanks for your most useful and most agreeable friendship and correspondence. I am, &c.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

P.S. When I was this morning with the King, he told me, if the Glover who was recommended belonged to the Glover of the city, he would not on any account give him the commission. I thought it was best not to battle it with him; and beg you would be so good as to recommend another person. I did not send him your private letter upon this subject; for, when he was in such humour, I did not think it would be right to knock down all with such an incident as this.

Draft with corrections in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 248–252.

To NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, Oct. 24th 1745.

My dear Lord,

Six packets arriv'd here together the night before last, by one of which I receiv'd your Grace's most private letter of the 9th. You bestow upon my private letter praises it does not deserve, and somebody else express'd an approbation of it which I did not expect. If it was of any use to you, I am glad; otherwise I am very philosophical about favour.

Since your Grace asks an opinion that is not worth having upon two points, I will give it you as far as I am able to form it myself. The first is by much the most difficult point of the two; I mean the Bavarian and Cologne treatys, and I much wonder that my œconomical friends the Dutch are so desirous to incur a new expence (though indeed their share of it would be but small) at this time, when I am convinc'd they are determin'd to have a peace this winter. To us this engagement will be extremely burthensome and raise great clamour in the nation; and, notwithstanding the concurrence of the Dutch, will be look'd upon as a part of the German scheme. Your Grace knows how immense the expences of this year would have been, even without this rebellion, which will immensely increase 'em, and consequently

can judge what will be said and thought if you now enter into new subsidiary engagements, which can only operate next year, and even then, I doubt, very little. Let me therefore suggest this expedient which you will do what you please with. Why should you not make the Queen of Hungary's consent to the revival of the treaty of Breslau a previous condition, *sine quâ non*, of your coming into the Bavarian treatys ? The Queen of Hungary is extremely fond of the Bavarian treaty, and so, no doubt, is somebody else. Therefore the making the conclusion of this the consequence only of the conclusion of the other may help to bring the other about, or, if not, they discover by their refusal what operations only they mean the Bavarian treaty should have [1]; in which case, upon your own system, you are justified in refusing to come into it, as an unnecessary expence, to carry on impracticable schemes. But, if the Queen of Hungary will first renew the treaty of Breslau, I think you may safely conclude that with Bavaria, for then it will plainly appear to be what in reality it will be, an engagement against France only, and in that case may possibly contribute to make the peace a little better ; for peace I still say you will have before next summer. I had almost said you must.

As to the point of Cape Breton, you may remember I was aware at first of the difficultys it would create ; and, when I hear'd people bawling and huzzaing for it's being taken, I wish'd it in their throats. But now I think you have not option left, and you might much easier give up Gibraltar and Minorca [2]; and I don't think you could find a plenipotentiary who would venture to sign it away. The keeping it must certainly cost you something in Flanders, and will consequently be violently oppos'd by the Dutch ; but on the other hand to restore it for a town or two more in Flanders, which neither the Dutch nor the Queen of Hungary will defend, and which France can most certainly take again whenever it pleases, will be giving up a very reall advantage from England for a precarious and short liv'd one for the Dutch as it will be call'd. This I fear is too certain, that the peace, whenever it is made, will not leave what us'd to be call'd the Ballance of Europe ; and, as the Dutch will certainly not be a power, we had better neglect them than ourselves. We may keep Cape Breton by our fleets, but I

[1] *i.e.* for the war against Prussia.

[2] Lord Sandwich in 1747 argued for the surrender of Gibraltar rather than Cape Breton, but Newcastle refused to listen to him. See *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 238–240.

fear we and the Dutch together shall never be able to keep Flanders by our armys. The United Provinces are impotent by their form of government, which does not seem likely to be alter'd [1]; they are beggar'd by their long mismanagement, and sour'd by their late misfortunes, and I will venture to prophecy that you will soon see 'em in a state of quiet subserviency to France. So that, as an ally, they are really not worth a sacrifice.

These are my hasty thoughts upon the two points upon which you order'd me to give you my opinion. They are only (to borrow the quotation of my friend Doddington) *quae censet amiculus*. I shall say nothing to Gower about 'em; I dare say he will do as you will as to the first point. And, as to the second, considering the popular fury, I think it is not a point of deliberation. I have not writt to Gower since I came here, for I really have not had time to plague any body but your self. I am glad he has rais'd a regiment, since those kinds of regiments are rais'd, but I dislike the thing very much; you will find 'em very troublesome and very useless. I have discourag'd 'em here, and kept 'em to the mere militia regiments and companys, which are just as usefull and attended with none of the ill consequences.

Your Grace did perfectly right not to insist upon Glover, who is brother to the citizen, and whom I can place here. I have no body to recommend in his room, but advise the not putting in of a Scotchman, that corps being a great deal too much Scotch already, and the colonel endeavouring to make it intirely so. Considering the strength we have now in England, I look upon the rebellion as crush'd and the invasion prevented. Look to yourselves in the Closet before the appearances of danger are quite remov'd. I have receiv'd a letter from your Brother, which by the length of this it appears plainly I cannot acknowledge to-night. I am the most faithfull of your Grace's servants,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 282–285.

TO CHESTERFIELD.

Most private. Newcastle House, Nov. 20th 1745.

My dear Lord,

I flatter myself you will not think my long silence proceeds either from disregard or forgetfulness of the obligation I shall

[1] But it was altered in May 1747 by the restoration of a Stadholder.

ever own I have to your Lordship. The true reason was that the constant sollicitude and necessary directions to be given about the rebellion (the state of which you will see pretty well by my other letter), and the little satisfaction and less precision that the interiour affairs of our own Court and Parliament afforded, scarce allowed me time to write any thing at all, and put it absolutely out of my power to send you anything agreeable. However, as things are now come a little nearer to a point, I will give you a short historical relation of what has passed, by which you will see the difficulties we have met with, and the uncertainty under which we still remain.

Your Lordship is already acquainted with the disagreeable incidents which happened in the House of Commons; *viz.*, the proposing to send for the remainder of the English troops now in Flanders, the premature enquiry into the causes of the progress of the rebellion, &c., in which those whom we were labouring (and perhaps with some prospect of success) to bring in to us, gave their and our enemies a handle to defeat us in that, but, what was worse, to suggest that our success in those questions plainly proved we could do without them and did not want their assistance. Broad hints were given that Prince of Wales and his friends would unite heartily with us, that Lord Granville should be out of the question, &c., if we would part with those that were lately taken in and replace those who had been lately removed.

These sorts of offers were too easy to be seen through to make any impression upon us, and only redoubled our attention to fix, as soon as possible, a solid scheme with those with whom we have always intended to unite. And accordingly my Brother had a meeting immediately with M^r^ Pitt, where the best dispositions appeared on both sides, tho' great difficulties were apprehended by M^r^ Pitt in bringing about what we so much desired.[1]

Something must be done to satisfy people; constitutional bills were talked of, and at last, I think, the whole was reduced to the three following demands, viz. 1. the extension of the Place-Bill to exclude from seats in Parliament all officers of the army under the rank of lieutenant-colonel and of the navy under that of captain. 2. The removing from court all friends of Lord Granville, and particularly the Finches. 3. The total alteration of the foreign

[1] Professor Basil Williams has taken this letter as the basis of his account of these negotiations in his *Life of William Pitt Earl of Chatham*, I. pp. 141–3.

system, by feeding only the war on the Continent, acting there as auxiliaries, and particularly by confining all the assistance we should give to the Dutch to the bare contingent of 10,000 men; but to increase our navy and to act as principals at sea in the war against France and Spain. For a peace with France at present was not to be thought of.

As to the first, we soon shewed a disposition to agree. As to the second, we stated our apprehensions as to the prudence and decency of insisting too strongly upon removals in the Bed-Chamber, &c. But neither of these points have created any great altercations among us or been the subject of much debate.

The last and great point, relating to our foreign affairs, is where the chief difficulty rests. Imagining that, in our present circumstances, and knowing our own real intention and disposition, it would be almost impossible for us to disagree, I had two long private conferences, first with M^r^ Pitt and afterwards with my Lord Cobham, where the question in dispute between us was whether, in order to prevent the Dutch from making a separate peace with France, we should not acquaint them, in answer to their application for assistance, that if they would exert themselves as they ought, since they are now principally concerned, we would give them such assistance as we were able, in proportion to what they should do for themselves, and consistently with our present circumstances and situation; or whether we should declare to them at once that all we could possibly do for them was to give them the bare contingent of 10,000 men.

My two private conferences passed with great civility and apparent friendship. But, as the arguments on both sides were the same as were used in the meeting last Saturday night at my Lord Gower's, I shall only give you an account of what passed there.

It was thought proper that this point should be considered amongst us together, and accordingly last Saturday night my Lord Chancellor, my Lord Harrington, my Brother and I met my Lord Gower, the Duke of Bedford, my Lord Cobham and M^r^ Pitt. We opened the conference by declaring [1] in the first place the necessity of the strictest union between that Company, both for the sake of the publick and ourselves; that it was upon that

[1] In the original draft Newcastle stated that it fell to his lot to open the conference. This was subsequently deleted.

dependance only we had removed Lord Granville ; and upon the success of that only that it was to be supported ; and that therefore we hoped that every body came disposed to remove, as far as possible, any obstacle that might be in the way of it ; that the difficulties relating to the regulations at home we were in hopes would be got over ; and that, as we agreed on many material points relating to affairs abroad, any difference that might remain relating to any part of them we hoped would be likewise removed. We then stated the affair of the Prussian treaty, which had been brought about by firmness and resolution, and by the same firmness and resolution ought to be supported ; that the Queen of Hungary had now as it were given an absolute refusal ; that she had forfeited the right to any further assistance ; and that therefore we were all of opinion that no further assistance could be given her either by subsidies or troops (and I believe we shall in a few days make that declaration to Mr Wasner in form) [1] ; that so far we were all agreed : but that the case of the Republick of Holland was different ; that it was so essentially our interest to keep well with them, and to keep them an independent state, that we thought we should shew a disposition to assist them as far as our circumstances would admit, in order not to force them to make a separate peace with France if it could be avoided ; that we were far from being sure whether all we could do would prevent it, but however that it was better it should be the effect of necessity than of choice, whereas, if we had once declared we could do no more than furnish the States with 10,000 men, they would immediately find that so inefficient as to be obliged to make their separate peace with France. And we stated to them the danger and hazard of being alone at war with France and Spain, which two powers, by being absolutely disengaged from all expence on the continent, would soon be able to be superior to us at sea.

Lord Cobham was the first that answered. He insisted that this defensive war would never bring about a peace ; that we might be more than a match for France by sea ; but what he chiefly relied upon was that the experience of last year [2] had hindered them from having any confidence this year ; that it was necessary for them to come to a point and to tie us down to a specific con-

[1] This parenthesis was inserted in the revised draft.

[2] *i.e.* the last campaign. The Chesterfield Convention was on 30 March of the current year. See above, pp. 31, 37.

tingent, in order to bring their friends with them ; that the quota stipulated by your Lordship's Convention had never been really complied with by the Dutch, but had been evaded under the pretence of garrisons, &c. ; that he said beforehand the Dutch could not comply with what they had promised, and that what he then said had since proved true ; and that, in short, under the pretence of supporting the Dutch, we might enter into as expensive and extensive a war, and as advantageous to the Queen of Hungary, as we should do if we were to take her part as we did last year.

To which he was answered that his arguments relating to the little effect of a defensive war were arguments for coming immediately to a peace (but they are more against that than any thing) ; that a defensive war upon the continent and an offensive war at sea was better than only an offensive war at sea,[1] which was what they proposed. That, as to the possibility of supporting the Queen of Hungary indirectly, our present circumstances would not admit of it, almost all our troops being in England ; and that it was neither our intention, inclination, nor disposition.

M^r^ Pitt strongly supported my Lord Cobham ; talked much against the behaviour of the Dutch ; insisted that 10,000 men, in our present circumstances, was a generous and noble succour ; that that, added to what Holland might do for themselves, would enable them to make a stand ; and he would not suppose that they could or would make a separate peace. He insisted on the necessity of coming to some precision as to the contingent in order to satisfy their people ; and talked much of the great impression we could make upon France when our efforts were singly at sea.

The Duke of Bedford [2] replied upon him very strongly that, let us make ever such savings in other respects, it was not possible for us to increase our navy beyond what it now is. And he, as well as my Lord Gower, is entirely of our opinion.

Upon the whole, we desired my Lord Cobham and M^r^ Pitt to consider that it was very possible this point might never come to bear ; that we meant nothing but to shew a disposition to support

[1] This was conclusively demonstrated in the Seven Years' War, when Pitt adopted the arguments urged by Newcastle and his friends at this conference.

[2] Bedford was First Lord of the Admiralty. His *Correspondence*, edited by Lord John Russell, is a very valuable authority for this period.

Holland as far as our circumstances would admit, rather than, by the strong declaration they proposed, force them immediately into a separate peace, the consequences of which we thought ought, if possible, to be prevented; that, if France and Spain had nothing to deal with but England, they might easily keep the rebellion on foot for years, if not destroy us quite, and soon have a marine superior to ours, and then what a condition should we be in? That in the late war we destroyed their marine by creating them business on the continent; that, by delivering them from expences on the continent, we should force them to reestablish their marine, of which we should hereafter feel the bad effects.

Upon the whole, we were not able to prevail: Lord Cobham and M^r^ Pitt came determined, and went away so. Every thing passed with great civility and good humour. But I am afraid there is little appearance of bringing about, at least at present, what you know we wish. If I am not more mistaken than ever I was in my life, the point upon which we differ at present will be universally decided on our side. To argue from our circumstances that we ought to make the best peace we can with France would be very reasonable. But to maintain that we must carry on a maritime war against France and Spain, with the weight and burthen of a rebellion at home, and not to go as far as we can towards preventing Holland from making a separate peace, and thereby passively if not actively taking part against us, is what I think (as indeed I told them) will not be the sense of the nation. This would be indeed reducing ourselves to our wooden walls, when we have rebellion at home and the most considerable powers of Europe are at war with us abroad. But what is of all others the greatest absurdity is that we shall dissolve an union so essentially necessary (as is admitted on all hands) both for the publick and ourselves, upon a point which, in all probability, may never exist. For, if we should be so happy as to make a joint peace with France,[1] or that all that we can reasonably offer the Dutch in our present circumstances may not be sufficient to hinder them from making a separate one, in either of these two cases, this point would never be brought into question.[2]

And now, my dear Lord, I have exposed our case to you. I

[1] On the efforts of the Dutch to bring about such a joint peace see Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy*, chap. IV.

[2] The last two sentences were interpolated in the revised draft.

have the greatest dependence upon your judgment and value for your friendship. The rebellion is far from being over or to be despised. An army of near 10,000 desperate men, inured now to fight and fatigue, is actually in England; France and Spain by all accounts determined to support it. The cause of our King, our country and ourselves may make it incumbent upon us not to retire in these circumstances, if we can have any prospect of doing service by staying in. But I own that is what I much doubt. And in that case our staying in would be of no use to the King and the publick, and infinitely disagreeable and dangerous to ourselves.

Consider the advantage that is given against us. I am ready, the King may say, to take in these gentlemen in the manner you yourselves propose (and I think he would do it). But, if they won't come in, even upon the terms and measures that you think reasonable, will you for that reason desert my service? To which, to be sure, no other answer can be given but that we are not in a condition to carry it on. To depend upon my Lord Granville's friends to support this administration against my Lord Granville is a contradiction in itself. To bring M^r^ Pitt in against his own will is impossible, and therefore, at present, there seems to me to be nothing to be done, if M^r^ Pitt is determined (which I should still hope he would not finally be), but with your Lordship, the Duke of Bedford and my Lord Gower, to get as many individuals as we can to carry us through till the rebellion is over, and then we shall be at liberty to take such part as we shall think most consistent with our own honour and the publick service.

These are my hasty thoughts: I beg you would let me have yours as soon as possible; and that you would write your opinion to my Lord Gower with the utmost freedom and cordiality; who is the best-intentioned man in the world, but may want your advice and encouragement to keep him so.

Having thus laid before your Lordship the miserable state of our domestic situation, I shall now acquaint you with our foreign one, which is in no degree better. The obstinacy of the Queen of Hungary has already produced many of the ill consequences we apprehended. The Electors of Bavaria and Cologne are going (if they are not entirely gone) off, the former having now refused to let his troops to the maritime powers without a stipulation to be indemnified for any losses he may suffer by so doing and on

condition that they shall not go out of Germany, and alleges the continuance of the war with the King of Prussia as what makes these conditions necessary. The latter (the Elector of Cologne) has recalled his minister from the Hague, and has given many proofs of his irresolution; whilst those heroes, the Princes and Circles of the Empire, who were immediately to put the King of Prussia to the ban of the Empire, are afraid of any thing that might look like an infringement of their neutrality.

In these circumstances the Pensionary has sent his emissary above a week ago to Paris,[1] and, after we had refused, for very obvious reasons, either to let the mission be in our name or to suffer the Pensionary to engage (as he calls it) *autoritativement* for us, he sent him with the enclosed instructions, which, I think, are extremely well drawn. What the event will be I cannot say. A tolerable peace might possibly be made were it not for the affair of Cape Breton. But how that difficulty will or can be removed I cannot say. France will not, in their present flourishing circumstances, give it up for a few towns in Flanders, which they will think cannot be taken from them.

There is also another incident which might (if we were masters to do what was really right for the publick) turn to our advantage, but otherwise, I am afraid, may embarass us. My Lord Harrington and I and M^r^ Van Neck [2] had a meeting with your friend, M^r^ Fournier,[3] the night before he went to France, wherein we gave him strong assurances of our disposition to peace. This has produced an answer from him which M. Vanneck brought me this morning, proposing the sending of persons of confidence on each side immediately to Roterdam to treat upon conditions of peace. And, what is most remarkable, there is at the same time a

[1] This was Colonel Larrey, who was sent personally by van der Heim and not by the States General. On his mission and its failure see my *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy*, pp. 137–141.

[2] Lambert van Neck was Pensionary of Rotterdam, and of course a staunch republican.

[3] Fournier was a French *sous-fermier*, who had come to England in the summer on behalf of the *ferme général* to settle about a duty on tobacco from England. He was employed by Marshal Belleisle in negotiations with the British ministers, especially with Newcastle. See an intercepted dispatch from Zöhrern to Ulfeld, 3 September (N.S.) 1745, in S.P. For. Confidential, 62. Zöhrern assures the Austrian Chancellor that he will keep a careful watch on Fournier's movements.

letter from M. Bussy to Mr Vanneck proposing that he, Bussy, may be the person desired from hence to be sent on the part of France, which would be agreeable to his Court.[1] The whole is a great secret. I have not yet seen any of my brethren upon it, so do not yet know whether any thing can be struck out of it. Our great difficulty is that (as I have before observed to you) Mr Pitt and his friends are more averse at present to the treating of a peace than to any thing else.

I have this moment an account of the surrender of the castle of Carlisle, pretty soon after the surrender of the town, whereby the rebels have made themselves masters of several pieces of canon, a quantity of arms, and a number of horses. Every day shews that this rebellion is by no means a trifle.

I have reserved to the last (tho' I have not time to say much upon it) thanking your Lordship for your most kind and useful letters. Those that were proper I have shewed to the King, and they had the desired effect, His Majesty beginning of himself to speak to my Lord Harrington of the wisdom, solidity, and resolution that appeared in them. They have, without a compliment, produced a wonderful alteration, which would not fail to have its good consequences if other things went equally well.

I beg pardon for having given you so much trouble. If I have not troubled you for some time with my correspondence, you see I am resolved to tire you at once with it, and consequently make you less desirous of a repetition.

My Brother sends you his best and kindest compliments.

Draft, very carefully revised and corrected, in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 318–336.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Nov. 25th, 1745.

My dear Lord,

Though I was concern'd, I was not surpriz'd at your long silence, easily imagining the load of business you must now groan under. Your most private and most friendly letter of the 19th [*sc.* 20th]

[1] Bussy, disguised under the name of Nelson, had been employed in 1745 in secret negotiations on the part of France. Puyzieulx, at his interview with Sandwich at Liège in 1747, proposed to send him over again, but the English ministers refused. See *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy*, p. 289.

has made me amends for that silence by thoroughly informing me of the present situation of affairs, which I can only regret, but which I am sure I cannot contribute to remedy.

Your Grace orders [1] me to give you my opinion upon the several points mention'd in your letter, an opinion which (without any false modesty) is little worth asking or giving at any time or in any place, much less at this difficult time and from this remote place. However you shall have it with my usuall freedom and truth, only premising this, that as my situation and disposition are singular, my opinion may very possibly be so too. I am in place and heartily wish to be out of it : I am out of the opposition, and do not wish to be in it. As to the rebellion, I confess I am not under the least apprehensions of it, nor should I be very uneasy if it were to be seconded by an invasion from abroad ; the regular force we now have in England and the fleets we have round it being more than sufficient to crush the rebels and to prevent or repel a foreign invasion, unless we are doom'd to destruction. If we are to fear now, when are we not to fear ? since from the circumstances (in that respect only fortunate) of the war abroad we have now at home a greater land and sea force than we are ever likely to have at any given time hereafter. The number and condition of the rebels is contemptible, and, should they be joyn'd by any insurrection in England, they would only be joyn'd by people still more contemptible than themselves. Our mob regiments (I ask their pardons) would be still better than theirs, and our regular troops I am convinc'd are fully equal to three times their own number of undisciplined rabble. And I make no doubt but that before your Grace receives this you will have received a much better letter from General Wade with an account of the destruction or at least the dispersion of those Scottish rascals. In short I see an end, and I think a speedy one, of the rebellion ; but I do not see an end, at least a good one, of the affairs you mention.

If you had fix'd your scheme with the opposition some time sooner, I think you would have done it easier, for they now see that you want them, as much as they want places, which I can assure you is not a little. You must make the best bargain you can with 'em, for you can only be supported by 'em. The Prince

[1] Chesterfield, punctiliously observing Newcastle's superior authority as Secretary of State, always, even in these confidential letters, describes his requests as " orders ".

and Lord Granville and company neither can nor will support you: they want the power as well as the places, whereas my friends in the opposition only want the places, without being, or meaning to be, your rivals in power.[1] As to the three points of your conferences, I agree with you that the last is both the most important and the most difficult. The first, which is call'd the constitutionall point, I think a good one upon another account, which is the great advantage that will result from it both to fleet and army, by hindering young subaltern puppys from forcing themselves by their seats in Parliament into higher posts than they are then, or it may be ever will be, fitt for. And the loss of that degree of influence in Parliament may easily be made up some other way. The meaning of the demand I know very well is to give a popular lustre to the places we are to get. *A la bonne heure.* It can do no hurt, and I think will do the good I have mention'd. As to the second point, you know I have long been of opinion that you should do it for your own sakes, if it were not demanded. The thing is so customary that it will be thought you can't if you don't do it, which will be of ill consequence to you. The appendixes of every discarded minister have always been sent after him; and the two Finches will be but two grains of wormwood more in the bitter potion that must be swallow'd when you come to form any plan. And, by the by, where does one take physick but in one's bed-chamber?

As for the third point, your Grace knows that from the first month that I was in Holland I have invariably said that it was impossible to carry on the war another year, that the Dutch neither would nor could do it, and that you must make a peace this winter both with 'em and through 'em. Every thing that has happen'd since has confirm'd me in that opinion and prov'd the truth of it. But to talk now of sending ten thousand men to the Dutch, when two and thirty thousand last year would not do, is the most extravagant thing I ever hear'd of, and could only be taken by them as a joke or an insult. Or to imagine that the Dutch are able to do next year so much as they did this, which I averr they are not were they ever so willing, can only proceed from an utter ignorance of the state of that Republick. The immediate consequence of such a proposal would be their making a separate peace with

[1] A strong statement to make of a group which included so ambitious a politician as the elder Pitt. Compare below, p. 114.

France instantly, and putting themselves for ever under the protection of that crown. And, if we break with them, we have not an ally left in the world. Should I be ask'd, since I think ten thousand too few, how many would I send? I'll answer none at all, for I own that thirty thousand will be full as useless as ten, as it appear'd last year. But I would make a peace with 'em and through 'em. Oh! but then it will be a bad peace, and we won't have a bad peace. I can't help that, but when you are beaten and can't carry on the war any longer unless to be beaten still more (which is our present case) all I know is that you must make the best peace you can, and that will be a bad one, which is always the case of the vanquish'd. I heartily wish we could obtain the Pensionary's plan, in which by the way I must observe two lines that plainly show the Dutch are determin'd to have a peace at any rate and that the Pensionary knows it. *Mais il doit se garder de ne pas rompre la negociation, et user pour cela de toutte sa prudence.*[1] The two negotiations, I think, are very combinable, for Monsieur Fournier's is to go through Vanneck of Rotterdam, who is Pensionary Vanderheim's right hand, and Bussy might be employ'd in either case, which for reasons you know of I could wish he should be. That Larrey is a very sensible man. I know him very well.

The affair of Cape Breton is the great and insurmountable difficulty, and I think you should buy it off, if you can, with almost any thing else; for I really don't know who will venture to sign it away. Upon the whole the situation of affairs both at home and abroad is so unfortunate that one has only evils to chuse out of, and so intricate that one does not know which is the least evil. For my own part *Davus sum non Œdipus.*[2] It is much above me. You have my good wishes and that is all I can give you. The step you intend to take with Wassenaer[3] is surely quite right, and will be in general satisfactory. Therefore the sooner it is done the better.

I have now troubl'd your Grace too long with my useless sentiments, but at the same time so freely that I need not recommend to you a secrecy which the nature of the letter sufficiently points

[1] Quoted from Larrey's instructions.

[2] Terence, *Andria*, I, ii., 23.

[3] This is the second time that Chesterfield has given this Dutch name to the Austrian envoy. See above, p. 67.

out of itself. My confidence in you is without reserve, as is also that attachment with which I am

Your Grace's most faithfull and humble servant,
CHESTERFIELD.

I receiv'd Mr Pelham's letter by the last post, which I will soon acknowledge.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 379–383.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, Nov. 30th, 1745.

My dear Lord,

I am in such a continual hurry that I have really not time to write to you so often and so fully as I ought and could wish. Nothing very material has happened since my last in our interiour affairs. The Parliament is adjourned, by the King's order, to Tuesday sennight, and will, by small adjournments, be carried on till after Christmas. This will prevent any disagreeable incidents there.

Mr Pitt continues cold and reserved, and frequents none of us. Lyttleton warm, eager, well inclined, but partial in the greatest degree to Mr Pitt and his opinion. The Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower [1] have all the good disposition we can wish, act entirely in concert with us, and approve of all we do; and we will do nothing without them. Your friends the Dutch have passed a most unreasonable resolution, demand more succours than those we furnished last campaign, seem not to enter into the necessity of our recalling our troops to suppress our own rebellion.

The King of Prussia has again beat the Saxons and taken possession of Leipsig. The court is removed from Dresden, and yet his Prussian Majesty, in the handsomest manner, offers by Villiers to make peace with Saxony on the three following conditions:

1. The accession of Saxony to the Convention of Hanover.
2. Not to assist the Queen of Hungary.
3. Not to give her troops passage.

The two last points the King of Poland has already agreed to. The first he must consult the Queen of Hungary upon. So now I think this great affair must do of itself.

I reserved to the last to tell you your favour daily increases.

[1] Bedford was Gower's son-in-law.

And His Majesty has, both to me and my Brother, approved extremely your conduct and behaviour since you came into his service, in a manner that really gives me great joy for the whole, if I did not daily meet other most disagreeable drawbacks.

We have taken the resolution to enter into your friend Fournier's proposal, and shall send immediately a proper person to Rotterdam. But we are at a loss to find one out, and no one is yet fixed upon.[1]

There is great reason to think we have got the Pretender's son.

We have had a strong battle with M. Stair, for raising the Scotch noble regiments; but we have stood it. We must send a force thither, and Wade must be the man.[2]

I am &c.

Holles Newcastle.

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 397, 398.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Dec. 6th 1745.

My dear Lord,

Though I write to your Brother by this messenger, I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of acknowledging your kind letter of the 30th past. I beg you will not imagine that I expect regular letters from you, and moreover I desire you will write me none with your own hand, which I am sure you cannot conveniently have time to do. But, when any thing either foreign or domestick happens that you would have me know, or that I ought not to be ignorant of, Mr Stone's hand and Mr Stone's head, with your directions, will perfectly satisfy me.

I own I am very glad that the King of Prussia has beat the King of Poland again, and that the former is wise enough to make use of his success only to secure, and not to increase, his demands. The latter will most certainly comply, his fear will, if his wisdom won't, make him do it. The King of Sardinia cannot hold out any longer; it is evident the Dutch won't, and I know they can't;

[1] Nothing came of this negotiation, so that nobody was sent to Rotterdam. France refused to come to any terms with England, as long as the rebellion was going on and the tenure of the English crown was regarded in Paris as uncertain.

[2] On account of his previous knowledge of Scotland, when he commenced the construction of his famous roads.

so that the Queen of Hungary has by her noble obstinacy fought down her allys to Carteret and Schaub, who cannot now be of any great use to her. I now look upon the treaty of Breslau as renew'd, because the Queen of Hungary must come into it. But don't flatter your self with any great good consequences from thence with regard to Europe in general, for it is now too late. And matters have gone too far to be retriev'd. Neither Saxony nor Bavaria will furnish troops against France singly, even for money; you see what the boastings of the Circles of the Empire amount to, and you will find that, when Silesia is out of the question, the Queen of Hungary will be very indifferent about every thing else, and even impatient to make her peace with France. She will then tell you that Flanders has been only a burthen and not an advantage to her, and that it is the business of the maritime powers alone to defend it. She will say too, and possibly with some truth, that the greatest, at least the best, part of her army will not serve her out of Germany, that her Hungarians, Pandoures, Croates etc., who swarmed to her defence when she was attack'd in a manner at Vienna, will now go home, and will never be prevail'd upon to pass the Rhine or go to Flanders. And you know *another power* in Germany [*sc.* Hanover] who, when the King of Prussia is out of the question, will certainly not expose itself to another visit from Maillebois [1] singly for the equilibre of Europe. From all which I conclude that the renewall of the treaty of Breslau is now only a favourable event as it will facilitate your negotiations of peace; but that it will not in the least enable you to carry on the war any longer.

Therefore, for God's sake, cherish my friend Fournier. I don't know who you'll find to send to Rotterdam; I am sure I do not know one man in England who would go, that I think fitt for that commission. Why should you not employ M^r^ Trevor, who can go to Rotterdam frequently, with less suspicion than any one can go from England there? For, should the thing transpire in the least or even be suspected, you would find that (in the present situation of things in Parliament) questions would be moved about Cap Breton, our wooden walls, etc., and that would distress you exceedingly.

[1] This refers to 1741, when a French army under Maillebois threatened Hanover, and George II, in his Electoral capacity, signed a treaty of neutrality with France.

I can say nothing to your Grace upon the state of your Court affairs but what I have already troubled, either your Grace or your Brother with. I see and lament the unreasonableness of some people [*sc.* Pitt and Cobham]; I see too that they connect what they call constitutional bills with their own private demands, that, if the negotiation should break upon account of the latter, it may be laid upon the former. Of this I think you should be carefull, and endeavour to disappoint 'em by giving up such of those points as you can.

I wish the trouble of the rebellion were over, for, as for danger, I confess I see none. I depend upon my Marcellus, the Duke, for exterminating those rascals more than I do upon your Fabius [*sc.* Wade]. Why did he stay a month at Newcastle? Why wait for a train of artillery against such fellows? Why not attack 'em with any numbers? Are they to be consider'd as regular troops, who were never yet attack'd by any number of regular troops without being beaten? Why does not Handaside crush those fellows in Perth? He has more troops than are necessary for that business. You did extremely right to repulse Stair's Scotch regiments, and for my own part I am very sorry to hear that any *loyall Highlanders* are to be arm'd at all. The proverb indeed says, "set a thief to catch a thief", but I beg leave to except Scotch thieves. And I both hope and believe that those to whom I see money is given to raise loyall Highlanders will put that money in their pockets and not raise a man. Upon my word, if you give way to Scotch importunitys and jobbs upon this occasion, you will have a rebellion every seven years at least. There must be alertness and vigour in crushing of this, and unrelenting severity in punishing it afterwards. Will you upon any sollicitation whatever suffer the notorious treachery of honest Stewart, the Provost of Edinburgh, to pass unpunish'd? I have witnesses here who saw the dog receive the Pretender into Edinburgh and do the honours of the town to him with the utmost duty and zeal. The French feed the rebellion only to hinder it from dying of hunger, but not enough to make it thrive. It is only to incline you to negotiation, to which they think you wholly averse. As soon as they find the contrary, I am persuaded there will be an end of their assistance.

I'll finish this rhapsody, which is already much too long, but, as I can write to you without reserve, I am insensibly drawn

on by that pleasure to write without measure too. I am most truly

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,
CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,705, fos. 415–418.

To CHESTERFIELD.
Newcastle House, Jan. 6th 1745/6.

private.

My dear Lord,

The continual hurry I have been in from the rebellion at home and the threatened invasion from abroad, as well as the unsettled state of our domestick affairs, must be my excuse for having been so long silent.

The vigour, activity, and courage of the Duke, your young Marcellus, have drove the rebels to the place from whence they came, where I hope General Hawley will not only be able to prevent their return, but entirely to reduce and defeat them there. I own I have a more mean opinion of them than I had before H.R.H. with an handful of men chased them through great part of England. But that which did, and does, alarm me most, is the declared part which France takes in their favour.

The landing of Lord John Drummond, the little assistance that has been sent from Dunkirk to Scotland, the small number of Irish and French officers that have attended the Pretender's son in Scotland and England, are appearances which I could easily account for without concluding that France had seriously entered into the Pretender's cause. But all our advices (and *those which cannot be intended to deceive us* [1]) have for some time past represented the party to be taken in the strongest manner, that the

[1] Among the " advices " alluded to by Newcastle were intercepted dispatches from Scheffer, the Swedish envoy in France, to the Danish minister, Bernstorff. Hardwicke wrote to Newcastle on 29 December 1745 that some of these intercepted dispatches had fallen into the hands of the French when they captured a Dutch fishing-boat carrying mails, that their interception was thus known in Paris, and that the French might have used this channel to convey misleading information (Add. MSS. 32,705, fo. 466). By underlining these words Newcastle emphasized his rejection of the Chancellor's suggestion. Chesterfield's reply showed that he, on the other hand, agreed with Hardwicke (below, p. 100).

Court of Versailles *a besoin de bride plutôt que des éperons*, that at present it was *cent contre cinquante* in favour of the house of Stuart; that volunteers were coming in every day at Paris for the *croisade*, that M^r^ d'Argenson [1] in his discourses with the Pensionary's emissary declared that they did not know who was King of England; that Prince Charles *avançoit au trone d'Angleterre*; that they could not treat with England; that it must be decided who was King. And all these menaces and gasconnades are realized by the actual departure of the Pretender's second son,[2] the Duc de Richelieu, the Prince de Turenne, the Duc de Monbason, General Buckley *en voluntaire*, etc., for Dunkirk, numbers of small vessels at different times assembled at Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and particular days for their departure named. And I think there can be no doubt but, if the rebels had continued in England advancing towards London, and our army been at a distance from the capital, the Duke de Richelieu would have attempted to make us a visit before now. And, though I rather think from the condition we are in to receive them and from the number of ships we have at present at sea, and from the Pretender's flight, that their design may be at present suspended, yet I am still of opinion that they keep it up, and shall not be surprized if we hear of them, and that soon, on some part of the coast, tho' perhaps not so near London as was at first apprehended.

I send you out of curiosity Lord John Drummond's declaration. Such an avowed engagement in favour of the Pretender and his family has not been taken by France since King James's time, and may cost us some pains to oblige them to recede from; [3] which brings me to our present political resolution and foreign system, which I hope you will approve.

The Queen of Hungary and the Elector of Saxony have been drubbed into a peace with Prussia.[4] The former would not fight,

[1] The Marquis d'Argenson had been Foreign Minister in France since November 1744, *i.e.* just before the fall of Carteret. Considering his importance in all the suggested schemes of general peace in 1745, it is not a little curious that the first mention of him in this correspondence should be delayed till January 1746.

[2] Afterwards known as the Cardinal of York.

[3] In all subsequent negotiations, and proposed negotiations, the English demand that France shall repudiate the cause of the Stewarts in perpetuity occupies a prominent place.

[4] The treaties of Dresden, 25 December 1745.

and the latter has paid dearly for it. However, the peace is made, and happy is it that it is so.

Larrey, the Pensionary's emissary (and by the way a very poor one), can get no sort of satisfaction. And your friend, Fournier, probably since Orry's removal, is quite dumb. Both these methods, therefore, have been tried, and in all appearance both failed.

Your friend Boetslaer [1] is come over, representing the miserable condition the Dutch are in, the danger of their being immediately overwhelmed by the French, their inability to withstand alone the power of France, their desire to exert to the utmost; and lastly, to insist to know what succour we can send them by the beginning of March, in order to prevent their utter ruin. That Prince Waldeck had formed a plan for the next campaign to the following purport, viz. that an army of 95,000 men should be assembled in the month of March to be thus disposed: that upwards of 70,000 should act offensively against France; that a *camp volant* of 8 or 10,000 should be formed to defend the canals about Brussels; and that the remainder should be employed to reinforce the garrisons where necessary. That, towards these 95,000 men, the States were willing to furnish upwards of 40,000 effective men, and that he, Boetslaer, was come to demand (I think) what, when, and how the King would contribute on his part.

We immediately determined that, in our present situation, no national troops could be sent from hence. But as, upon the principle of my former letter, we were willing to do what we could in reason for the support of the Dutch, and to make a diversion for France on the continent, we thought the circumstance of the Prussian peace might enable us, in a proper manner, to do it, and therefore determined that the inclosed answer should be given to M. Boetslaer, which was accordingly done on Friday last.[2]

I hope it will have your approbation, as it has had that of my

[1] See above, p. 38 and note.

[2] The answer is in Add. MSS. 32,805, fo. 1. This answer, dated 3 January and signed by Harrington, dilates at considerable length upon the hampering troubles in England, and upon the duty of the Dutch to defend the Netherlands, which is to them a domestic task. But, apart from these distasteful excuses and exhortations, the document conveys the assurance that the English King will assist the Dutch "en tout ce qui sera de son pouvoir, vû la situation presente de ses royaumes". This was Newcastle's formula, which he had persuaded his colleagues to accept, and which he now tries to commend to Chesterfield.

Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Dorset, my Lord Gower, the Duke of Bedford, my Lord Harrington, my Brother, and your humble servant.

We don't despair of inducing the King to continue the Hanover troops for Flanders upon his own Electoral account, viz. the common Electoral pay, and our paying the difference and the extraordinaries.[1] If this can be done, we shall avoid the objections arising from an estimate for taking those troops into the British pay, and the King, as Elector, will contribute considerably towards the war in Flanders.

And, if we cannot have peace upon tolerable terms, and if the Dutch will, of themselves, continue the war, rather than give themselves up to France, must not we, ought not we, to stand by them, and to employ France on the continent, that the whole weight of their power may not fall upon us, whom at present they would extinguish if they could?

We expect, from what appeared before the Houses adjourned, warm opposition when the Parliament meets.[2] The Duke of Bedford and my Lord Gower act hand and heart with us; and my Lord Gower told me the other day he really thought we could form an administration, if the King desired we should, exclusively of those whom we wish'd to have but could not have, M[r] Pitt, etc. With this the King seemed pleased. I ventured to tell him I believed Lord Chesterfield would not hurt this scheme when he came over; to which he answered that he would do every body justice, and that Lord Chesterfield had done extremely well in Ireland, that his notions were very right as to England, and should be followed.

But, notwithstanding all this, we have our doubts and difficulties. During the heat of the rebellion I was most graciously received. But, whether from the danger being more remote, or from whatever other cause I know not, during the last week there was a visible alteration. I had had some few conferences upon the state of Scotland, the impracticability of things going on with the

[1] The Hanoverian troops in the service of the allies received better pay than they did from their own ruler. When troops were sent by the Elector, nominally at his own expense, it was impossible to expect them to be content with lower pay than that of their fellow-countrymen serving in the same army. As George II refused to pay more than his normal rate, England had to make up the difference. This did not increase English love for the Hanoverians.

[2] At this time Newcastle despaired of gaining Pitt and Cobham.

no administration there was there, etc., and on Saturday last (very wisely for himself) the Marquis of Tweeddale resigned the seals.[1] The King told us three or four days ago that it would be so; but since has relapsed into the grievances of last years, and has had a visible alteration of behaviour.

Our young master [*sc.* the Prince of Wales] has been much dissatisfied that he is not suffered to go to command in Scotland, and is said to have expressed his resentment strongly at it. Lord G[ranville] [2] and Lord B[ath] have sent the King a message that they would not go into opposition, tho' the Prince did. This we have had from the best hands, and I think it has evidently made an impression.

Our young hero [*sc.* Cumberland] returned yesterday morning, highly pleased and satisfied with having driven the rebels into their own country and having bravely retaken Carlisle, considering his strength and the materials he had to do it with. All the world is in love with him, and he deserves it. He is highly sensible of your good wishes for him.

And now, having given you a short sketch of our present situation, I must beg that you would think of coming to England as soon as you can finish your affairs on the other side of the water. We want your assistance and support. For my own part, I can most truly say I have the utmost confidence in, and reliance upon, your opinion and judgment, and the marks you have given me of your friendship have been such as have unfeignedly attached me to you.

There is one favour I have to beg of you, and I will do it in a manner that I am sure is the most likely to succeed with you, by telling you beforehand that, if you will not grant it me, I will not attempt to do it without you.[3] For, how much soever I may desire to have the thing done, I would not disoblige you one moment to bring it about.

Lord Malton will never be easy till D[r] Griffith is made an Irish

[1] Tweeddale, an ally of Granville, was Secretary of State for Scotland. On his resignation the office was suppressed. In 1885 a Secretary for Scotland was re-appointed, and recently the holder of the office has been raised to the old rank of Secretary of State.

[2] Written in full in the first draft, and then all but the initial letter erased.

[3] This means that Newcastle will not use his authority as Secretary of State. Chesterfield, who had refused Lord Malton's request, was very indignant at the attempt to coerce him by an appeal to his official superior. See below, p. 103.

Bishop. He and his numerous dependents are of great consequence, and, if it is not done, he will lay the whole blame upon me. I had some thoughts of mentioning it to you upon the late vacancies. But they are over, and the King most readily came into the promotion of Dr Chenevix. I wish you would give me leave to assure my Lord Malton that Dr Griffith shall have your recommendation for the next vacancy.

As I write but seldom, you will the more easily excuse the length of this letter. Whether I write or not, you may always be assured that I am with the same sincerity and affection, [unfinished].

I forgot to mention [1] to your Lordship the present state of our Prussian affairs. Mr Villiers, to whom the King of Prussia gives the whole honour of the success of the late negotiation at Dresden, and has expressed a desire to have him at his court, is ordered to go immediately to Berlin.[2] I suggested to the King that, now the peace was made, it would be right to make the best uses of the King of Prussia we could; and Mr Villiers is instructed to see whether it may be practicable to get him to give some assistance towards the defence of Flanders and Holland, or at least to declare to France, in a strong and peremptory manner, that he cannot sit unconcerned and see them use their utmost efforts to overturn the Protestant succession in His Majesty's family in these Kingdoms. He is further directed to insinuate to the King of Prussia that, if he could learn from the Court of France the terms upon which they would negotiate for a general peace, the King would be glad to be informed of them through his Prussian Majesty's canal. Your Lordship sees by this that we employ all engines to see whether a tolerable peace can be obtained.

Draft, with numerous emendations, especially in the postscript, in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 17–29.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Jan. 11th 1745.

My dear Lord,

I make you no professions in return for the friendly and confidential letter I receiv'd from you yesterday. You do justice,

[1] This postscript was evidently quite distinct from the rest of the letter, and was tacked on to it afterwards.

[2] On Villiers' embassy to Berlin see Lodge, *Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 61–63.

I am persuaded, to my sentiments, which is more than I should do my self, if I attempted to express 'em.

Your domestick difficultys (I mean those only that relate to the rebellion) are greatly lessen'd, if not entirely remov'd. Fourteen battaillons, three regiments of dragoons, and the Hessians, are full enough to conquer all Scotland, were it worth conquering; you see it is only marching up to those scoundrels to put 'em to flight; and, if Hawley acts with spirit, as I verily believe he will, you will see the troubles in Scotland ended in two months time at furthest. As for the French invasion, I own I have as little apprehensions of that. I believe the French are desirous to keep us in the apprehensions of one, in order to keep our strength at home [1]; but, with the army we have in England and the fleets we have almost all round it, I cannot conceive that they are imprudent enough to send out an army that probably will be taken by our fleets, or if by accident it should land, must be cut to pieces by our troops and not one man escape out of England.

I wish your affairs at S[t] James's and Westminster were in as good a way; but I confess there I am bewilder'd. I am astonish'd and griev'd at the unaccountable conduct of Pitt, who I hear (but I don't know whether it is true) is reconnected with young master [2]; and by your letter young master seems to announce opposition. In that case let me give you one piece of advice, which is to avail your selves to the utmost, in the Closet, of his opposition, and to have no other regard or management for him than what mere decency absolutely requires. I knew him better than you do, and I know he has neither love nor hatred in his temper, and those who are worst with him to-day are as likely as those who are best to be well with him to-morrow. The messages of Lords Granville and Bath that they will not oppose, though he should, are in my mind a gross collusion, and I hope no necessity whatsoever will reduce you even to temporise with either of those two Lords. You know the insolence, the perfidy, and the wildness of 'em both in their different ways. They can bring you no friends, for they have not one in the world, but they may lose you many. I am very glad that Gower and the Duke of Bedford act so cordially with you, and that Gower thinks that an administration may be form'd without Pitt. I think it very possible too, but it

[1] See above, p. 94, note.

[2] Pitt's return to the Prince of Wales was very shortlived.

must be by breaking considerably into the opposition and hindering it from being reckon'd a national opposition. I should hope Lyttelton, after some convulsions, might be kept, and a Grenville or two [1] and Barrington got, which would cripple Pitt's opposition extremely. Among other individuals, take my word for it, you cannot get a more usefull one, nor one more to be depended upon if he is to be had at all, than Harry Furneze. You did very right to tell the King that I would not disturb such a scheme of administration. I shall not disavow you, if Gower and the Duke of Bedford continue in ; and, if they don't, I shall disturb no scheme, nor be concern'd in any, but be quiet for the rest of my life. But I have said too much upon these domestick affairs already : which at this distance it is ridiculous to say any thing at all upon ; every moment and a thousand circumstances changing perpetually the state of the case.

The answer to Boetslaer I think is an extreme good one : if there is any defect in it at all, it is only that the Dutch declaring war against France is not made absolutely a condition sine quâ non.[2] Though indeed that is pretty much the same thing ; because I am persuaded that, as the letter now is, it will make the Dutch soon take some engagement of peace, armistice, or neutrality with France. These words alone, *qu'on ne doit pas s'attendre que S.M. y puisse fournir même cette proportion de force qu'elle a fait çy devant*, will in my opinion do it ; for I know they expected much more than last year. But, considering the present state of affairs, will there be any great hurt if they have to, and have you any better way of getting out of this scrape with common decency ?[3] Suppose that scheme of Prince Waldeck's to take place—nominally, and that an army of ninety four thousand men shall be thus got together in Flanders. Does your Grace think it will be any thing

[1] The Grenvilles were not yet Pitt's brothers-in-law, but they were closely allied with him, and served with him under the nominal leadership of Lord Cobham.

[2] The answer to Boetzelaer concluded by expressing a hope that the Dutch would put themselves on the same footing with the British nation by declaring war against France. Nobody knew better than Chesterfield how chimerical this hope was. When he went to the Hague, he had been instructed to obtain such a declaration, but had reported it to be impossible.

[3] This idea that the desertion of the Dutch would serve to screen the English ministry in the event of having to conclude an unpopular peace, was present to many minds. The Dutch were well aware of it, and resented it bitterly. See my *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy*, pp. 132, 148.

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

like ninety four thousand effective men, or able to look the French army in the face ? [1] You know how largely the Austrians reckon by battalions and squadrons, and how prodigiously their reall differs from their nominal force. You know too by experience how extreme bad the Dutch troops are, which are to make near half this army. And lastly who shall command it ? I will venture to prophecy that this army, if it ever appears in the field, which I don't believe it will, will be extremely beaten. But should the Queen of Hungary send the force requir'd to Flanders and Italy, will not France send another army to attack her in her German dominions ? [2] I am persuaded they will, for I am sure they are able. In that case the Empire will make fine decrees, and do nothing else. You see their timidity and neutrality in every step they take, and you know their inefficiency were they willing. Should she be thus attack'd at home, you must expect and could not wonder at her recalling her troops from Flanders. But supposing she should not be attack'd in Germany ; if the war continues, depend upon it the Electorate of Hannover will, and where are you then ? And will the deffence of the Electorate be trusted to the King of Prussia, our new ally ; or will the Hannoverian troops and the Hessians too be call'd from Flanders ? It is easy to decide which. For my own part I see no possibility of carrying on the war ; and I am still convinc'd that the Dutch will not do it, whatever they may say, and I think that what they talk of now is only to justify what they are determin'd to do, and that they may have it to say that they would not have done it, if they could have hoped for the proper support from England. Moreover, if it be true, as I think it probable, that some commotions are beginning in Zealand tending towards a Stadhouder, the anti-Stadhouder party in Holland, which is the ruling party, will not hesitate a moment to conclude with France upon almost any terms ; and France, I make no doubt, will willingly conclude with them upon the foot of *uti possidetis*.[3]

[1] His Grace was in the next year to show a fatal facility in accepting paper assurances as to the number of allied armies at their face value. Chesterfield's warnings on the subject had no effect.

[2] This was exactly what France would not do. The French had had more than enough of war in Germany.

[3] It is possible that Chesterfield's forecast might have been fulfilled, if d'Argenson had been allowed, as he wished, to conciliate the Dutch. As the military party insisted upon a policy of intimidation, the invasion of Dutch

Nothing can be more obliging than your desiring me to return to England as soon as possible, and the reasons you give for desiring it; but I assure you I do not want pressing for that. And I will not stay one moment longer than necessary. My drudgery here is uninterrupted, and intolerable to one naturally so lazy as I am. The Parliament here cannot possibly be up till the second week in March, and then I believe I shall not delay my journey many days. It is a very small compliment, for it is a very great truth, to tell you that I shall be exceedingly impatient to see you in England.

Though I think your Lord Malton and his drunken parson very impertinent, I assure you, my dear Lord, that, as you take a greater interest in him than I think he deserves, I should be very glad to do upon that account what I would not do upon any other; but, to tell you the real truth, it is so usuall and expected a thing for a Lord Lieutenant to make his first chaplain a Bishop, especially after having postpon'd him twice for two of this country, that I had upon this promotion promis'd him the next, and told every body that I had. It is D^r^ Twisden, nephew to M^rs^ Purcell. And I should make a very poor figure here if that recommendation were not to prevail. But, as you are intirely out of this affair, provided you can convince that little puppy that you were in earnest in it, and lay it all on me, I send you an inclos'd letter writt on purpose that you may show him. I'll answer for it neither he nor his dependants will quarrell about it; his dependants have all places, which they will not lose for him, and though he has no place himself, he recommends to about a hundred and fifty a year, a privilege which I dare-say he will not quarrel with. I am really asham'd of the length of this letter, and, not to make it longer, will end it abruptly, and only assure you that it is impossible to be with greater truth and attachment than I am

Your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 35–40.

To NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, Jan. 11^th^ 1746.

My dear Lord,

I am sure you do me the justice to believe that nothing can be more uneasy to me than to be oblig'd to refuse your Grace any

territory enabled the Stadhouder party to prevail. But their success did not remove the military and financial weakness of the Republic.

thing that you so earnestly desire as (by your repeated letters to me) I find you do desire the promotion of Dr Griffiths to an Irish Bishoprick, from the regard you have for Lord Malton. But at the same time I am as sure that your Grace will neither be sur priz'd nor offended if I have some regard for my self and that station in which the King has been pleas'd to place me here. I had scarce taken possession of my office before I receiv'd an application from Lord Malton, with whom I am but little acquainted, to make his Chaplain at one stroke an Irish Bishop. The application, I confess'd, surpriz'd me, it being I believe the very first of the kind that ever was made to a new Lord Lieutenant, who had not then had any opportunity of providing for any of his own domestick Chaplains. I writt however as civil an answer as possible to Lord Malton, told him that he could not but suppose that I had some engagements of my own, and that Dr Griffith was already loaded with preferments. This was so true and I thought so civil an answer that I flatter'd myself that sollicitation was at an end or at least suspended for a reasonable time, when, to my great surprize, I find it now renew'd, and that in a most uncommon manner, not through the Lord Lieutenant. For my own part I should never think of recommending to my Lord Chancellor even a Justice of the Peace for the West Riding of York. I should, and even that with great diffidence, apply to Lord Malton. And if he, who must be the best judge of the state of that country, declin'd it for a time, I should think it very improper to renew my application to the Chancellor. A Bishop is surely something more important for the King's service here. I have at least thought it so much so that I have postpon'd my own domestick Chaplains twice in favour of the last two Bishops, with whom I was unacquainted, but whose promotion seem'd to me necessary. Having thus twice put by my own domestick Chaplain, Dr Twisden, I have promis'd him the next vacant Bishoprick, which, if I am Lord Lieutenant, he will certainly have. I thought it necessary to say thus much to your Grace to excuse my self to you, for it is to you only that I desire to be excus'd.[1] I am with the greatest truth and respect your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 41, 42.

[1] Newcastle was apparently not pleased with the refusal, as he made no reply to this letter, and did not write again for a full month.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, Feb. 10, 1745/6.

My dear Lord,

I have only time to acquaint you that this day Lord Harrington and I resign'd the Seals to His Majesty. My Brother does the same to-morrow, and Lord Chancellor and probably some others soon after. This resolution was taken upon a firm conviction that the King's dislike of his ministers and disapprobation of them, and unwillingness to give them the necessary support, made it impracticable for us to carry on his affairs with success. Lord Bath has lately had frequent access to the Closet and a favourable reception there, in preference, as we had reason to think, to those who were to be responsible for the success of affairs. Our situation therefore became as dangerous as it was disagreeable. And, as your young Marcellus had by his bare appearance drove the rebels to their mountains, we thought the publick affairs could not suffer with regard to the rebellion at home, and the intended invasion from France is at present laid aside, and I hope we are now so well armed, both by sea and land, that they will not venture to resume it. The Duke of Bedford and Gower, I believe, will resign to-morrow. All friends are perfectly well. I need not put you in mind that I have no longer any power over the Postmaster.

I am, my dear Lord,

most sincerely and affectionately yours,

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Copy, not in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. fo. 136.

To NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, Feb. 15th 1746.

My dear Lord,

I received about two hours ago your letter of the 10th. I believe you know me well enough to require no particular answer to it now. In two days you will, by a proper opportunity, be troubl'd with a longer letter from

Your Grace's most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fo. 155.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Feb. 18th, 1746.

My dear Lord,

Though I threaten'd you in my last of the 15th with a longer letter, this shall not be a very long one, for besides that I am not at any time very fond of my own speculations, all speculations at this distance, and in such a conjuncture, are probably impertinent. A situation so violent must vary every minute, and will (I dare say) be very different at the time of your receiving this letter from what it is now at the time of my writing it.

I am convinc'd I need not tell you that the day after my arrival in London I shall most certainly resign my employment. As to the manner of doing it, I will receive and observe your directions. But this I think necessary to tell you, which is that, though I believe most people have a good opinion enough of me to take it for granted that I intend to quitt, yet I have not communicated that intention to any person living, either here or in England, but leave it intirely to you to publish, or not, as you shall think proper. Let me only know which you do, that I may conform my self here to it.

During the rest of my stay here, which shall be as short as I can possibly make it, though it cannot be half as short as I wish it, I must necessarily send my recommendations to your successor, whoever he may be, but I will take care that those recommendations shall be of such a nature that, if they prevail, I shall only have a civility, but not an obligation, to acknowledge. In the mean time my situation is extremely disagreeable, and God knows when it will end, for I have no great hopes that the Counsil [*sic*] in England will give much attention or dispatch to my Irish Bills,[1] so that I may possibly have full leisure to learn the language, if I apply myself.

It seems to me impossible that the two Earls can carry on the business unless they have a strength in Parliament which I am not aware of, for I take it for granted that by much the greatest part of your old corps will stick to you, and I cannot think that many of the old opposition will desert, so that, in my opinion your situation is better than it has been this great while, as your way

[1] Under Poynings' Act, all Irish Bills required the approval of the English Council.

is clearer. You must be call'd for again, and that upon your own terms. When that day comes, and I think it cannot be far off, *point de foiblesse humaine, point de quartier, I beseech you*; and let no ill-tim'd *decency*, candour, lenity, or heroism weaken or spoil the best and most solid settlement of an administration that it was ever in people's power to form. In short, don't be *subjectum lenis in hostem.*[1] Adieu, my dear Lord, you have long known me to be what (if possible) I am now more than ever,

Your most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

My compliments to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer [*sc.* Henry Pelham], and if you please to the whole late Cabinet Counsil.

Tuesday night.

P.S. Just as I was sending away my letter, I receiv'd Mr Stone's of the 14th, which show'd me I was no bad prophet. And, to do honour to my spirit of prophecy, I send you the letter itself by the common Post, which you are again master of. Your victory is compleat, for God's sake persue it. Good policy still more than resentment requires that Granville and Bath should be mark'd out, and all their people cut off, to the dog that pisseth against the wall. Old Archy [2] ought too, in my mind, to be made an example of for more reasons *than one*. Every body now sees and knows that you have the power, let 'em see and know too that you will use it. The Garters, I should think, ought instantly to be properly dispos'd of in one way, and the Finches in another. A general run ought to be made upon Bath by all your followers and writers. If the rebels had persued their victory at Preston Pans, they might have come to London and we had been undone, as they are now by their own neglect. If we had persued our victory at Dettinghen, Fontenoy had never been.[3] As to your humble servant, all he

[1] Chesterfield had learnt this maxim from Walpole, when he himself had suffered from it. On Walpole's implacability to opponents, whether Whig or Tory, see F. S. Oliver, *The Endless Adventure*, p. 256.

[2] Lord Archibald Hamilton, M.P. for Dartmouth, was deprived at this time of his seat on the Admiralty Board.

[3] This is extremely disputable. If the allies had pressed France immediately after Dettingen, Frederick would probably have intervened earlier, and it was Prussian intervention which gave France her ascendancy in the Netherlands.

desires for himself is dispatch to his Irish Bills, of which he will send you another cargoe the latter end of this week.[1]

C.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 176–178.

To Chesterfield.

Newcastle House, Feb. 18, 1745/6.

Private.

My dear Lord,

I am now to give you an account of the most surprising scene that ever happened in this country, or, I believe, in any other. And, that you may have as perfect an idea of it as I can give you, you shall have a short account of every thing that has any immediate relation to it.

Some few days before the meeting of Parliament after Christmass [2] Mr Pitt (who had for some time before had no commerce upon business with any of us) went to the Duke of Bedford, expressed an inclination to know our foreign scheme, shewed a disposition to come into it, and wished that some of us would go and talk with Lord Cobham, into whose hands they had now entirely committed themselves.

I went accordingly the next day to Lord Cobham, and opened our whole scheme to him, which he owned was much more reasonable than he imagined we could have made it, and that, if we would support the continent at all, it could not be in a better or cheaper manner. He seemed very desirous to come into us, and to bring in his Boys, as he called them, exclusively (as he expressly said) of the Tories, for whom he had nothing to say. The terms were, Mr Pitt to be Secretary at War, Lord Barrington in the Admiralty, and Mr James Grenville to have an employment of £1000 a year. He flung out Lord Denbigh, the Duke of Queensbury, and some Scotch Politicks, but not as points absolutely to be insisted upon.

Upon this, I soon opened the budget to the King, which was better received than I expected; and the only objection was to the giving Mr Pitt this particular office of Secretary at War. For any other His Majesty was willing he should have. We had, all

[1] This letter, curiously isolated, is printed in Bradshaw's edition of *Chesterfield's Letters*, vol. II. pp. 791–793. It is the only one of these letters which appears there.

[2] The new session began on 14 January (O.S.) 1746.

of us, several conferences with His Majesty upon it, the King insisting for some time that he would not make him Secretary at War; afterwards, that he would use him ill, if he had it; and at last that he would give him the office, but would not admit him into his presence to do the business of it.

You may easily imagine we shewed His Majesty that the giving the office in the two last instances would not be doing the thing. We represented to him how necessary the making Mr Pitt Secretary at War was for the service of his affairs and for enabling his administration to carry them on with success.

The King grew very uneasy, and complained extremely of being forced. But, when the difficulty seemed in a way of being removed, my Lord Bath got to the King, represented against the behaviour of his ministers in forcing him in such a manner to take a disagreeable man into a particular office and thereby dishonouring him both at home and abroad,[1] and encouraging the King to resist it by offering him, I suppose, the support of his friends in so doing. This strengthened the King in his dislike of the measure, and encouraged, I conclude, His Majesty to think that he had a party behind the curtain who would either force his ministers to do what he liked or, if they did not do it, would be able to support his affairs without them.

Tho' Lord Bath was, luckily for us and for the publick, the open transactor of this affair, it is not to be imagined but that my Lord Granville was in the secret.

Mr Pitt, very decently and honourably, authorised us immediately to renounce all his pretensions to the office of Secretary at War. But it was thought proper, at the same time, to suggest to the King that, after so publick an eclat as my Lord Bath had made of this affair, it was thought absolutely necessary that His Majesty should give some publick mark of his resolution to support and place confidence in his then administration; or otherwise we should be at the mercy of our enemies, whenever they should be able to take any advantage of us, without having it in our power to do the King or the publick any service.

[1] Lord Bath was not altogether wrong. However difficult it may have been in the last two centuries for the sovereign to refuse to take a particular man as chief minister, the Crown retained a veto upon the selection of subordinate ministers. Queen Victoria is said to have exercised such a veto against Mr. Labouchere. It seems a smaller exercise of prerogative to exclude a man from a particular office.

His Majesty was extremely irritated, loudly complaining of our conduct both at home and abroad, unwilling to give us any satisfaction or assurance of his countenance or support, and plainly shewing a most determined predilection for the other party.

Upon this, we thought, in duty to the King and in justice to ourselves, the wisest and honestest part that we could take was to desire leave to resign our employments. And we determined that Lord Harrington should go first, myself next, then my Brother, and afterwards my Lord Chancellor.[1] Accordingly my Lord Harrington went (as you know) on Monday the 10th, and resigned the seals. My Lord Bath went into the Closet after him, and I after my Lord Bath. My Lord Pembroke, my Brother, the Duke of Bedford, and my Lord Gower resigned the next day. The Chancellor was prevented from going till the Friday following by the King's going to the House of Lords. The interview with Lord Harrington, I believe, was pretty warm. With me it was otherwise, very civil, kind enough; and we parted very good friends.

The next day it began to be seen how this thing would be taken in the world; and great resentment was shewed in my Brother's audience on Tuesday. It was soon evident that the resignations would have been almost universal, tho' without any concert or any endeavours used of any kind for that purpose. This struck such a terror upon the new ministers that Lord Bath went on Wednesday to declare to the King that he could not undertake it, and the King sent Mr Winnington [2] to us that day to desire that we would return to court and to our old employments.

We represented to His Majesty that it would be necessary for him to make some publick declaration of his design to make us his ministers if we were to return to his service. We then considered that, on that condition, as the publick had declared so strongly in our favour, if we refused to serve the King and the publick when called upon, the torrent would turn against us, especially as it was plain that they could not carry on government without us.

We immediately desired that the court might be purged of all

[1] The order is an odd one. In modern usage a Prime Minister would resign for the whole ministry. But at the time simultaneous resignations were unknown. This was the nearest approach that had yet been made, and both the King and Granville were obviously quite unprepared for it.

[2] The King had vainly offered to make Winnington Chancellor of the Exchequer in succession to Pelham.

their friends and dependents; that Lord Bath might be out of the Cabinet Council; the Duke of Bolton, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, Mr William Finch, the Vice-Chamberlain, Mr Edward Finch, the Groom of the Bedchamber, Mr Boone, and the Advocate of Scotland (which were all that were left of that sort) should be removed. We were told that all should be done, except what related to the Bedchamber, and accordingly we returned to court on Friday last.

My Brother had a long conference on Saturday evening, wherein the chief resentment was shewed to Lord Harrington, and that in the strongest and bitterest manner, and hints flung out that, if we would give him up, every thing else should be done. But my Brother saw Lord H.'s chief fault was his having stuck to us. You may easily imagine we had more honor than to give in to any thing of that kind; and that conference, which began tolerably well, ended very unsuccessfully, with strong declarations against making some of the alterations proposed.

The Duke of Grafton [1] had a long conversation on Monday morning, which certainly had a good effect. I went in alone that day, was very graciously received, and got every thing done that was wanted except the removal of the Vice-Chamberlain, which the King begged us not to insist upon in such a manner, and said he should take it so kindly if we did not do it, that in the opinion of every body it would have been indecent to have pressed it.

As to Ned Finch, we all thought the Bedchamber could not be attacked. And indeed, considering the part we found ourselves under the necessity of acting, and the publick declaration there was in our favour, we did apprehend that the insisting too strongly upon a particular point, which the King appeared to have so much at heart, would have been universally blamed.

The Duke of Bolton and Lord Berkeley were this day removed. Lord Portsmouth is to be Governor of the Isle of Wight, and the Duke of Bedford Warden of New Forest. Mr Pitt is to have Lord Torrington's place,[2] who is to succeed Lord Berkeley. Lord Barrington comes into the Admiralty in the room of Lord Archibald Hamilton; Mr James Grenville is to succeed Mr Bladen at the

[1] Charles, Duke of Grafton, an amiable nonentity, held the office of Lord Chamberlain from 1724 to 1757. His grandson, Augustus Henry, was the Grafton whom Junius denounced.

[2] Pitt became joint Vice Treasurer of Ireland, but he only held the office until April, when on Winnington's death he became Paymaster General.

Board of Trade; and Mr Thos. Gore is to have Mr Boone's place of Muster-master General.

The behaviour to Lord Harrington is already better than could have been expected; so I hope that will soon come right.[1]

Thus our affairs are so far settled. There seems to be the best disposition in old and new friends to make one strong, solid, and irresistible corps; which I think will succeed, if our new friends do not insist too much upon our engaging at present that the Bill for limiting the officers of the army shall be passed some time this session; which, if they do, in the unsettled state things are, will, I am afraid, create new difficulties.

I have now troubled you with a pretty long, but true, narrative of this great affair, and as I have spoke very freely both of things and persons [I must insist that you will keep it entirely to yourself [2]]. I hope you will approve what we have done. If you do not, it will be a great mortification to me. I should be glad to hear from you, but infinitely more so to have the pleasure of seeing you. In all situations your presence is most agreeable to your friends: in our present circumstances it is absolutely necessary, and therefore I must conjure you to make what hast you can to us. For, tho' your Irish subjects will detain you as long as they can, I should hope you would think near seven months Royalty sufficient.

My Brother sends you his best compliments, and I hope you will believe that I am, with the sincerest respect and affection, my dear Lord [unfinished].

P.S. I must beg to put your Lordship in mind of my friend, Mrs Spence, to whom there was a year due upon her pension last Christmas. I should be infinitely obliged to you if you would order the payment.

Draft with corrections in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 164–175.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, Feb. 23d 1746.

My dear Lord,

I write this in the greatest hurry imaginable that it may go by the messenger who carrys the Irish Bills to England and who sets

[1] This sentence was interpolated in the revised draft.

[2] These words are enclosed in a pencil line, and in the margin, also in pencil, is the word "omitt".

out in an hour. So that it is more to acknowledge than to answer your Grace's letter of the 18th, which I have this moment receiv'd. Things are now upon a right foot, and you are ministers for life if you please. As far as you have gone is in my opinion extremely well, but I still think you should go a little further. I mean with regard to the Finches, more upon account of the scandal their continuance may give, and the suspicions it may create, than for any importance of their own. Moreover, after the Duke of Bolton, Lord Berkeley etc. are remov'd, they will be suppos'd to have some particular hold, some distinguish'd favour, in the Closet, if they remain in. I hope in God you will not let the Army Bill create any differences among yourselves, for, though I am convinc'd that the constitution will not be one groat the better for it, I am sure the army will, which, I will venture to say, is at this time the worst officer'd army in all Europe, and, if it is ever to be of any use, you must lay some such bar in the way of those Parliamentary sollicitations, which otherwise cannot be withstood. I have not a moment's time more.

Yours most faithfully,
CHESTERFIELD.

It is the fault of Mrs Spence's agent that she has not receiv'd her money. If I knew who he was, I would send to him. No body is two months behind hand that have sent for their money. If the person properly authoriz'd to receive it does not come, the Treasury can't pay it.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fo. 197.

TO NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Cast. Feb. 27th 1746.

My dear Lord,

This letter is supplemental to my last of the 25th, which the wind and tide, that wait for no man, made shorter than I intended it, if I had had more time. I must seriously request it of you that you will not mention one word of it to any mortal being except your Brother; no matter for my reason for that request. There is some difference between unreserv'd confidence and distrust, and I may desire to confine the former to you two only, without entertaining the latter of any body else.

You may remember I foretold to you the difficultys you would meet with in your new arrangement would arise much more from

the Whigg than from the Tory part of the opposition ; the event has verified that prediction, and I am far from thinking those difficultys are at an end by your taking in the people you mention. You will find that they will not cement well with your old people, who are in truth jealous of them and not of the Torys, though they pretend the latter to cover the former. Your own people were never alarm'd really at the Torys, whose inefficiency and insignificancy in business they well knew ; but only dreaded the talents and efficiency of Pitt and that set, who they knew, if joyn'd with you, would either have the lead given 'em or would take it. In that they judg'd right, and you will find that will be the case. They will be for dictating, Cobham will put 'em upon it,[1] and if there is any considerable party left for them to retreat to, they will be eternally threatning you with such a retreat. What convinces me the more of this intention is Cobham's chearfull and willing exclusion of the Torys, for whom you know he was always the great stickler. Consider therefore whether you should leave 'em this resource ; or whether you should not rather engage so many Torys on your side as to leave the rest only a fraction, or if you will a faction. You will, I am sure, find your own people much easier about the Torys than they us'd to be, when Pitt, the Tory they fear'd, is once in. But I promise you he will not be easy till he is Secretary at War and Dick Grenville [2] of the Treasury. Jemmy Grenville's £1000 a year was dirtily ask'd and prudently granted, but that won't do, and Dick's Treasury is the tender and favourite point. In these difficultys, which you will soon find your selves involv'd in, should you not strengthen Gower's hands as much as ever you can ? You may depend upon him, and I will be bound for him, which in these times I would be for very few people. Would it be impossible to connect the Duke of Argyle [3] and Marchmont [4] ? In my mind they would both find their accounts in such a connection. Marchmont with some faults

[1] But compare the assurances given in his letter of 25 November. Above, p. 88.

[2] For a vivid description of Richard Grenville (later Earl Temple) and his brothers see Lord Rosebery's *Chatham*, pp. 130–140.

[3] Archibald Campbell, third Duke of Argyle, had succeeded his brother John, the General, in 1743. As Earl of Islay he had been entrusted by Walpole with the control of Scottish patronage, and he ruled the northern Kingdom as absolutely as did Henry Dundas in a later generation.

[4] Hugh, third Earl of Marchmont. As Lord Polwarth, he sat in the Commons from 1734 till 1740, when he was disqualified by succeeding to the

is certainly very able and a man of business, and if he engaged with you, it would be warmly and firmly. His brother too, who would follow him, is efficient in Parliament.[1] If Argyle were to promise him Stair's seat in the House of Lords upon his death, which I think cannot be remote, I believe it would connect him firmly. Since you have indulg'd some body with his two Finches, which I confess I would not have done, you may, I should think, contrive to remove 'em into other places of equal or even greater value. If the profit of their places is what they only mean, they can have no objection to an equall or an advantageous exchange, and if they mean any thing more, that meaning should be defeated. It is surely a ridiculous and an indecent thing that Will Finch should every day by virtue of his office hear and see every thing that is done or said in the backstair room. Whereas, if he chang'd with one of your own people, whom you could depend upon, both the inconveniency and the indecency would be remov'd. As for Ned, I would rather he had a thousand pounds a year at the Board of Trade than his present five hundred in the Bedchamber; and what pretence could he or *any body* [*sc.* the King] have for refusing that exchange? Whatever disagreeable things you have to do *somewhere*, you should in my opinion do now, while your victory is fresh, and somebody as sore as he can be. Tearing open an old sore a year hence will be much more disagreeable to you both. When that work is over, would it be amiss for you to cultivate Lady Yarmouth more than you have hitherto done? She certainly can give good or bad impressions in the many hours conversations she has; for even the wisest man, like the cameleon, takes without knowing it more or less of the hue of what he is often *upon*. Now Diemaar's[2] pension of a thousand pounds a year upon this establishment expires next month, and why should not your Brother hint to

Scottish peerage. As he did not become a representative peer till 1750, he dropped out of parliamentary life for ten years. He had made a reputation as an opponent of Walpole, and he continued to be closely associated with Bolingbroke, Chesterfield, and other opposition leaders until December 1744, when many of his friends joined the ministry. He himself remained in the cold until 1747, when he received a post in Scotland. His diary (*Marchmont Papers*, vol. I) is a valuable and much quoted authority for this decade.

[1] Alexander Hume Campbell was the twin brother of Lord Marchmont. He also entered Parliament in 1734 and acquired a considerable reputation as an able speaker.

[2] Diemar was a General in the service of Hesse-Cassel, who had earned his pension by helping to maintain friendly relations between England and the Landgrave.

her a grant of that pension for a term of years? I dare say she would understand so much English as that perfectly well.

Though I am oblig'd to you for wishing me in England, I assure you you need not invite me there. I have had Royalty enough, God knows, and am very impatient to return to the state of an English subject. Your return of my Bills from the Counsil determines mine to England. I will hurry 'em through the Parliament as soon as possible, and then in a most gracious Speech prorogue it. Don't think by this that I imagine I can be of any use to you in England, rather the contrary; and very possibly some silly accident may happen to me at my arrival; for in the present situation of mind in which I take his Majesty to be, he may probably be glad to ease himself on one whose resentment could be of no consequence.

Your foreign system will very soon, whatever it does now, please Cobham, for I take it for granted that in a fortnight's time the Dutch will have sign'd something or other with France. They can't do otherwise: they have no army now left, and this is not the time to begin to raise one. So there's an end of the land war.

Pray make my compliments to the new Chancellor of the Exchequer [*sc.* Henry Pelham], to whom I owe a letter. I don't write because I write this; but tell him that I beg he will remember Sewallis.[1] He'll know what I mean. After tiring you so long, I'll end without ceremony. My attachment to you deserves that indulgence.

Yours,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 221–224.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, March 5th 1745/6.

My dear Lord,

I must return you my sincere thanks for the favour of your letters of the 18th, 23d, and 27th of last month; and, before I enter into the subject of them, or give you any further account of our situation here, you must allow me to make my most grateful acknowledgments for your unreserved confidence in me, and those

[1] I can find no such surname. But a certain Sewallis Shirley was at this time M.P. for Brackley, Northants, and the peculiarity of the name makes it practically certain that Chesterfield alluded to him.

evident marks of your friendship and goodness to my Brother and myself, which we shall both make it our study to deserve. According to your desire I have shewed your letter to nobody but my Brother, and you may be assured I am as incapable of making any ill use of your confidence as, I hope, I am of being wanting making a proper return to it.

Your prophecy in your letter of the 18th was fulfill'd much sooner than you yourself possibly would have imagined had you been on the spot. The new undertakers did all they could to muster up a force, but it proved to no purpose, of which one instance, perhaps, may make you merry. When somebody was complaining that all the old servants were going, and particularly that the Duke of Grafton would resign the next day, my sanguine successor [1] would not at first believe it. But when it was repeated to him, he bravely replyed: "If it is so, turn him out to-night."

I hope you do not imagine I could doubt one moment of your doing, upon your return from Ireland, what you should think right for your friends, yourself, and your country. But that was so much taken for granted, tho' (as you may imagine) never mentioned by us, that, to prove that this measure, which in reality was a very sudden one, had been long designed, it was alleged that there were letters from Ireland upon it. But, however what relates to yourself might have been suspected, nobody, I can assure you, shall know it from me. And I must particularly thank you for the obliging manner with which you acquainted me with your then design.

I was afraid you would think us a little too tender. But, had you been with us and seen the state of things and persons, your own good sense and good nature would, I am persuaded, have inclined you to alter your opinion. There remain none but the Finches, and as to them I own I differ a little with you in opinion. Is it not better they should do so, where their employments are some excuse for it, than be removed to others where all the world must see it can be nothing but partiality to their persons and party? [2] For, as to the real mischief of their being at court, I think

[1] Granville took both the secretaryships for two days, and actually sent out letters to the envoys in foreign courts intimating his accession to office.

[2] The meaning of this cryptic sentence seems to be that less misunderstanding would arise if the Finches were left in posts which were obviously due to court favour, than transferred to posts which would seem to be due to ministerial partiality.

what was said to me upon that subject has great weight in it, viz. were there an inclination to carry on a correspondence with those people [*sc.* Bath and Granville], the means of doing it would not be wanting, tho' these gentlemen [*sc.* the Finches] were not in office.

The disposition of the Garters was mentioned. But the particular resentment to the first of our friends that must have one [*sc.* Harrington] may be just at present an obstacle to it.

We have now settled our administration as to persons, and, if we can be so happy as to be thoroughly united amongst ourselves, and pursue dispassionately and disinterestedly what is right for the publick, we must then either stay in with satisfaction and success or (which I do not think will be the case) go out with honor and applause.

I hear from my Brother you will have a full account from my Lord Gower of every thing that relates to M^r^ Pitt. The situation of those affairs is very different from what it appears to you. As to the Tories, they have left my Lord Gower,[1] and my Lord Gower has left them. And we have, at present, no correspondence or negotiation with any of them. Nor has Lord Gower any that I know of. He is absolutely broke with Sir J. H. Cotton,[2] and has been so this whole winter. And it was generally believed (tho' I don't know upon what foundation) that that gentleman was endeavouring to get the Tories to join Lord Granville; though I neither believe that the Tories would come in to Lord Granville, nor Lord Granville at that time have taken them. What may be the case hereafter, I know not. It is certain that in the countries [*sic.* ? country or counties] our late behaviour was very popular both with Whig and Tory.

What you say of the real jealousy that our old friends have conceived of M^r^ Pitt and that set, may be true with regard to some few of the leading men in the House of Commons. But it was the dread and apprehension of taking in Tories that hurt us with our great friends in the House of Lords and the bulk of the party in the House of Commons. And it is those we must stick by; and it is those that have stuck by us.

[1] See above, p. 40.

[2] Sir John Hynde Cotton, who had sat in Parliament since 1708, was the most consistent and active Tory in the House of Commons. He had been appointed Treasurer of the Chamber in December 1744, but was dismissed in June 1746. Newcastle's letter intimating his dismissal is in Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 336.

The accession of the Whig part of the opposition (tho' it may affect and displease some few individuals) is look'd upon, in the main, as an addition of strength to the party, and as such is generally liked. And, if our old and new corps can be well cemented (which I should hope might be) I do think an irresistible party will and must be formed.

I have seen nothing of our new friends since they came in: but I hear well of them from those that have. The spirit of dictation was to be apprehended, but I think the incidents of this winter have a little changed that disposition. And our friend Gower, ever since the last accession, has been perfectly satisfied with the conduct of M^r^ Pitt and his friends; is convinced that my friend Cobham has only a nominal credit with them; and has been strongly assured of their adherence to the Duke of Bedford and him.

This made me say that the state of that question was a little altered from what it appeared to you. Gower is perfectly well with us, and in the utmost confidence, and he is equally so with our whole party; and any thing for him or any friend of his would go as easily as he himself could wish. The same as to the Duke of Bedford, who has no faults to us, the party, or the publick.

As to Lord Marchmont, I should be glad we could oblige him. But, I am afraid, he was strongly inclined the other way. My politicks as to Scotland are exactly the same with yours. The rebellion must be got the better of in such a manner that we must not have another the next year. And, if the power of the Highlands is not absolutely reduced, France may play the Pretender upon us whenever she pleases, when, perhaps, we shall not be so well prepared to resist it as we were even this time.

As to foreign affairs, they are as bad as possible. The King of Sardinia's separate peace, I am afraid, is signed or upon the point of being so, and that in a very bad way, except that, by the accounts I have had this day by a good hand from Paris, our good friend the Queen of Spain is outrageous with France for their liberality to the King of Sardinia, and is said to have protested against it.[1]

[1] Elizabeth Farnese, who hated Sardinia and clung to the letter of the treaty of Fontainebleau, was furious when she learned that France was proposing to partition the prospective endowment of Don Philip. In the end she decided to accept the terms, but it was then too late, as Charles Emmanuel had broken off the negotiation and returned to the allies.

A bold minister would be apt to endeavour to make an advantageous exchange of Sardinia for Spain. But I doubt whether the Queen of Hungary has sense and temper enough to facilitate such a measure.

It is true that our friends in Holland are every day losing their towns and their troops; and yet there is not, at present, the least appearance of their having any design to clap up a separate peace. Twickle indeed is at Paris,[1] but he has, as yet, done nothing. And I much question whether he has any other authority or instructions but to sound, suggest, and report, which probably may end in nothing.

In these circumstances it is almost the universal opinion that we should give Holland what assistance we can. In order to it, it is proposed to enable the Queen of Hungary by a subsidy of £400,000 to have 40,000 *combatans* in the field by the end of this month. 15,000 were said to be arrived in the Low Countries or in the neighbourhood, and 21,000 more were got as far as the Lahn and the Mayne in their way to the Netherlands. Marshal Bathiani is to have the chief command.

The Dutch are, jointly with us, pushing the bargain for 12000 Saxons, which I hope will succeed [2]: and the States seem disposed to pick up any troops they can meet with in the Empire and to exert to their utmost.

The Queen of Hungary says she will have 70,000 men in Italy, and that there are now there or on the march thither 49000 effective men.

Your young Marcellus has, very wisely, stopped the Hessians in Scotland,[3] upon the reassembling of the rebels, their taking Inverness, and the indisposition which he found in that part of the country to the King's government. I think by this measure and the cordon made by the Hessians, His Royal Highness will put an

[1] After the return of Colonel Larrey, the States General sent Count Wassenaer-Twickel (see above, p. 44) to Paris. He was not at first more successful than his predecessor, but he continued, with a subsequently appointed colleague, Gilles, to play a part in the negotiations with France to the close of the Conference at Breda in 1747.

[2] Saxony in the end preferred to make a subsidy treaty with France, and was rewarded in 1747 when a daughter of Augustus III was chosen to be the second wife of the Dauphin.

[3] It had been promised to the Dutch that the Hessians should return to the Netherlands.

end to the rebellion, tho' Count Fitz-James has owned that their design was to feed it, and even to send 10 battalions into Scotland, which they will now find it a pretty difficult matter to get landed there.

I have reserved for the last (not because it is the most material but because I am afraid I have the least to say upon it) an account of our present situation at Court. We rub on; we meet with no great obstacles and with as few encouragements. Not quite so much serenity as there was in the first days after our return. The particular prejudice to my Collegue seems rather abated, tho' without any proportionable increase of favour any where else. We have no reason to complain, and as little to be elated.

Your suggestion with regard to a certain great person [*sc.* Lady Yarmouth] is a very kind and a very wise one; and attention will be given to it. If that could be brought about, things might go much more pleasantly.

As to yourself, I really hope and believe you will find yourself under a mistake. I think things are greatly altered, and, if you suffer less, I really believe it will be not for your own sins but for ours.

But I can never think upon your subject without congratulating myself and my Brother upon the acquisition of the most honourable and estimable friend that ever two men had. I have spoke to my Brother about Sewallis. You may be assured of our ardent wishes for every thing that you desire. But I find my Brother wishes he would make it a little more practicable for us by his conduct in Parliament, where I doubt he has always been on the wrong side.

I will get my Lord President [1] to post back to you your Irish Bills, so that I will flatter myself that we shall have the honor and pleasure of seeing you here soon. For indeed we want you to add weight, solidity, and firmness to our system, and to connect us all thoroughly together. And, in what immediately relates to my own department, I really want your opinion and advice.

I am &c.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

I thank you for your kind intentions to M^rs^ Spence. She writes to her agent, M^r^ Clements, to reprimand him for his negligence.

Draft in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32706, fos. 247–256.

[1] The Duke of Dorset.

To Newcastle.

Dublin Castle, March 11th 1746.

My dear Lord,

I can't delay acknowledging your very kind and friendly letter of the 5th. I make no professions in return to it; it would be too late, and you must now be convinc'd of the truth of my sentiments for you, or you must for ever doubt of 'em.

Though Gower has broke with the Torys, and the Torys with him, I still think they are worth managing to a certain degree. If they remain an unbroken party in the House of Commons, they will be resorted to by every dissatisfied Whigg there, and you will often be threatn'd with 'em. I think I foresee things that make such a management prudent. If you can keep Cotton in temper, by keeping him in place, it is surely worth while.[1] You will find the next session of Parliament a most difficult one. Your old and your new friends will be all together by the ears, and a bisque in your sleeve will do no hurt.

I remain in my opinion that there neither will nor can be an army in Flanders this year. The Queen of Hungary's forty thousand men will not be five and twenty thousand effectives. I am acquainted with the difference between the Austrian prima planas and their effectives. The Dutch cannot bring so many men this year in the field as they did the last. And those they can bring are the worst in Europe, and almost as ill officer'd as ours. Is the end of March a time to be picking up regiments here and there among the little Princes of Germany, in order to form an army? When? By November at soonest. Will the 12,000 Saxons make up these defficiencys? In short will the Dutch let their very existence depend upon the deffence of an army so inferior in number, so variously compos'd, and so ill constituted as this must be? I think it is impossible, and I will pawn my head upon their signing something or other with France before the last day of May. You can give 'em no assistance, for France will certainly feed this rebellion till a peace is made; and I don't see but that the rebels may teize you in Scotland these six months. For my part I would put a price upon the heads of 'em, and then they would bring in and destroy one another. And why not? There is already a price upon the Pretender's head, who is the only one

[1] See above, p. 118, note. Newcastle did not follow Chesterfield's advice.

among 'em to be pitied or justified. And why not put a price upon the Drummonds, the Gordons, the Glengairys, and the rest of those rascals? They are not enemies but criminals; we cannot be at war with 'em, and I should have an exception in favour of the troops sent by France, who should be treated like fair enemies. I would likewise order all the *Loyall Highlanders* under your Loudons and Campbels into garrison in Newcastle, Berwick, and other towns in England, and employ only English and Hessians in subduing the Highlands. I would also forbid provisions of any kinds being sent upon any pretence whatever (unless directly to the Duke's Army) into Scotland, and I would starve the loyal with the disloyal, if the former thought to remain with the latter. General Campbell has a permission to be supplied from Liverpool, Milford Haven etc. with provisions, which I would repeal. He has applied to me several times for the like permission from hence, which I have flatly refus'd. And I have taken effectuall care that the *Loyalest* Highlander shall not have an oatcake from hence. These are my notions concerning the rebellion, and I will undertake they would put an end to it in six weeks.

I count the days with impatience till I can have the pleasure of seeing you in England. If my last batch of Bills returns as soon as I think it may, I hope to prorogue the Parliament about the last of this month or the first week in April, and in about a fortnight after to arrive at St. James's and to be most *graciously received.* As to that you know my sentiments and that they go no further than a neutrality. But if you, numerous as you are, are all to be whipp'd upon my breech, that part of me, besides it's own demerit, will have a fine time on't.

Pray make my compliments to Lord Chancellor, and tell him that in a very few days I shall give a very pretty thing to his friend Mr Belcher. It is in the law, but pray tell him that, though I don't expect to be paid in kind, I hope to be paid in parson.[1]

Dayrolles [2] is flatter'd with your message, writes to you himself,

[1] The Lord Chancellor has a very considerable ecclesiastical patronage.

[2] Solomon Dayrolles, nephew and heir of James Dayrolles, for many years Resident at The Hague, was Chesterfield's godson and favourite protégé. He attended his godfather both at The Hague and at Dublin. In 1747 when Chesterfield was Secretary of State he sent Dayrolles to be Resident at The Hague. This appointment was bitterly resented by Lord Sandwich, who was Minister to the Republic. See *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 255–258.

and with some pleasantry. He has been impetuous upon the late events, and if he had been in England would have been kill'd in single combat ; which I expected, when he came here first, would have happen'd to him in this Kingdom. But I thank God he has had a thousand accidents ; the most important one was cracking the muscle of his leg in a minuet with a fine lady, whom he left in the middle of it to shift for herself, and hopp'd off with precipitation.

Adieu without ceremony, my dear Lord,

Yours most faithfully,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 286–288.

TO CHESTERFIELD.

Undated, but endorsed " March 15, by express ".

My dear Lord,

I believe you will be as much surprized with my commission, as that I am the person charg'd with it, and more so when you hear that I am at this instant seemingly the favourite with some body, but all that I can brag of is that I am perhaps for the present *the best of the bad ones.*

My commission in short is to acquaint you that the King of Prussia has wrote to Andrié some very uncomplaisant and indeed impertinent letters on occasion of our fall and return to court. In short he does us the honor to give us the greatest encomiums with promises of his tenderness to England now that *Hanovre ne gouvernera plus l'Angleterre,* and that we are now in a situation not to be *contrecarré par le Roy.* His satisfaction, with the highest compliments, is to be communicated by Andrié to Lord Chancellor, Lord Chesterfield, Lord Harrington, the Duke of Newcastle and M^r^ Pelham, and he is ordered to endeavour to find out from Lord Harrington and more particularly the Duke of Newcastle and M^r^ Pelham, the *complot* which he supposes was concluded against him by the King and his favourite, the earl of Granville.

When these letters fell into our hands, I thought it became me to speak to the King about them, and to let His Majesty know how injurious I thought it to us, to suppose we were capable of betraying to any foreign prince any measures (and indeed we know

of none and suspect none) supposed to be taken by His Majesty during the late short administration.

When Andrié came to me he showed me only the letter of compliment with the P.S. in his master's own hand *qu'Hanovre ne gouvernera plus l'Angleterre.*[1] I told him that I should not deserve his master's good opinion if I did not value these [*sc.* compliments] very honestly, and that I was extreamly zealous for the union between our courts. But that, as long as the King of Prussia had management and even predilection for France, our enemy and the great enemy of Europe, he could not be surprised if H.M. and the allies had jealousies and eloignement for him. His conversation with Mr Villiers showed plainly that he had management etc. for France and that he wished to see the House of Austria further reduced, which was distinctly contrary to the principles upon which this country had and ever would act. That he had nothing to fear from the Queen of Hungary for Silesia, having our guaranty, if he would act a thoroughly strong and confidential part with us. But if his Master would act as a friend and ally to the King in all capacities, and in consequence with the Queen of Hungary and the maritime powers, then things would go right.

My friend pretended he knew nothing to the contrary, and seemed to think and hope that his Master would. But by all his most confidential discourses with Villiers it is plain he has the utmost jealousy of the Queen of Hungary, will not do any thing to offend France, where is his greatest dependence, or to assist us.

The account of this conversation was very graciously received, and I was only asked whether I had told Andrié that his master must not think of falling upon the Electorate, for we fear the King of Prussia flatters himself that the present ministry would abandon the Electorate to him.

I said I had not indeed said this in direct terms, but " His Majesty in all capacities " included it, and that I had no difficulty in saying it whenever I saw Andrié again. I was immediately dispatched to my Brother and the Chancellor, as it was thought Andrié would go thither, to say they should talk to him in such a manner as to prevent the Prussian King's falling on the Electorate. I accordingly saw them both yesterday, and had a very satisfactory answer from them, tho' they have not yet seen Andrié.

[1] For this letter see below, Appendix A.

I was very well received, and then in a most gracious manner desired to write to Chesterfield to give him a hint to answer Andrié in the same manner, as it is thought Andrié will write to you with the compliments of the King of Prussia. I answered for you, which seemed not at all doubted, but only I was urged to give you a hint of it, least Andrié should write.

We must want common sense if we did not do all in our power to prevent a disagreeable circumstance of that kind which, if it should happen, might be of very bad consequence in all respects here. I therefore made no difficulty to agree to what was proposed. As I was ordered to write immediately to your Lordship, I promised to do it by express, and I wish you would write me such a letter as I may shew. I am sure it will be such a one as will do good. The present request, for that it is, is in my opinion very reasonable, and the doing readily what is reasonable and right will enable us, as I hope we always shall, to resist what is not so.

The King wished, I apprehend, to be certain that, when Andrié acquaints us with his master's satisfaction at our being reinstated, we should talk to him in such a manner as may discourage the King of Prussia from making any attempt upon His Majesty's electoral dominions, which the King now seems to apprehend his Prussian Majesty may think would not be disagreeable to the present administration.[1]

I think we should endeavour, if possible, to lay hold of this opportunity to remove jealousies on both sides. But I am afraid neither party is so made as for that to be practicable. However it should be tried. And as on the one hand we should do every thing to discourage the King of Prussia from thinking of molesting the King as Elector, the King of Prussia, on the other hand, should have no just cause given him by the ministry at Hanover to complain. Great overt acts we may prevent: but little differences, I am afraid, it will be impossible.

Our foreign affairs alter every day. The negotiation between the King of Sardinia and France seems to be upon the point of breaking off. A suspension of arms was signed, and M. Maillebois' son sent with it to Turin, but it was attended with modifications which the King of Sardinia would not consent to, and when M. Maillebois was within six miles of Turin, he was desired to go

[1] At this point Newcastle's effort came to an end, and Andrew Stone took up the pen.

back to Briançon.[1] The King of Sardinia has concerted an operation with the Austrian general for flinging provisions into Alexandria, which, it is reported, has so far succeeded that Asti is said to be taken with a Lieut. General and seven or nine French battalions.

Twickle has made a report of the success of his negotiation, and I send you a copy of the proposals given him by M. D'Argenson.[2] The very perusal of them will be sufficient to shew that it will be impossible for us to make peace upon these terms. The immediate giving up C. Breton is a *sine quâ non*. The entire omission of Italy, the absolute silence about the Queen of Hungary, the Emperor, or any thing relating to them (except the dismantling of Luxemburg and the cession of Limburg), and the making no mention of our succession or of the renewal of the treaties which guaranty it, shew plainly that the view of France is to make a separate peace with Holland. And if, rather than submit to that, we will come into these terms, we may.

We were unanimously of opinion (the Duke of Bedford and Lord Gower as strong as any body) that an answer should be returned to the Pensionary that the conditions were so inadmissible that we could not treat upon them. But that, if France would either propose or agree to such terms as His Majesty in honor and conscience and in concurrence with his allies could accept, the Pensionary would find all possible facility on the part of the King. And we recommended very strongly the losing no time in getting our army together in Flanders, in order to be the better prepared for either peace or war. What effect this answer will have in Holland I cannot say. But the consenting to a peace at present upon these terms might, for aught I know, create a rebellion here, and he who would advise it would be a bolder minister than even Lord Granville.

If we could get the King of Prussia to join with us, we might still make our party good. But I own I despair of it.

[1] The story of the mission of the younger Maillebois and its failure is told in detail in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, pp. 114–5.

[2] For these *Idées sur la Paix entre Messieurs le Marquis d'Argenson et le Comte de Wassenaer*, see *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, p. 146. There is a copy of the document itself in the Dutch State Papers (P.R.O.), 417, fo. 101, another in Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 32,706, fo. 270, and yet another in *ibid.* 32,808, fos. 96–104.

Cape Breton is a difficulty, which I do not see how it can be got over at present. France will not make peace without it, and that you may depend upon ; and who will dare to give it up, I know not.

I wish you would let me know your thoughts upon the present situation of our foreign affairs.

The great apprehension of a Stadtholder, and the great losses the Republic has sustained of her money and troops, will make it difficult to prevent them from concluding a peace at any rate. The likeliest way to do it will be to give them as much assistance as we *possibly* can, which seems to be the present measure. For it is of the utmost importance to prevent it if possible.

We had on Monday last a pitched battle in the House of Commons about the method of raising money, when H.R.H.[1] and all the late ministry, except two or three of Lord Granville's friends, were beat by a majority of 99.

I have heard it whispered that you have some thoughts of staying in Ireland after the return of the Bills. I am persuaded there is no foundation for it. For nothing could mortify your friends and servants here so much.

I am with the most unfeigned acknowledgments and regard, my dear Lord, [incomplete]

The printed gazettes will inform you of the motions of the rebels and their defeat. I would add nothing to them but H.R.H.'s [2] bitter complaints of the ill disposition and behaviour of the country where he is.

Rough draft, the first (very illegible) part in Newcastle's own detestable script, the second part in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 300–309.

To Newcastle.

Dublin, March 20th 1746.

My dear Lord,

I send you an ostensible letter, such as it is, to lay before *somebody*. I have calculated it as well as I could for the purpose, though very possibly I may have fail'd.

I am very sorry that the custom has prevail'd so long of showing

[1] The Prince of Wales, who was associated with the opposition. He had been annoyed at not receiving the command of the troops in Scotland.

[2] The Duke of Cumberland.

that Person all the intercepted letters. It must frequently have very ill effects, and I should think that upon some occasions they might be sunk, and a courier might be suppos'd to have brought 'em instead of the common post.

The *Idées sur la paix* are to be sure not admissible, and yet what can be done? You are now in the situation Cardinal de Retz mentions, in which it is impossible to do well with a rebellion at home, which, though deffeated, is far from being extinguish'd by us, or totally abandon'd by France. You cannot assist the Dutch effectually, and not assisting 'em effectually, you only assist 'em to their ruin and your loss. This they know, and will act accordingly, that is, will make up in some shape or other with France. Bad as I own that will be, I still see nothing better. And you are then reduc'd to your naval war, which you must carry on as well as you can.

The difficultys between the King of Sardinia and France seem now to be only *du plus au moins*, and I am convinc'd will be soon remov'd by a treaty.[1] What can the Queen of Hungary do then, and what can you do to help her? I saw a scheme t'other day in the Utrecht Gazzette, which I wish ever to take place, though I'm persuaded it will not; it was to give Flanders to the King of Prussia instead of Silesia. I need not suggest to you the conveniencys or inconveniencys of this scheme, they are both obvious; but I see no other way of our being able to cope with France. I don't believe the King of Prussia would agree to it, and I think the Dutch would be mistaken enough to dislike it. However, I wish it; but don't expect it.

I assure you I will not stay here one moment longer than is absolutely necessary. The return of the Bills from England will fix that moment. If you knew the life I lead here, you would not suspect me of prolonging it one moment.

Your victory over Sir John Barnard [2] and company, was compleat, and yet I wish the minority had been much less; it is the

[1] Chesterfield was entitled, by experience, to speak with authority about the Dutch, but he can have had no equal or adequate knowledge of the position of Sardinia.

[2] Sir John Barnard was M.P. for the City of London from 1722 to 1761. He was Lord Mayor in 1737. Like most of the City members in the eighteenth century, he was usually associated with the opposition. He had a reputation as an able financier, but he refused to be Chancellor of the Exchequer under Bath and Granville, when they tried to form a ministry in February 1746.

embryo, and not a very small one, of an opposition,[1] which may grow very considerable, if it should be suspected not to be disagreeable in the Closet.

The Duke's report from Scotland verifys the opinion I have always had and declar'd of that country, and while that favourall distinction remains of loyall and disloyal, the rebellion will never be extinguish'd. Recall your Scotch heroes, starve the whole country indiscriminately by your ships, put a price upon the heads of the chiefs, and let the Duke put all to fire and sword. Here is one of the rascals, a Maclaughlin, who, as I am inform'd, is come over to raise some men to carry to Scotland. I intend to put a price of two hundred pounds upon him, as soon as I am sure he is here.

I am most faithfully yours,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 323–325.

To NEWCASTLE.

Dublin Castle, March 20th 1746.

My Lord,[2]

I have this moment receiv'd the honor of your Grace's letter of the 15th, and assure you that the hint you give me, though a very friendly one, was a very unnecessary one, for two reasons. The one is that Monsieur Andrié has not writt to me, the other is that, if he had, I should have answer'd him just as your Grace has done. But I rather believe he will not write to me, because when, by his Master's orders, he applied to me some years ago with relation to the late King's will,[3] I gave him an answer that displeas'd both his Master and himself, which answer would be as proper upon this occasion. I told him I was surpris'd at being

[1] Owing to the fluidity of parties and the absence of party organization, eighteenth-century ministers were alarmed by what seems to us an insignificant opposition.

[2] This is the " ostensible letter ", alluded to in its predecessor. As it was carefully designed for submission to the King, it does not belong to the strictly " private " letters. It is, however, included here, partly on account of its intrinsic interest, but mainly because it is an integral part of Chesterfield's answer to Newcastle's letter of 15 March.

[3] There was always a mystery about George I's will, which George II had carried away and never disclosed. Chesterfield, who had married a natural daughter of the late King, was supposed to know its provisions or to have an interest in discovering them.

thought capable of telling a thing of that kind if I knew it; that I would do all I could to promote a good correspondence between the King and his Master, but that I would never contribute to widen a breach I so much lamented. And I added that I was extremely concern'd to find that his Master could mingle such considerations with the much greater affairs of Europe that so immediately requir'd the closest union between those two Princes. I can't help observing to your Grace that I gave him this answer at a time when it was plain that the King of Prussia expected, and when, I fear, a much greater King than he expected, that I would have given a very different one. I own I am astonish'd at the notions which your Grace tells me the King of Prussia entertain'd of some of those who have the honour to serve the King, as if truly they would serve him but in one capacity, and betray him in another. Whereas I am convinc'd that all those persons he addresses himself to (not excepting my self, the meanest of 'em) will as truly, and as sincerely at least, serve the King in every capacity, as any who ever did or ever will serve him; and, far from encouraging the King of Prussia in any designs injurious to his Majesty, will do their utmost to produce that union which the present unfortunate situation of affairs renders so absolutely necessary. If Monsieur Andrié should write to me (which, as I mention'd before, I don't believe he will), I will send your Grace a copy of his letter and my answer. I am with the greatest truth and respect,

Your Grace's most humble and obedient servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,706, fos. 321, 322.

To CHESTERFIELD.

Newcastle House, April 6, 1746.

most private.

My dear Lord,

I am now to return you my sincerest thanks for your several private letters of the 11th 20th and 23d [1] of March, the last of which I received on Monday last.

[1] The letter of 23 March is one of the semi-official letters to "my Lord", giving an account of the measures he has taken to prevent the transport of grain and meal to Scotland in little boats. He adds, as proof of the existence of this trade, that "new Spanish pistoles and, what is more surprising, Scotch money, are pretty common now in Ulster".

I must begin with assuring you that the ostensible one of the 20th was most graciously received, and had the desired effect; and I was ordered to acquaint you with the satisfaction it gave. Particular notice was taken of the former answer that you gave to an application made to you, which fact was known to be so at the time.

Our foreign affairs are, we think, much cleared up since my last. The surprising turn in Italy,[1] and the not less surprising arrival of between thirty and forty thousand effective Austrians in Flanders, have much changed the face of affairs. The King of Sardinia and the Queen of Hungary will, in all probability, be able to distress the French and Spaniards to the greatest degree. Maillebois' army is reduced to under 10,000 men, and is already retired into the Genoese state; whilst Brown and Nadasti have drove the Spaniards before them, and have taken possession of the important post of Guastalla. And there is at present the greatest mistrust and misunderstanding between the French and the Spaniards, which Mr Noailles will have a good deal of difficulty to remove. This contretems arises to France in a corner of the world where they thought themselves sure of carrying all before them, and France must give up Italy and the Queen of Spain,[2] or be at an immense expence to send reinforcements thither.

You will see by the inclosed copy of General Ilson's letter to the King, and the accounts he sends of the troops now in Flanders, that we have already a very considerable army there, tho' your friends the Dutch make so small a part of it. And the King has lately done an act which has gained him the greatest reputation, both at home and abroad, and especially in Holland.

The Saxons have been and still are haggling for the 12,000 men which the Dutch and we are endeavouring jointly to get from them.

[1] The French forces were lulled into inactivity by the confident expectation of an armistice as a preliminary to a peace with Sardinia. They were therefore completely taken by surprise when the Sardinians suddenly captured Asti on their way to raise the siege of Alessandria. The Spaniards denounced the French as traitors, and the consequent discord enabled the forces of Austria and Sardinia to drive the Gallispans out of Italy.

[2] This might have been the case if the Austrians had not lost Genoa after capturing it. The failure to re-take Genoa resulted in an absolute deadlock in Italy, and meanwhile the continued French successes in the Netherlands enabled France in the end to extort concessions to Don Philip, which the military operations in Italy had failed to obtain.

We offer them £200,000 for the first year, and a subsidy of £150,000 per annum as long as the war lasts, whereas we are entitled by the treaty of Warsaw to have them for £90,000.[1] But they have made larger demands, to the extent of which we shall not come up. Upon this the King, in the most handsome manner, told me that, since he found it was so difficult for us to get troops, if we approved of this, he would let us have 10,000 men more for £100,000; and, as we were before to give £200,000 for the 8000 men which were in Flanders, His Majesty now agrees to let us have the 18,000 men for £300,000. This must be looked upon as a real act of generosity, when it is considered that we formerly gave £400,000 besides contingencies for 16,000 men, tho' they were employed in Germany, and shall now have 18,000 men in Flanders for £300,000, without any allowance for contingencies whatever except *a small article* of £10,000 for a train of artillery, and the usual allowances with the deductions for bread and forage.

This step has really got us great reputation in Holland. The Dutch have immediately set about a negotiation for 5000 Munsterians and 3000 Hessians on their own account; and will contribute their third to whatever agreement we shall make for the 12,000 Saxons. But where the Dutch national troops are I do not conceive.

Our friends in Holland have procured M[r] Gilles, the second Greffier, to be sent as coadjutor to Twickle at Paris. He is represented to be a very able, a very honest, and a very firm man, and one that is neither to be amused nor frightened with the insinuations or threats of the court of France.[2]

The use that I would make of this appearance of our being in a condition to make some stand against France, is to be preparing for peace at the time that we begin to open the campaign: and

[1] Article 6 of the treaty of Warsaw provided that, in return for the subsidy of £90,000, Saxony should send 12,000 men to the Netherlands, as soon as the danger to Bohemia was satisfactorily ended. The Saxon answer to the claim of the maritime powers was that the treaty of Dresden was not a satisfactory end.

[2] The sending of Gilles to France was followed by a great quickening of the Franco-Dutch negotiation. Gilles himself became Pensionary in this year on the death of van der Heim, and played a prominent part in the Conference at Breda (see *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, chapter V). He was still Pensionary when the revolution of May 1747 restored the Stadholdership to William IV.

thus to make use of our being in tolerable condition to make war in order to procure the better terms of peace at the end of the campaign, when I hope, by the blessing of God, we shall be in a better condition of doing it than we are at present, or at least were a fortnight ago.

These measures, I believe, will meet with pretty general approbation, when it is known from the proposals of France that we cannot now make peace even upon tolerable terms, and when it is seen that the war is carried on upon a *national* bottom,[1] and when all mankind see that it is idle to think of peace without restoring Cap Breton, and when no man dare, at present, to think of giving it up.

But, in order to get the concurrence of our new friends for the support of these measures in Parliament, they extremely press an expedition to be forthwith sent for the reduction of Canada. The Duke of Bedford has formed a project for it which is forthwith to be undertaken. Lieut. Gen. St. Clair will have the command, and will go with five regiments of foot besides the regiment of Frampton [2] and two others that were sent from Gibraltar to Louisburg. All hands are at work to get things ready, but it is as much as we shall do to be in time ; for the Duke of Bedford works night and day, and so must every body do that would be well with him. I am not sure, from some hints you let drop, that you would be quite so zealous for this as some others are.

I have seen very little of our new friends of the House of Commons. But I hear they go on very well and in great harmony with our old ones. Canada and Quebec will keep all things right. But it may be still a question whether, tho' we do all we can, we shall be able to be in time.[3]

There is nothing new as to the situation of the Court or of the House of Commons. Things certainly mend in the Closet ; as I believe you will find upon your arrival. There has been a most ridiculous story, which has prevailed about town, of Lord Granville's being to come in with my Brother and me, and my Lord

[1] The extended coalition put an end to all fear of serious parliamentary opposition. But it tended to produce increased discord within the ministry.

[2] *i.e.* commanded by Major-General Frampton.

[3] The expedition was not ready in time to satisfy the naval authorities, and so it was postponed to the following year, and in the end never sailed. See *Bedford Correspondence*, Vol. I, 182, and Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 August, 1746 (Add. MSS. 32,708, fo. 138).

Harrington to go out. I hope you think us neither such fools nor such knaves as to be capable of such a thing.

I am much obliged to you for communicating to me, with so much freedom, your thoughts about Scotland. Your notions in general are certainly right, and I hope will be followed as far as you seriously would think they should. They are much tasted in the Closet, where I am sure you are thought at least a good minister for Scotland. Your young Marcellus writes in the same strain, and, to be serious, I have it more at heart to do something right in this respect than in almost any part of our administration, as thinking it more material for the peace and interest of this country.[1]

As I hope you will now write nothing back, but come yourself away, give me leave to repeat to you my thanks for your most confidential and useful correspondence. I have endeavoured to answer it, in the best manner I could, by an undisguised communication of every thing that has passed here, and by the most sincere and grateful sense of your goodness, and a most firm resolution to deserve the continuance of it. It is a satisfaction to me that, however awkward things were at your first setting out, nothing of that kind has appeared to your subjects in Ireland, as His Majesty has most readily and indeed graciously taken every recommendation, civil and military, that has come from you since you have been in Ireland.

My Brother sends his best compliments. I most heartily wish you a good journey to London, where you will find all your friends and servants impatient to receive you, but none more so than, etc.

Draft, with corrections, in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 30,707, fos. 21–28.

To Newcastle.

Dublin, April 11th 1746.

My dear Lord,

This is only to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 6th. I this day put an end to the Parliament, and embark next Thursday if the wind will allow me, and hope to have the pleasure of seeing you in about a week afterwards. You will easily judge

[1] For a full account of the measures taken in Scotland, see Yorke, *Hardwicke*, vol. I. chap. 17.

of the hurry I must be in now, and easily excuse an abrupt conclusion from

Yours,

C.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 49.

To Newcastle.

Park-Gate, April 24th 1746.

My dear Lord,

After a very good passage I am this moment landed here, from whence I set out to-morrow morning, and barring accidents shall kiss your hands on Thursday, May-day, upon which day I require you either to give or procure me a dinner.

For many reasons I think it will be better that I should kiss the King's hand at his levee than go into the Closet. Therefore pray let it be so, and don't endeavour to facilitate or procure a private reception for me, which can have no good, and may have some silly effects.

Yours most faithfully,

Chesterfield.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 96.

To Newcastle.

Dunstable, April 30th 1746.

My dear Lord,

I ask'd you for a dinner to-day, which I cannot have the pleasure of eating, for on Tuesday evening I was taken ill of a feaver, and my old giddyness in my head at Whooburne, and with difficulty got on here that night, where I kept my bed all yesterday. I shall set out this morning, and hope to be able to reach London to-night or to-morrow morning at furthest.

Yours, my dear Lord, most faithfully,

Chesterfield.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 126.

To Newcastle.

Thursday evening [endorsed May 1st 1746].

My dear Lord,

I am heartily sorry for what you tell me about Gower and Halifax, and will not take any engagements with them till after I have

seen you. But I beg of you to make up that matter quietly, because Gower's and Halifax's resigning necessarily brings on the Duke of Bedford's and Sandwich's, in which case I shall be in a situation utterly incompatible with character or quiet.[1] Though it should break into a proper arrangement that you might have made before, yet, considering the consequences, had you not better break into it in one instance, which is only Halifax's case, whose place may be made up worth the acceptance of one of your own people?

I am really too ill to be time enough or able to be at that debate to-morrow. I am astonish'd at that debate, but as I am always sincere with you, I will own to you fairly that, though the circumstances of the case are much alter'd, I cannot think of appearing for a thing, which to the publick in general seems to be (though it really is not) the same thing that I so lately distinguish'd myself in opposing, especially having not only so fair a pretence, but really so true a reason, for my absence.

Yours most faithfully,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 142.

Wednesday [endorsed 20 August, 1746].

My dear Lord,

This is the first office my hand has done me, and it could not do a more pleasing one to the heart that directs it than to thank your Grace for your kind and friendly sollicitude for me in my illness. After a long and painfull struggle, it is now decided that you shall have for some time longer

your most faithfull friend and humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph, in a rather shaky hand. Add. MSS. 32,708, fo. 110.

[1] On these ministerial troubles, which arose on the death of Winnington and the consequent shuffle of offices, see *Bedford Correspondence*, I, pp. 78, 83, 84, 86, 88, 93, 102. The chief agent in composing them seems to have been Lord Sandwich, who pacified his cousin Halifax. There is no mention of any intervention on the part of Chesterfield.

CHESTERFIELD TO ANDREW STONE.[1]

Bath, Oct. 6th 1746.

Sir,

The less news you have to send me, the greater is your attention in writing to me, and I think myself the more oblig'd to thank you for your letters.

Sir John Ligonier has sounded to battle in every letter he has writt since he has been in Flanders; so that his expectations of a battle have long ceas'd to raise mine. The taking of Monsieur Puysieux's courier and letters was (I make no doubt) done by the particular orders of Prince Charles and Bathiani, in order to throw another rub in the way of a negotiation which their court neither likes the name nor the appearance of.[2] And I think it may very possibly have this effect, that the King of France will insist upon having the conferences remov'd to some town of his own.

Should we take Belle-isle (and if we attack it we probably shall, as it is a place of no strength), I shall cry *Belle-isle for ever*, and be for hanging any minister who shall ever dare to think of giving it up. It commands the mouth of the Loire, it is not very far from the Garonne, you may go too, if you please, from thence to the Rhone; all which necessarily gives you the whole French fishery in Europe. It is also very near Port L'Orient, which of course makes you masters of their East India trade. Not to mention that, this being but the second thing which we have taken in the war, it ought never to be given up.[3]

These waters, together with that idleness which I love, and which loves me, have already done me a great deal of good. I

[1] This letter and the next are indexed in the British Museum Catalogue of Add. MSS. as if the recipient was unknown. But the internal evidence is conclusive that they were addressed to Andrew Stone.

[2] See Sandwich's dispatch from Breda to Harrington, 6 October 1746 (P.R.O. S.P. For. Holland, 421, fo. 111). Puyzieulx was reported to be in a violent rage because his courier had been robbed of his dispatches and carried off a prisoner by Austrian hussars near Antwerp. He accused the English and Dutch plenipotentiaries of being parties to the outrage, and declared that he would take no part in the Conference until he had entire satisfaction. He was partially pacified when Gilles wrote to Waldeck and Sandwich to Ligonier urging immediate punishment and reparation. In the end the courier's bag was found thrown away with the dispatches intact. This disposes of Chesterfield's suspicions.

[3] An ironical parody of the arguments employed to defend the retention of Cape Breton.

have recover'd some flesh, strength and spirits, which I still propose to increase and to bring with me to London before the King's birthday.

I writt to your brother [1] by the last post, though you know how little I had to say to him upon the main point.

Pray make my compliments to the two Brothers, who I heartily wish were less like the two Brothers *Dioscuroi*, for I would fain have 'em shine *together*.[2]

I am with great truth and esteem

Your most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,709, fos. 16, 17.

CHESTERFIELD TO ANDREW STONE.

Bath, Oct. 9th 1746.

Sir,

You will allow me to send this letter through your sides to the Duke of Newcastle, both because I would not trouble [him] singly upon this occasion, and likewise because I hope to have you for my sollicitor and his remembrancer.

I have receiv'd a letter this morning from Lieutenant Colonel Stanhope [3] in Scotland, who is stark mad for the rank of Colonel, which rank, I may say, he deserves at least as well as some who have it. He tells me there is now a regiment vacant by the death of Colombine, and a place of Aide de Camp to the King likewise vacant. As he thinks (whether right or wrong I can't tell) that he has been deceiv'd by Lord Harrington, he will not apply for either through him, and relys singly upon my good offices, which I neither could nor would refuse him. I own I have his interest at heart a great deal more than my own, but, as that may possibly be thought not saying much, I will add that there is not one thing which I have so much at heart as his preferment. I am sure I have not been troublesome with my applications for relations or dependents, so far from it that there is not in this Kingdom one single man who owes his employment, whether civil, military, or ecclesiastical, to any application or interest of mine. This

[1] George Stone, Bishop of Derry. See above, p. 4.

[2] Alluding to the notorious differences between Newcastle and Pelham on the question of an early peace.

[3] A cousin of Chesterfield.

therefore for the rank of Colonel, in any shape, for one whom I look upon as my son, who has serv'd wherever he could serve from the age of eighteen, and who distinguish'd himself so much at the affair of Pfalkirk, and who has had younger officers put over his head, I say I hope this is not an unreasonable application. Pray tell the Duke of Newcastle that I most earnestly beg that he will endeavour to bring this about, as the greatest mark of friendship and favour that he can possibly give me; that I rely upon him alone in it, and that I have mention'd it to no other mortal; that, if he thinks it would be of any use, he may lay it before the Duke as my most humble and earnest request, and the only one I will trouble him with. In short I beg that you will often put him in mind that this is the thing which *iterum atque iterum rogo, oro, postulo, flagito.* I am, Sir,

Your most faithfull humble servant,

CHESTERFIELD.

Autograph. Add. MSS. 32,709, fos. 29, 30.

APPENDIX A

The following letter, printed in Frederick's *Politische Correspondenz*, vol. v. p. 42, is obviously the letter which Andrié communicated or read to Newcastle.[1] But there is no mention in it of Chesterfield, the Lord Chancellor, or Mr Pelham. Nor does it contain the precise phrase as to the ministry not being *contrecarré par le Roy*, though that might be construed from its wording. The references to the other three ministers could hardly have been invented by Newcastle, and the inference, confirmed by Newcastle's statement that Andrié only showed him one letter, is that there was another intercepted letter from the Prussian King. For this letter I have hunted in vain both in the Record Office and in the British Museum. It is unfortunate that in the Record Office collection of intercepted dispatches there is a gap from September 1745 to 1751. There is nothing in the following letter to even hint at a design of "falling upon the Electorate", but this may have been only conjured up by George II's inveterate distrust of his nephew. Newcastle's agitation and his whole conduct in the matter is evidence of his new-born desire to curry favour with the King.

I may add that in Frederick's published letters during this year there is no reference to Chesterfield prior to his becoming Secretary of State.

THE KING OF PRUSSIA TO ANDRIÉ.[1]

Potsdam, 7 Mars, 1746.

Vous avez très bien fait de m'informer d'abord et par un exprès du grand événement qui s'est passé le 24 du mois de février dernier en Angleterre et qui fait l'objet de votre relation du 25 dudit mois.

Vous jugerez aisément de la satisfaction extrême que cette nouvelle m'a causée, tant par l'interêt que j'y ai moi-même que par ce que je vois rétabli en place ce qu'il y a de meilleures têtes et de gens les plus dignes en Angleterre. Aussi ne manquerez-vous pas de les en féliciter cordialement de ma part et de vous épuiser surtout en compliments et en assurances d'amitié, dans les termes les plus polis et

[1] Above, p. 125.

les plus obligeants, envers le duc de Newcastle et envers milord Harrington ; à quoi vous ajouterez que je n'aurais jamais pu me fier à l'Angleterre, ni avoir des liaisons étroites avec elle, tandis que la direction des affaires ne serait pas entres les mains de ministres aussi bien intentionnés qu'eux, mais les voyant dans l'avantage où ils sont maintenant, et qu'ils ne pourraient plus être contrariés des gens qui pensent mal sur les véritables interêts de l'Angleterre, ils pourraient compter sur mon amitié sincère et que je me ferais un sensible plaisir de contribuer autant qu'il dépendrait de moi pour vivre en très bonne intelligence avec l'Angleterre ; qu'avec cela j'espérais qu'ils auraient pris de si bonnes mesures qu'ils ne pourraient plus être contrariés dans leurs bonnes intentions et dans leurs vues droites, ni par le Roi, ni par qui que ce soit, ce qui m'attacherait d'autant plus à eux. Au reste, comme vous me marquez ce que les ministres vous ont dit touchant la contrarieté des sentiments du Roi dans l'affaire de la convention d'Hanovre et depuis, de même que du capotisme que vous avez observé aupres des ministres autrichiens, saxons et russiens, lorsque Carteret a été obligé de se congédier derechef, mon intention est que vous deviez tout faire pour pénétrer les trames secrètes que le Roi a faites contre moi par son favori Carteret, et toutes les circonstances du complot qu'on a fait apparemment avec les cours de Vienne, de Dresde et de Pétersbourg pour me faire des nouvelles querelles. Ce que je vous recommande le plus fortement et dont vous ne laisserez pas de me faire à son temps une relation secrète, mais bien détaillée.

FEDERIC.

Dites tout ce que vous pouvez de plus obligeant de ma part au Duc de Newcastle et à milord Harrington, et assurez-les que je serai bon Anglais, tant qu'ils seront tout-puissants et que Hanovre ne gouvernera pas Londres.

The postscript was added by Frederick in his own hand after signature. This was his frequent practice when he wanted to impress any special duty upon his envoys, and these postscripts are often the most interesting and revealing part of the dispatch.

APPENDIX B

(1) Extract from Letter of Newcastle to the Duke of Cumberland, dated 23 May, 1746.

I am sure your Royal Highness will be sorry to hear that your faithful servants have differed amongst themselves upon the orders to be sent to Mr Trevor upon a Counter Project of peace given by Mr d'Argenson to the two Dutch plenipotentiaries, and transmitted hither by Mr Trevor.[1] The principal articles of this counter project are the restitution of Flanders, the settling a perpetual neutrality for Flanders, tho' the powers themselves [*sc.* Austria and France] should be at war, the giving Tuscany to Don Philip till he is King of Spain or Naples, and the restitution of Cape Breton. Lord Harrington, Lord Chesterfield and my Brother were for giving Mr Trevor a power to conclude, upon explaining the article about Dunkirk, without consulting our allies or waiting for any further orders from hence. My Lord Chancellor and I were quite of a contrary opinion, and I drew up the two inclosed papers as containing our thoughts what orders should be sent to Mr Trevor. Lord Harrington and I debated the matter fully before the King, who has been very strongly of our side of the question; so that Lord Harrington has, at last, wrote (tho' awkwardly) in that way. Your Royal Highness will see the foundation of our opinion, and I am persuaded you will not think me in the wrong. A perpetual neutrality for Flanders will for ever prevent the maritime powers from concerning themselves on the continent.[2]

Copy in Stone's hand. Add. MSS. 32,707, fos. 234, 235.

[1] D'Argenson's Project was really a "Counter Project", because it was drawn up in reply to a Project presented to him by the Dutch envoys. But Trevor warned the English ministers that they must always call it a "Project," because the States General had no official knowledge of the previous course of the negotiation, in which the envoys had been guided by instructions (very largely those previously given to Larrey) supplied by the Pensionary alone.

[2] Cumberland replied from Fort Augustus on 6 July. "I agree almost in every respect with your way of arguing, but must wonder particularly at

(2) Letter from Newcastle to Stephen Poyntz, dated 23 May, 1747.

Dear Sir,

As my Brother has had the pleasure of your company for some time at Esher, I doubt not but he has fully informed you of the conditions of the counter-project delivered by Mr d'Argenson to the Dutch ambassadors, and transmitted hither by Mr Trevor. I conclude also that he has acquainted you with the difference of opinion between my Lord Chancellor and me on the one side, and my Lord Harrington, my Lord Chesterfield, and himself on the other.[1]

I am always very sorry when I differ from my friends. But, when I do so, so essentially as I do at present, my honor, my conscience, my duty to my King and country oblige me not to depart from my opinion, in the station I am in at present.

To have given Mr Trevor, circumstanced as he is, a power to conclude so great and so important a transaction, without waiting to know, even from the Pensionary, the success of our remarks upon the first communication from abroad or deliberation at home upon a treaty that must decide the fate of all Europe, would in my humble opinion, have been an unjustifiable and an unheard of thing.

When I differ in opinion with my friends, the first and great consolation is that it is not from prejudice or personal views. The next would be to have the concurrence in opinion of those whose judgment I honour and esteem. I hope I need not say that amongst them there are none that I prefer to yourself.

That you may know the reasons upon which my Lord Chancellor and I have gone, I take the liberty to send you a paper that I prepared and communicated at the meeting on Friday night as our thoughts, when my Lord Harrington proposed the draught of a letter to be wrote to Mr Trevor upon very contrary principles.

I also add an expedient proposed by me on Monday last, which answers all the material objections made by Lord Harrington from the inconveniences that would arise from the delay. The King, after the most mature consideration and two long conferences held in his

Lord Chesterfield, who I imagine would see the dangerous consequences of an eternal neutrallity for Flanders" (Add. MSS. 32,707, fo. 288).

[1] Nothing can be more characteristic of Newcastle than this assumption that Henry Pelham must have betrayed ministerial secrets to a visitor who had no official right to know them. Poyntz, in his reply, declared that he had not had any such information at Esher. The only possible defence of Newcastle, and it is quite inadequate, is that he may have had some idea of employing Poyntz in the negotiation with France. He did subsequently offer to send him to Breda, but Poyntz refused. Another reason for confiding in Poyntz was that he had been "governor" to Cumberland.

presence on the subject, having been pleased most strongly to approve my Lord Chancellor's opinion and mine, Lord Harrington wrote to Mr Trevor on Tuesday night partly in our sense, though, being of a different opinion, I think not quite in a way to have all the success that we proposed.[1]

[1] The above letters illustrate how completely important foreign affairs were reserved to the inner Cabinet. The other Cabinet ministers were not consulted. They also show that the King still possessed a dominant voice in the settlement of foreign policy. In this case he decided against the majority of his confidential advisers.

APPENDIX C

NEWCASTLE TO LORD HARDWICKE.

Newcastle House, October 28th 1746.
Tuesday, just come back from Kensington.

My dear Lord,

The great events of this morning cannot surprize you more than they did me. Lord Chesterfield made me a visit about eleven o'clock. I gave him, in the presence of Stone, an account of every thing, our dispute with the Dutch, and the situation of Lord Harrington, who, I thought, could not continue long, tho' I wrote the enclosed note to the King to stop every thing for the moment. I told Chesterfield he was the natural successor, were it not for three reasons : first the King ; secondly himself ; thirdly, which was the greatest difficulty of all, our difference in opinion about foreign affairs. He said he would speak very plainly to me, that of all things he did not desire to be Secretary of State ; that, as to the difference of opinion in foreign affairs, he had been, and still was, of opinion that peace should have been made pretty much upon the foot of D'Argenson's project, but that now the die of war was cast, and that he thought it should be carried on in the strongest manner, and particularly that we should give £900,000 for 30,000 Russians, if we could have them, and upon this foot would accept the Secretary's office. He allowed me to acquaint my Brother with this and even the King. This I thought determined him the successor, in case the King liked it. When I came to Court, I saw Lord Harrington, who was just come out from the King. He told me he had quitted. I seemed surprized and asked him whether he had altered his letter. He said he had never shewed it, that he told the King things could not go on, that the King agreed with him, that he spoke of my private correspondence, and the King owned he had seen all my letters. I went in immediately. The King said, " He has quitted, I am glad of it."—I answered, " Who does your Majesty think of for successor ? "—" I have nobody, whoever you will "—and then of himself, " Chesterfield is the man that naturally occurs, but he differs so far from you as to peace and war,

that can't do."—I then told him Lord Chesterfield's discourse, but that I would not recommend him or any body His Majesty did not like. He seemed pleased, but said, "I know him better than you," —to which three or four times I replied I would recommend nobody but whom he liked; if he liked Chesterfield, I thought that would give the most strength to his administration. He said, "You shall help to get rid of him, if I don't like him." I answered, "That is already done. The moment the King dislikes him, he told me he would make his bow." I never saw the King so gay, so gracious and so well-satisfied. I asked if it would be more agreeable if I should have the Northern Province[1]; he seemed pleased at that, and said "Yes." So this thing stands. Chesterfield accepts. I should have spoke to you and my Brother. I had no notice. I thought you must like this, and sure it is right.

Ever yours,
HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

[1] Newcastle did not in the end take the Northern Department at this time (see above, p. xlii). But he did take it on Chesterfield's resignation in 1748.

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES

INDEX

Alessandria, 132*n*.
Alsace, x, xi.
Alt, Hessian minister in London, 20, 21, 35, 39.
Amsterdam, 54.
Andrié, Prussian minister in London, xix, xxii*n*, xxvi, 27*n*, 63, 67, 124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 141.
Arenberg, Duc de, 32, 39, 47.
Argenson, the Marquis de, French Foreign minister, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, 65*n*, 95 and *n*, 102*n*, 127, 143, 144, 146.
Argyle, Duke of, 114 and *n*.
Armagh, Archbishop of, 4.
Asti, 127.
Augustus III, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, xviii, xix, xx, xxiv, 8, 10, 11 and *n*, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 34, 39, 43, 46, 72, 91, 120*n*.
Austria, succession in, ix; renewed war with Prussia, xiii.

Balance of Power, 77, 92.
Barnard, Sir John, 129 and *n*.
Barrier, Dutch, xi, xiii.
Barrier Treaty, xxxvii.
Barrington, Lord, 101, 108, 111.
Bath, Chesterfield at, 138, 139.
Bath, Lord, 51, 98, 100, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111.
Batthiani, Austrian General, 120, 138.
Bavaria, ix, x, xi, xxxix, 8, 15, 16, 19, 23, 27, 30, 34, 46, 49 and *n*, 50, 75, 76, 77, 84.
Beaufort, Duke of, 40, 44.
Bedford, John Duke of, xii, xxxi, xxxv, xl, xlv, 7, 49, 56, 70, 75, 82, 90, 97, 100, 101, 105, 110, 111, 119, 127, 134, 136.
Belleisle, Marshal, 55 and *n*, 64, 85*n*.
Belleisle, proposed attack on, 138.
Bentinck, William, xlii, xliii.
Berkeley, Lord, 111, 113.
Berlin, Villiers sent to, 99.
Bernstorff, Danish minister, 94*n*.
Bestuzhev, Alexis, Russian Chancellor, xxi.
Bladen, Mr., 111.
Boetzelaer, Dutch envoy to England, xxxii, xxxiii, 38, 96, 101 and *n*.
Bohemia, Prussian invasion and evacuation of, xi; vote of, xviii, 8, 11 and *n*.
Bolton, Duke of, 111, 113.
Boone, Mr., 111, 112.
Brandenburg, proposed partition of, xxi, 8, 15*n*, 39.
Breda, Conference at, xxxviii, 120*n*, 138 and *n*.
Breslau, treaty of, x, xx, xxii, xxvi, 9, 27, 34, 35, 76, 92.
Brest, 74.
Broad-Bottom Ministry, xii.
Browne, Austrian General, 132.
Brühl, Count, xviii, 29, 34, 47.
Buckley, General, 95.
Busch, Hanoverian agent at Dresden, 19, 26.
Bussy, 86 and *n*, 89.

Cabinet, 107, 111; the inner, xiii, xxvi, xxxv*n*, xxxvi, 143, 144.
Calendar, the old and the new, xxii, xxviii.
Campbell, Alexander Hume, 115 and *n*.
Canada, xxiv, 134.
Cape Breton, captured, xxiv, xxxi; reluctance to restore, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix, xl, 75, 77, 85, 89, 92, 127, 128, 134, 138*n*, 143.
Carlisle, taken by Jacobites, 86; re-taken, 98.
Carlos, Don, King of the Two Sicilies, x.
Carteret, Lord, ix, x, xlv, 38*n*. *See* Granville, Earl.
Champigny, agent of Cologne, 20, 47.
Charles VII, Emperor (Charles Albert of Bavaria), ix; death of, xviii, 24, 37, 56.
Charles of Lorraine, xi, xvi, 14, 138.
Charles Edward, the Young Pretender, xxvi, 61, 62, 91, 94, 95, 119, 122.
Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia, xxiv, xxxvii, 70 and *n*, 75, 91, 119, 126, 129. *See* Sardinia.
Chavigny, French minister at Munich, 19, 46.
Chenevix, Dr., 25, 40, 43, 49, 53, 99.
Chesterfield, Earl of, helps to form and maintain Broad-Bottom ministry, xii, xviii, 3 and *n*, 9; King's hostility to, xiii, xv, 21, 31, 36, 40, 43, 57; Embassy to Hague, xv–xvii; agreement with States, xvi, 31, 37; opinion on Imperial election, xix, xx, 11, 23, 29, 34, 39, 43, 47; attitude towards Prussia, xxii, xxv, 8*n*, 18, 19, 24, 46, 50, 61 67; receives overtures from Opposition, 30, 45, 47; enters inner Cabinet, xxiii, xxxvi, 143; goes to Dublin, xxvii, 61; optimism as regards rebellion, xxviii, 73, 77, 87, 93, 100; pessimism as regards the war, xxviii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 20, 24, 67, 77, 88, 89, 92, 101, 122, 129; urges coercion of King, xvii, xxx, 22, 35, 44, 45, 68, 71, 72; gains royal favour, xxviii, xxxvi, xliv, 73, 86, 91, 97, 135; criticises ministerial settlement, xxxiv, 114, 115; returns to England, xxxv, 136; advocates early peace, xxxvi, 143, 144, 146; refuses to go to Breda, xl; accepts Secretaryship of State, xli, 145–146; relations with Newcastle in office, xlii, xliii; retires from ministry, xliii; estimate of character and conduct, xliv.
Clements, Mr., 121.
Cleve, duchy of, 16*n*.
Clonfort, Bishopric of, 25, 43, 53.
Coalition (of 1742), x, xi; (of 1744), xii, xviii, 3; extension of, in 1746, xxxiv, xxxv, 111.
Cobham, Lord, xii, xxx, xxxi, 3, 56, 80–83, 108, 114, 116, 119.
Cologne, Elector of, xvii, 15, 19, 34, 47, 75, 76, 84, 85.
Cope, General, xxviii.
Cotton, Sir John Hynde, xii, 40, 118 and *n*, 122.
Courten, 36.
Cumberland, Duke of, xvi, xvii, xxxii, xliii, 14, 25, 29, 37, 42, 57, 93, 94, 98, 105, 120, 128, 135, 144*n*; Newcastle's letter to, 143.

Dayrolles, Solomon, 123 and *n*.
Denbigh, Lord, 108.
Derry, Bishopric of, 4, 6.
Dettingen, battle of, 107 and *n*.
Devonshire, Duke of, xii, 4, 6.
Diemar, Hessian General, 115.
Doddington, Bubb, 78.
Dorset, Duke of, 6, 97, 121.
Dresden, treaty of, xxxii, xxxiv, 95, 99.
Dromore, Bishopric of, 4, 6, 25, 53.
Drummond, Lord John, 94, 95.
Drumore, Lord, 26.
Dunkirk, 95, 143.

Elizabeth, the Tsaritsa, xx, xxi, 11*n*.
Elizabeth Farnese, Queen of Spain, ix, 119 and *n*, 132.
Emden, 16*n*.
Esher, residence of Henry Pelham, 144.
Eyles, Sir John, 36.

Falkirk, 140.
Family compact, ix, xxxix.
Fawkener, Sir Everard, 36, 42.
Ferdinand VI, King of Spain, xxxix.
Ferrol, 74.
Finale, xxiii.
Finch brothers, the, xxxiv, 68 and *n*, 79, 88, 107, 111, 113, 115, 117, 118.
Flemming, Count, Saxon minister in London, 10, 26, 29.
Fleury, Cardinal, ix.
Fontainebleau, treaty of, ix, xxxv.
Fontenoy, battle of, xvii, xxiii, xxv, 56, 57, 107.
Fournier, 85 and *n*, 89, 91, 96.
Frampton, Major-General, 134.
France, declares war in 1744, ix; threatens invasion of England, xxvi, xxviii, 74, 87; negotiations with, xxix, xxxii, xxxiv–xxxvi, 75, 83, 85, 89, 91, 95, 96, 127, 134, 143, 144.
Francis I, Emperor (previously Duke of Lorraine, and Grand Duke of Tuscany), xviii, xix, xxxvii, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 34, 39, 54, 64 and *n*.
Frankfort, xviii, 46; League of, x, 8*n*, 35.
Frederick II, King of Prussia, ix, xviii, xxii, 91, 99, 124, 127, 129, 130; renews war in 1744, xi; overtures to England, xix, xx, xxi, xxv, 8, 16, 18, 24, 27, 30, 33, 39, 43, 46, 50, 51; concludes Convention of Hanover, xxvi, 61, 63, 67; extorts treaties of Dresden, xxxii, 90, 95; congratulates restored ministry in 1746, 124, 125, 141.
Frederick, Prince of Wales, 20, 41, 47, 79, 87, 98, 100, 128.
Freiburg, 46.
Friesland, East, 16*n*.
Furnese, Henry, 36 and *n*, 101.
Füssen, treaty of, 49*n*, 53.

"Gallispans," the, xxiii, 132*n*.
Garter, Order of the, 49, 51, 53, 68, 107.
Gelderland, Prussian, 16*n*.
Genoa, xxiii, xliii, 132*n*.
George I, will of, 130 and *n*.
George II, x, xiii, xv, xvi, 42, 56, 57, 63, 64; compelled to part with Carteret, xii; hostile relations with his ministers, xii, xxx, 20, 21, 29, 33, 45, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 97, 98, 105, 121; futile effort to form a Bath-Granville ministry, xxxiii, 110; allied with Newcastle in opposing a hasty peace, xxxvii, xxxix, 144, 145; approves Chesterfield's letters from Ireland, xxviii, 73, 86, 91, 97, 135; accepts Chesterfield as Secretary of State, xli, 146, 147.
Gibraltar, 77, 134.
Gilles, Jacob, xxxv, 120*n*, 133 and *n*, 138*n*.
Glover, 76, 78.
Gore, Thomas, 112.
Gower, Lord, xii, xviii, xxxi, xxxiv, xxxv, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 17, 20, 40, 41, 44, 48, 49, 56, 70, 75, 78, 80, 82, 84, 90, 97, 100, 101, 105, 110, 114, 118, 119, 122, 127, 136.
Grafton, Duke of, 111 and *n*, 117.
Granville, Earl, xii, xiii, xviii, xix, xx, 10, 17, 18, 19, 21, 29, 30, 35, 41, 45, 47, 51, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 79, 81, 84, 92, 98, 100, 106, 107, 109, 110*n*, 118, 124, 127, 128, 134, 142; sensational but brief return to office, xxxviii, 117 and *n*.
Grenville, James, 108, 111, 114.
Grenville, Richard, 114 and *n*.

Grenvilles, the, 101 and *n*.
Griffith, Dr., 98, 99, 104.
Guastalla, 130.

Halifax, Lord, xxxv, xxxvi, 136, 137 and *n*.
Hallewyn, Pensionary of Dort, 54.
Hamilton, Lord Archibald, 107 and *n*, 111.
Hanover, Convention of (26 August, 1745), xxvi, xxviii, xxix, xxx, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 74, 90, 142.
Hanover, Electorate of, xiii, xxiii, 13, 24, 26, 47, 92*n*, 102, 124, 125, 141, 142; Regency of, 32; troops from, xvii, 22, 23, 45, 97 and *n*, 102, 133.
Hardenberg, 55.
Hardwicke, Lord, xii, xxiii, xxvi, xxix*n*, xxxvii, xxxviii, xli, xlii*n*, 3, 6*n*, 12, 38*n*, 70, 74*n*, 80, 94*n*, 97, 104, 110, 123, 124, 125, 143, 144, 145; letter of Newcastle to, 146.
Harrington, Lord, Secretary of State, xiii, xv, xxvi, xxxvi, xxxvii, xlv, 3, 6, 10, 12, 32, 40, 41, 49, 53, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 85, 97, 105, 110, 124, 134, 139; King's hostility to, 110, 111, 121; resigns the seals, 146.
Hawley, General, 94.
Heim, van der, Grand Pensionary in Holland, xix, xxix, xxxv, 12*n*, 27, 33, 38, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 64, 89; death of, xxxix, 133*n*.
Helvoetsluys, 10, 31*n*, 57, 64.
Hesse-Cassel, 8*n*, 30.
Hesse-Cassel, William of, 8 and *n*, 35, 39.
Hessian troops, 102, 120, 123, 133.
Hohberg, Baron, 10.
Hohenfriedberg, battle of, xxv.
Holland. *See* United Provinces.
Hop, Hendrik, Dutch minister in England, 9, 12*n*.
Hyndford, Lord, British Ambassador in Russia, xx, xxi, xlii*n*, 50.

Ilson, General, 132.
Ireland, xiii, xxvii, 63, 68, 73; Bishoprics in, 4, 6, 25, 33, 36, 40, 43, 48, 53, 57, 58, 98, 99, 103, 104; Parliament in, 103, 116, 135; Pension on, 115.

Jacobites, rising of, xi, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 61, 62, 73, 74, 87, 93, 94, 98, 100, 105, 123.
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, xviii.
Joseph, the Archduke, xx, 11, 15, 16, 19, 34.

Keene, Benjamin, xxxix.
Kildare, Bishopric of, 4, 6.
Killaloe, Bishopric of, 53.
Kingston, Duke of, 52.
Königsegg, Marshal, xvi, xvii, 7, 14, 18, 24, 26, 29, 37, 42.

Lafeld, battle of, xliii.
Larrey, Colonel, xxix, xxxii, xxxv*n*, 85*n*, 89, 95, 96, 120*n*, 143*n*.
Ligonier, Sir John, xliii, 64, 138.
Lisbon, negotiation at, xxxix, xl.
Lorraine, x, xviii.
Lorraine, Charles of, xi, xvi, 14, 138.
Louisbourg, capture of, xxiv, 134.
Lyttelton, George, 5, 9, 41, 90, 101.

Macanaz, Spanish envoy to Breda, xliii.
Maillebois, Marshal, 32, 40, 92, 126, 132.
Maillebois, the younger, 126, 127*n*.
Mainz, Elector of, 8, 15.
Malton, Lord, xxxiii, 98, 99, 103, 104.
Mann, Hessian minister at The Hague, 20.
Marchmont, Lord, xli*n*, xlii*n*, 114 and *n*, 119.
Maria Theresa, ix, x, xi, xiii, xvi, xviii, xx, xxi, xxv, xxvi, xxxv, 8, 16, 18, 23, 24, 34, 39, 46, 49, 50, 51, 81, 102, 120, 122, 125; rejects Convention of Hanover, xxviii, 64, 67, 70, 74, 77; makes peace at Dresden, xxxii, 95.

Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, xviii, 8; concludes treaty of Füssen, 49*n*. *See* Bavaria.
Minorca, 77.
Moidart, xxvi.
Monbason, Duc de, 95.
Mortaigne, 36.
Munich, xi, xviii.

Nassau, Count, 9, 10.
Neck, Lambert van, 85, 86, 89.
Netherlands, the Austrian, xiii, xiv, xvii; proposed neutrality of, xxxvi, xxxvii, 143, 144.
Newcastle, Duke of, Secretary of State for southern department, xiii; corresponds privately with Chesterfield at The Hague, xv; renews correspondence with Dublin, xxvii, 66*n*; active in forming Broad-Bottom ministry, 3 and *n*; attitude on imperial election, 15, 16; on Prussian overtures, xxi, 8, 9, 16, 27, 33, 39, 90; attached to Whig tradition of foreign policy, xxv, xxix; consents to coercion of Austria, xxvi, 81; clings to Dutch alliance, 81–3, 96, 97; alarmed by Jacobite rising and French threat of invasion, xxviii, 69, 86, 94, 95; postpones rupture with King till rebellion is over, xxx, 70; negotiates with Pitt and Cobham, xxxi, 79–84; narrates ministerial resignations and return, 105, 108–112; defends settlement with King, 117–119; sets himself to gain royal favour, xxxviii, 124–126; opposes early peace, xxxvi, xxxvii, 143–145; chooses Chesterfield as fellow Secretary, xli, 146; motives, xlv.
New England, xxiv, xxxvi.
Newport, Lord, 4, 68.
Noailles, Duc de, embassy to Spain, 132.
Orange party in Holland, xiv, xvii, xlii, 102.
Orford, Lord. *See* Walpole, Sir Robert.
Osorio, Joseph, Sardinian minister in London, xxxviii.
Ostend, 64.
Oxford, Lord, 44.

Palatine, the Elector, xiii.
Pelham, Henry, xiii, xv, xxv, xxvi, xxxv*n*, xli, xlii, 3 and *n*, 6, 12, 38, 52, 57, 64, 69, 97, 105, 107, 110, 112, 113, 116, 118, 121, 124, 125, 139, 144 and *n*, 147; advocates early peace, xxxvi, xliii, 139*n*, 143, 144.
Pembroke, Lord, 110.
Pensionary of Holland. *See* Heim, van der.
Pepperell, Colonel, xxiv.
Philip V, King of Spain, ix; death of, xxxix.
Philip, Don, Spanish Infant, ix, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxix, 75.
Piacenza, battle of, xxxviii.
Pitt, William, xiii, xxx, xlv, 9, 41, 86, 90, 97, 100, 101, 118, 119; negotiations with ministers, xxii, xxxi, 79–84; renewed negotiations, xxxiii, 108; acceptance of office, xxxiv, 111 and *n*; promoted to be Paymaster-General, xxxv.
Poll, Jan van der, 28, 42.
Portsmouth, Lord, 111.
Poynings' Law, 106*n*.
Poyntz, Stephen, xiii*n*; Newcastle's letter to, 144.
Prestonpans, battle of, xxviii, 107.
Prussia, neutrality of (1742–4), x; return to war, x; overtures for peace, xix, xx, xxi, 8, 26, 39, 43; George II's hostility to, 9*n*, 43; France refuses aid to, 54, 56; Dutch hostility to, 16, 30, 51.
Purcell, Mrs., 103.
Puyzieulx, the Marquis de, sent to The Hague, xxxviii; sent to Breda, 138 and *n*; at Liège, 86*n*.

Quebec, 134.
Queensberry, Duke of, 108.

Regency during King's absence, 56.
Reischach, Baron, 46.
Rhine, the, allied army on, xiii, xvii, 13, 23, 32, 39; French army on, xviii.
Richelieu, Duc de, 95.
Richmond, Duke of, xxx.
Riviera, the Genoese, xxiii.
Robinson, Sir Thomas, British minister at Vienna, xxxvi, 39, 46, 63.
Rotterdam, proposed negotiation at, xxix, 85, 91, 92; nothing comes of it, xxxii, 91*n*, 96.
Russia, xx, xxi, xxix, xxxii, 18, 24; hire of troops from, xli, xlii*n*, xliii, 146.

St. Clair, General, 134.
St. Saphorin, 10.
Sandwich, fourth Earl of, xxxvi, xl, xli, xlii and *n*, xliii, 77*n*, 137 and *n*, 138*n*.
Sardinia, x, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxix, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, 70, 75 and *n*, 91, 119, 120, 126, 129.
Saxe, Marshal, xvii, xxiii, xliii.
Saxony, xviii–xxii, xxv, xxvi and *n*, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 34, 43, 46, 90, 120 and *n*, 132.
Scarborough, Lord, 25.
Schaub, Sir Luke, 10, 29, 92.
Scheffer, Swedish envoy in France, 94*n*.
Schwiegelt, Hanoverian minister at The Hague, 19, 22, 23, 26, 45, 47.
Scotland, rising in, xxvi, xxviii, xxxii, 61, 62, 73, 119, 122, 130, 135; Secretaryship of, 98 and *n*.
Sewallis Shirley, 116 and *n*, 121.
Sicily, 30 and *n*.
Silesia, 9, 26; ceded to Prussia, x; English guarantee of, xx; Austrian effort to recover, xiii, xxi–xxiii, 18, 46.
Smissaert, General, 39, 58.
Somerfeldt, General, 47.
Somers, Lord, 52.
Soor, battle of, 75.
Spain, double war with England, ix; Family compact with France, ix, xxxviii; expected change of policy in 1746, xxxix; futile negotiations with, xliii.
Spence, Mrs., 112, 113, 121.
Stadholder, restoration of, xiv, xlii, 11*n*, 102, 128, 133*n*.
Stair, Lord, xvi, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18, 26, 91, 93.
Stanhope, Earl, x, xlv.
Stanhope, Lieut.-Col., 139.
States General of the United Provinces, xiv, 31.
Steinberg, Hanoverian minister, 20, 26, 47, 55.
Stewart, Provost of Edinburgh, 93.
Stone, Andrew, xvi, xxii, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii, xl, 13, 62, 63, 72, 91, 107, 146; letters of Chesterfield to, 6, 61, 71, 138, 139.
Stone, George, Irish Bishop, 4, 6, 139.

Tories, xviii, xxxi, xxxiv, 20, 22, 40, 41, 44, 114, 118, 122.
Torrington, Lord, 111.
Tournay, surrender of, 23.
Townshend, Lord, x, xlv.
Traun, Marshal, xi, xxiv *n*.
Trevor, Robert, British envoy at The Hague, xiv, xvii, xxxiv, xxxv*n*, xxxvi, xxxviii, xxxix, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21, 32, 62, 92, 143, 144, 145.
Trier, Elector of, 15.
Triumvirate, the (Pelham, Newcastle, Hardwicke), xv, xxvi, xxx, xxxi, 6*n*.
Turenne, Prince de, 95.
Turin, negotiations at, 126.
Tuscany, grand duchy of, xxxv, xxxviii, 23, 143.
Tweeddale, Lord, 98.
Twisden, Dr., 103, 104.

Tyrawly, Lord, British Ambassador in Russia, xx, xxi.

Ulfeld, Austrian Chancellor, 85*n*.
United Provinces, the, weakness of, xiv, 78, 102; probability of their separate treaty with France, xiv, xxiii, 80, 81, 82, 83, 89, 102; Chesterfield's agreement with, xvi, xvii, 31, 37, 81*n*, 82; hostility to Prussia, 16, 30, 51.

Vienna, treaty of (1731), ix.
Ville, Abbé de la, 53, 54.
Villiers, Thomas, British minister at Dresden, 10, 15*n*, 49*n*, 90; sent to Berlin, 99, 125.

Wade, Marshal, xvi, 74, 87, 91, 93.
Waldeck, Prince of, xvi, 24, 96, 101, 138*n*.
Wales, Prince of, 20, 41, 47, 79, 87, 98, 100, 128.
Walpole, Horace (the younger), xxii.
Walpole, Horatio, xiv, 22*n*.
Walpole, Sir Robert (Lord Orford), x, xii, xlv, 107*n*.
Warren, Commodore, xxiv.
Warsaw, Quadruple Alliance of, xx, xxi, xxii, 133 and *n*.
Wasner, Ignaz von, Austrian minister in London, xxiv*n*, xxxviii, 26, 46, 63, 67, 74, 81, 89.
Wassenaer-Twickel, Count, Dutch envoy to France, xxxiv, xxxv, 54, 56, 67*n*, 89, 120 and *n*, 127, 133.
Weissenfels, Saxe-, Duke of, 49 and *n*.
Whigs, xviii, 20, 41, 44, 114, 122; their tradition in foreign policy, x, xiv, xxv.
William III, King, x, xiv.
Williams, Sir Watkin, 40, 44.
Winchilsea, Earl of, 45, 51.
Winnington, Thomas, xxxv, 110 and *n*; death of, 111*n*, 137*n*.
Woburn, 136.
Worms, treaty of, x, 30*n*.

Yarmouth, Lady, xxxiv, 115.
Yorke, Joseph, xxiii*n*.

Zealand, 102.
Zöhrern, xxiv*n*, 85*n*.

SHOREDITCH PUBLIC LIBRARIES

SHOREDITCH
PUBLIC
LIBRARIES

Sh[illegible]itch Public Libraries.

RE[illegible]ENCE DEPARTMENT.

Shelf No. [illegible]99 Class Letter 6

Please [illegible] this book to the Assistant-in-charge.

DATES OF CONSULTATION.